terrorism, which he considered a practical means of achieving his foreign policy objectives. He instigated acts of subversion against moderate governments in the Middle East and Africa, he aided “liberation” movements in countries all over the world, and he provided training, arms, and funding for a disparate collection of terrorist organizations. By the end of the decade the United States and other Western governments considered Qaddafi the world’s most notorious champion of terrorism.
The Reagan administration set out to develop a multifaceted strategy to challenge Qaddafi’s illegal claim over the Gulf of Sidra, to contain his subversive activities, and to confront his reprehensible involvement with terrorism. The strategy consisted of diplomatic and economic sanctions, covert operations, and demonstrations of military power. During the first five years of Reagan’s presidency certain elements of the strategy became stricter, bolder, and more assertive. In 1981 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched a covert operation in Chad designed to challenge indirectly Qaddafi’s hold on power. In 1985 the CIA planned to provide lethal aid to Libyan dissident groups in the hope that they would abolish the Qaddafi regime, and the National Security Council (NSC) actively encouraged an Egyptian attack on Libya. In 1982 Reagan ordered an embargo on imported Libyan oil and in 1986 he severed all economic ties between the two countries. During his first year in office Reagan directed the U.S. Sixth Fleet to conduct a large naval exercise near Libya; five years later he ordered the fleet to carry out a series of progressively larger and more complex demonstrations, which eventually culminated in major surface and air operations in the Gulf of Sidra.
The Sixth Fleet exercises vigorously challenged Libya’s claim over the Gulf of Sidra and forcefully demonstrated the will of the American people in the struggle against Libyan terrorism. In August 1981 and March 1986 Qaddafi attempted to strengthen his illegal claim to the gulf with military force. In each instance the fleet defended itself and answered Qaddafi’s challenge with a stern rebuke. To avenge his humiliating defeat in March 1986 Qaddafi ordered several terrorist operations against American citizens and interests overseas. In early April his agents carried out the deadly attack on La Belle discothèque in West Berlin.
Ironically, for about two years Reagan’s Libya strategy seemed to have a quieting effect on Qaddafi but, by 1984, the Libyan dictator was linked to several notorious acts of subversion, terrorism, and dangerous mischief. Reagan’s strategy had failed to induce Qaddafi to renounce terrorism and subversion largely because America’s European allies had given the policy little support and rejected certain portions of it outright. Reagan had sought the closure of all Libyan embassies and a total ban on the purchase of Libyan oil, but the Europeans for the most part were unwilling to take those steps. They feared Libyan reprisals and wanted to avoid any action that might threaten their lucrative commercial relationships with Libya. When U.S.-Libyan relations reached a crisis in early 1986, the United States found itself virtually alone in confronting Qaddafi. After the West Berlin bombing Reagan realized that other steps that fell short of military force—diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, and large naval demonstrations—had not produced a noticeable change in Qaddafi’s behavior. Knowing full well that few allies would support his decision, Reagan nevertheless proceeded with Operation El Dorado Canyon. Most of them later criticized his action.
Yet the air strike profoundly affected both Colonel Qaddafi and America’s allies. Qaddafi received the unambiguous message that he could no longer attack Americans with impunity. The allies, on the other hand, sought to forestall further U.S. military action by implementing stronger counterterrorism measures and pledging to cooperate more closely with the United States in the fight against international terrorism.
Several years have passed since American bombs fell on Libya, and the events leading up to Operation El Dorado Canyon and the raid itself have faded from public memory. By 1991 the air strike was eclipsed by several important foreign affairs developments, such as the Iran-Contra affair, a large U.S military commitment in the Persian Gulf during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War, U.S.-Chinese relations following the massacre at Tiananmen Square, the collapse of Soviet communism, the U.S. invasion of Panama, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moreover, it is worth noting that two well-known biographies of Ronald Reagan—President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime by Lou Cannon, originally published in 1991, and Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan by Edmund Morris, published in 1999—each devote only a few paragraphs to the U.S.-Libyan showdown of the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the story of Operation El Dorado Canyon and the events and circumstances leading up to it deserve to be told. On a number of occasions the dispute between Reagan and Qaddafi dominated U.S. foreign policy and, during the first three and a half months of 1986, it was a full-fledged crisis. This book presents a political-military history of relations between the United States and Libya from the beginning of Reagan’s presidency through the aftermath of the air strike, including the development of Reagan administration policies regarding international terrorism and its most prominent advocate, Muammar al-Qaddafi, and the political and economic strategies, diplomatic initiatives, covert actions, and military operations aimed at the Qaddafi regime. During Reagan’s presidency hostilities erupted between U.S. and Libyan forces on four occasions. Therefore, considerable space here is devoted to operational planning, descriptions of military equipment and tactics, and a portrayal of the combat actions that took place.
In recounting the turbulent relationship between Reagan and Qaddafi I have emphasized a number of points. First, developing a comprehensive U.S. strategy toward Libya was a long and difficult process. Many policy decisions took months to achieve because of bureaucratic infighting, disagreements between senior officials, conflicting interpretations of intelligence, and the need to assuage allies’ concerns. Second, despite having a reputation among his critics as a “trigger-happy cowboy,” Reagan refrained from using force in response to Libyan terrorism until he could reliably attribute responsibility for a specific terrorist incident to the Qaddafi regime and until other measures had been given a reasonable chance to modify Qaddafi’s behavior. Third, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force planned and trained for operations against Libya with exceptional skill and precision—often facing short deadlines and working under intense political pressure—and carried them out with extraordinary heroism. Fourth, the Sixth Fleet played an indispensable role in the prolonged confrontation with Libya by demonstrating the advantages of using naval power to achieve and maintain foreign policy objectives without resorting to all-out war or the long-term deployment of military forces. Finally, the air strike of 15 April 1986 was a devastating political and psychological defeat for Qaddafi. It undercut his ability to carry out or support further acts of terrorism, and it convinced him that he could no longer harm Americans without paying a terrible price. After Operation El Dorado Canyon Qaddafi was haunted by the prospect that the next terrorist incident that bore his fingerprints could trigger another armed riposte from the United States. While he did not forswear the use of terrorism, he was forced to adjust his operational methods, which in turn significantly reduced his involvement in the deadly practice. Moreover, the effect of the air strike on Qaddafi, namely the effective employment of military force against his regime, was not lost on other practitioners and supporters of global terrorism.
Certain portions of this book reveal a particular bias of the author. As a retired naval officer I take great pride in describing the extraordinary professionalism and heroic actions of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force servicemen who risked their lives in combat against Libyan air, naval, and air defense forces. I have the highest admiration of and deepest respect for the courage of our servicemen and, in the case of two airmen, their supreme sacrifice. On the other hand, I am not blind to the faults of the Reagan administration and the U.S. military, especially regarding policies that did not serve the interests of the American people and tactical decisions that placed American forces in exceptional danger.
The body of this work begins and ends with a look at Libya. Chapter one contains an overview of Libyan history, an account of Qaddafi’s rise to power, and a description of revolutionary Libya. Portions of chapter seven examine the impact of El Dorado Canyon on Libya’s leader and describe Qaddafi’s attempts to end his country’s isolation in the years immediately following the air strike. The epilogue
