British public opinion would not have supported even a token stand against Hitler. However, further military conversations took place not only between the Navies but between the General Staffs of the Armies and Air Forces as well. The Belgians also attended these conferences. The British promised the French that in case of German aggression, two divisions would be ready to embark in British ports within fourteen days after mobilization. The problem of transporting and escorting these troops was one of the main things discussed, and this joint staff work laid the foundation for joint effort in 1939.
On both these occasions, 1935 and 1936, the French Navy discreetly called back to service, by individual postcards, a few reserve specialists for “a period of training.” When, in 1938, Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland brought on another crisis, the precautionary measures taken by the French Navy were much greater in scope. As early as September all hands on leave were recalled and all ships brought up to full complement. Wartime commands were activated, and even a few preliminary mobilization measures were ordered. The cruiser schoolship Jeanne d’Arc, about to leave Brest on a round-the-world training cruise, took aboard combat ammunition over one side, and, over the other, it took on board cases of fine wines to be served at international receptions. No one knew which would go off first, the guns or the champagne corks! Then came the settlement at Munich, and peace—though for how long, no one had any idea.
These crises, as well as the Spanish Civil War, accustomed officers and crews to living in a constant warlike atmosphere. Flaws which had been revealed in the semimobilizations were promptly corrected—something which brought its reward in 1939, when mobilization was effected without a hitch. The Navy looked upon Munich as being nothing more than a temporary respite, and it vigorously speeded up its programs.
In March, 1939, came the next great crisis when Hitler marched his troops into Prague and “peacefully” annexed Czechoslovakia. This little country had an army 35 divisions strong, and would have provided worthwhile bases for Allied aviation. But its main defenses had been dismantled six months earlier when the statesmen of the West had withdrawn their support—partly because they considered Czechoslovakia indefensible.
Strategically this decision was prudent and wise—perhaps too wise. But such logic did not continue to prevail, for on March 31 Britain and France officially guaranteed the defense of Poland, a country much more remote and more difficult to defend. Thereupon Hitler immediately put forward new claims—on Danzig, this time—and war again seemed inevitable.
Joint British and French staff conferences were held at London on March 31, April 27, and May 3, 1939. The French delegation was headed by Vice Admiral Jean Odend’hal, who later was to represent the French High Command at the British Admiralty throughout the war.
Today, the officers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have daily staff conferences to work toward a common concept. In 1939 no such procedure was in existence, and these prewar Allied planning conferences were indispensable in deciding upon the general disposition of each fleet in time of war, as well as in establishing liaisons, and coordinating areas of command and establishing convoy routes and escort procedures. The Franco-British naval entente had been effected cordially and without mental reservations.
But Poland, trusting in the Allied guarantee, was beginning to inquire urgently what plans were being made to protect her in case of aggression. The British Navy declared—and justifiably—that circumstances did not lend themselves to operations in the Baltic; all that England contemplated was a few bombing raids over Germany. The French default was of the same order. The Army declared that all it could do, as a diversionary measure, was to hurl itself against the powerful fortifications of the German Siegfried line, without much hope of breaching it. The Air Force promised to contribute sixty Amiot type-143 bombers—planes which barely had flying range sufficient to make the trip across Germany to Poland’s westernmost airfields. As these airfields were captured by the Germans on the first day of hostilities, the gesture never had to be carried out.
Regardless of the Allies’ admission of helplessness, and perhaps suffering under the fatuous delusion that Hitler would be deterred by the mere paper guarantee of France and Britain, Poland refused to compromise. A Franco-British military and naval mission hurried to Moscow in an attempt to obtain the support of the Russians, but the Poles did not trust the Russians, did not want them on their territory. And then on August 21 Stalin closed the door in the face of the Allies by concluding a treaty of nonaggression and economic cooperation with Germany, with whom he also had a secret understanding for the partition of Poland.
In the French Navy, as odd as it may seem today, the pact between Stalin and Hitler was welcomed with relief. If French sailors had to fight, they would prefer not to have the Communists as allies.
Morale in the Navy was high. All leaves were cancelled and men ordered to report back to their ships immediately. On August 23 the Reservists were called up. Lookout and antiaircraft defenses were manned. Exchange of liaison officers was arranged: French officers to Malta, Gibraltar, Plymouth, Dover; British to Bizerte, Toulon, Brest, Dunkirk. Sizable naval missions were established in Paris and London. On August 25 a Franco-British signal code, prepared in great secrecy, was taken out of the security vaults and put into effect. Central Mediterranean trade was suspended; merchant ships and fishermen were advised to depart from German or Italian waters as speedily as possible. Even before mobilization a few trawlers were being obtained from willing owners for conversion to minesweepers. On the 30th the convoy and routing sections charged with the wartime dispatching of merchant shipping set up offices in the principal ports.
Little by little, the various wartime commands were activated. At the summit were Admiral of the Fleet François Darlan, Chief of the General Staff of the French Naval Forces, and General Gamelin, the Commander in Chief of the Army, each of them answerable only to the Government. The Minister of the Navy retained only the responsibility of operating the navy yards and maintaining the ships of the Fleet. The Commander in Chief, Darlan, had under his direct control the commanders of the various theaters of naval operations, each one responsible to Darlan for the conduct of all routine operations in his respective zone—convoys, escorts, air reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, etc.—as well as for special operations, for which the necessary ships were assigned to them. Under these theater commanders, in turn, were the commandants of the naval districts, who were responsible for the coastal defenses. As a rule the Commander in Chief reserved to himself the operational control of the high seas forces, the most powerful of which would be the Raiding Force (Force de Raid), under Admiral Marcel Gensoul. This force, to be set up on mobilization, consisted of the battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, the aircraft carrier Béarn, and some ten cruisers or super-destroyers.
In accordance with the war plan, the principal subordinates of the Commander in Chief were as follows: in the Mediterranean, Admiral, South (Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva), with headquarters at Toulon—or, in case of war with Italy, at Bizerte; in the North Atlantic, Admiral, West (Admiral Jean de Laborde), with headquarters at Brest; in the English Channel and North Sea, Admiral, North (Admiral Raoul Castex at first, and later Admiral Jean Abrial), with headquarters at Dunkirk; in the Far East, Admiral, French Naval Forces, Far East (Admiral Jean Decoux), with headquarters on board the Lamotte-Picquet, usually at Saigon; in the Caribbean Sea, Admiral, Antilles (Admiral George Robert), with headquarters at Martinique. Early in the war another theater commander, Admiral, Africa (Admiral Emmanuel Ollive), was established, with headquarters at Casablanca and with an operational zone reaching from Gibraltar to Dakar, and extending westward to include the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands.
Such was the worldwide extent of the French naval establishment, yet the organization was simple, adaptable, and efficient. It relieved the Commander in Chief of routine chores, it gave him time to think, and it allowed him to devote his attention to the global concept of a war at sea.
All tourists familiar with Paris know the Ministry of the Navy, that beautiful colonnaded building which borders the Place de la Concorde to the east
