brought us special advantages which other less favored authors might not have been in a position to obtain.
We realize that, in explaining events and in evaluating their effects, one may well arrive at opinions different from those we have reached. We believe that, as with all human endeavors, this one is not perfect and perhaps constitutes only a step toward an understanding of what took place. At least we are certain that we have never knowingly distorted the truth, and we hope that, by supplying the reader with facts he might not have known, our book will enable him to appraise at its high worth the service record, so often misunderstood, of the French Navy during World War II.
PAUL AUPHAN
Rear Admiral, French Navy (Retired)
JACQUES MORDAL
Villefranche de Rouergue—Paris
October 15, 1957
The collapse of France in 1940 was a tragedy, not only for the nation, but for the Navy, the personnel of which—particularly those outside of France—were faced with the necessity of making agonizing decisions. No matter what course they took, or whether or not we agreed with them at the time, I feel that the majority of French naval officers and men must be given credit for pursuing what they felt to be their duty. It is hard to put one’s self in their shoes. Our own Civil War was the cause of great sectional bitterness, which has been long in dying out. Even greater, in my opinion, have been the schisms and divergences of opinion produced in France by the unfortunate events of the last war—rifts which not only continue but which have had much to do with the difficult position in which France now finds herself.
The French Navy in World War II is believed to be the first complete account of French naval activities during the Second World War. It should constitute a valuable historical record, revealing many facts never before published. It covers the story of the French Navy before the Armistice, the Free French Naval Forces, the Vichy French Navy, the new “National Navy” formed under the Provisional Government in North Africa after the Allied landings in 1942, and the activities of the French naval personnel who remained in France after the total occupation of that country in November 1942.
The authors, Rear Admiral Paul Auphan, F.N. (Ret.), and Jacques Mordal, were of the category of those who were in France at the time of the North African landings, and perforce remained there, as a result of the Nazi occupation. Admiral Auphan, in the early days of the war, was Plans Officer on the staff of the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Darlan. After the Franco-German Armistice, he became the Director of the Merchant Marine, at Vichy. Thereafter, as Admiral Darlan moved up, Admiral Auphan succeeded him as Chief of Naval Operations and Minister of Marine. Jacques Mordal was Admiral Auphan’s confidential assistant in the latter post. Accordingly, both were in unique positions to observe at first hand many of the events described in this book. Each of them is a recognized historian of first rank, with many books behind him, and this work, as a whole, is the result of exhaustive research covering all of the material available to them.
Shortly before the scuttling of the Fleet at Toulon, Admiral Auphan resigned in protest at Laval’s policies and retired to his home, there to engage in underground activities against the Germans. At the same time, Jacques Mordal got himself assigned as Medical Officer to the personnel of the French merchant and fishing fleets operating out of English Channel and North Sea ports, and utilized that position as convenient cover for manifold intelligence activities.
Impartial as I feel sure the authors intend to be, it is almost impossible for a person to avoid some personal attitude toward persons and things with which he has been intimately connected. The understanding reader will bear this in mind. One can agree with many of the opinions expressed herein without agreeing with them all.
For one thing, however much one may disapprove of some of General de Gaulle’s actions, and of those of the Provisional Government under his administration, one cannot fail to honor him and his followers for the courage with which they adhered to their convictions, for their loyalty to the cause which they believed to be right, and for the sacrifices they made in behalf of that cause. But, respect should also be accorded to those others who, conscientiously, felt themselves duty bound to obey the orders of the Vichy Government, and thus, under tragic circumstances, found themselves opposed to their erstwhile allies and to many of their fellow countrymen.
I understand the regret of the authors that the British and ourselves did not rely on Darlan’s word that the French Fleet would never be surrendered intact to the Axis. But I do not agree with their view. That Darlan would have been true to his promise, I now firmly believe. The authors’ statements in this respect are strikingly supported by the testimony of other French naval friends, close to Darlan, in whom I have the utmost confidence. Unfortunately, however, conditions at the time were not such as to inspire confidence on the part of the British, nor, later, of their American ally. With an aging Marshal Pétain at the head of the Government and such men as Laval wielding political power, who could be sure that Darlan, even were he determined not to give up the Fleet, would remain in power? And, for that matter, Darlan himself was suspect, owing to his apparent dealings with the Nazis—dealings which, it is now revealed, had the aim of securing the best possible bargain for France without sacrificing her Navy.
With respect to the seizure of French ships under their control at the time of the Franco-German Armistice, and the regrettable events at Mers-el-Kebir and Dakar, it must be remembered that, from the British side, there was much to justify their actions. A desperate Britain, left alone, but under an unconquerable leader, was courageously fighting for her national existence. She could take no chance whatever of losing her naval supremacy by permitting Axis acquisition of the French men-of-war at Mers-el-Kabir (or Alexandria). As to Dakar, a glance at the map indicates all too clearly what the seizure of that port by the Axis, and its employment as a U-boat base, would have meant. We ourselves, in the Atlantic Amphibious Force, were directed in the spring of 1942 to study plans for the possible seizure of Dakar, in order to deny it to the enemy.
The authors do not conceal their regret that the Anglo-American allies did not see fit to take the French leaders into their confidence with respect to the landings in North Africa, but they themselves recognize that this was not possible. Such a course would have been highly desirable, could it have been determined with certainty just which leaders to trust. But secrecy was vital to success. Had our objectives leaked to the enemy, concentrations of enemy submarines at the points of landing would certainly have resulted in tragic losses, if not in complete failure.
I know that many of our French friends believe that at Casablanca it was the American forces who opened fire first. But, as commander of the Western Naval Task Force, I can state authoritatively that this was not the case. Our orders, to take no hostile action unless resistance was encountered, were positive, and each of our task groups had definite orders to do no firing unless fired upon. As our first boat wave approached the beach at Fedhala, I saw to my delight a searchlight beam go vertical, the signal prescribed in our advance plans that we would be welcome. But shortly the searchlight beam dropped to horizontal and hostile machinegun fire was opened on our boats. Only when I received word from all our task forces that they were being fired upon, did I reluctantly give the code signal, “Play ball!” to our forces to open fire.
As to our attack on the French submarines in Casablanca harbor, these constituted the greatest menace to us of all the French forces. Even so, these were not attacked until their movements after daylight seemed to evidence hostile intent. It is my great regret that it was not possible to prevent the resulting tragic loss of life in combat between traditional friends and allies.
The spirit of the majority of the French Navy after the North African
