was thus—that is to say, by chance—that the French High Command learned of a decision already made of vital importance to the battle then raging, and, in fact, to the future of the whole alliance. When Weygand and Darlan learned of it, through Auphan’s report, they had some rather sharp words to say about the British—not because of the decision itself, which time was to prove was highly correct, but because it had been made unilaterally, and because the evacuation thus made would disorganize the entire defense. When, two or three weeks later, the question of a separate Franco-German armistice arose, it was the opinion of the majority of French leaders that after such a breach of trust and disregard for the spirit of teamwork, France was not required to make a greater sacrifice for the common cause than England had.
At Dover Captain Auphan met Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and Admiral Sir James Somerville, who briefed him on “Operation Dynamo”—the evacuation of Dunkirk—which was already in progress under their direction. Auphan agreed with them upon a plan whereby the French could join the operation without delay. This plan was approved by the French Admiralty the day after Auphan’s return.
Now the requisitioning of the small vessels in the Channel and Brittany ports proved an enormous advantage. Orders were sent out to the requisitioning officers to expedite the program to the maximum. Even so, the British, who had had much more time than the French to set up their program, began complaining that the French vessels were not arriving quickly enough.
On May 28 Rear Admiral Marcel Landriau was designated to command all the small French naval vessels assigned to the operation, which would be called the Pas-de-Calais Flotilla. This short-lived naval force consisted of two super-destroyers, seven fleet-destroyers, six 600-ton torpedo boats, four sloops, some twenty patrol vessels, submarine chasers, or fast motor boats, and a host of miscellaneous small craft—approximately 200. Landriau hoisted his flag on the antiaircraft sloop Savorgnan de Brazza, and proceeded to Dover. At Admiral Abrial’s direction he joined Admiral Ramsay’s force in establishing a shuttling bridge of ships between the English coast and Dunkirk. Although the Royal Air Force provided some protection, mostly the shuttle ships operated without air cover.
As his part of the operation, General Weygand sent one of the generals of his staff to the Armies of the North to order them to counterattack once more. But in view of the inability to stage such an attack, and in light of the collapse of the Belgian front and the withdrawal of the British, all General Weygand could do was to order a general withdrawal of the French also. At 0720 on May 29, he telegraphed22 General Georges Blanchard, General Billotte’s successor, “Fight your way through to the coast!”
Ever since the fall of Abbeville, when the last remaining land wire was cut, all messages between Supreme General Headquarters and the First Group of Armies were handled by the Navy.
However, only a few divisions succeeded in getting through; the remainder sacrificed themselves before Lille in order to cover the retreat of the others.
Despite the speed with which they acted, the French naval operation was always one week behind that of the British. This, added to the fact that the Royal Navy had greater means at its disposal, explains why the French Navy rescued fewer people than its ally. But if Abrial and the Dunkirk defenders had not checked the German attacks for several days, neither the British nor the French would have brought as many men out of the trap as they did.
When the Dunkirk evacuation is mentioned, one thinks almost entirely of the British operation. The two authors of this book, one of whom was at French Admiralty headquarters and the other at Dunkirk itself, were in an excellent position to observe the “magnificent work” and the personal bravery of the British crews,33 who, with their French comrades, rescued from that infernal trap some 338,000 men, of whom 120,000 were French. The British operation is known to the world. What will be attempted here is the account of the French part in that operation.
Extract from Admiral Abrial’s official report.
To evacuate anything at all, it was first of all necessary to hold on to Dunkirk. It would serve no useful purpose to send evacuation ships there if they found the Germans already occupying the wharves and the beaches when they arrived.
The entrenched camp established around Dunkirk by Admiral, North, extended in the main from La Panne and Bray-Dunes to Mardyck, via Bergues. As they fell back, all French forces came under the orders of Admiral, North, as soon as they entered this defense perimeter. Many, however, were not fit for combat. Only the freshest troops were sent to man the lines.
As far as the French generals were concerned, no command difficulties confronted Admiral Abrial, as all had received definite instructions from General Weygand. On the British side, however, the situation was more delicate. A single command did not exist, which resulted in frequent consultations at Government level. On May 31 the Supreme Allied War Council decided, in principle, in favor of Abrial, but then it was too late. Too late also was another decision on that date—demanded by Mr. Churchill as a matter of honor for the British Army—that the British be assigned the rear guard. The British, acting independently, had already taken their dispositions, which often superimposed themselves on Admiral Abrial’s.
When orders are contradictory, incidents are bound to occur. For instance, the British demolition parties wished to destroy immediately certain installations which the French wanted to hold to the very end.
In general, the British undertook to defend the Eastern Sector, while the French took over the Western. In reality, however, by the 1st of June the British rear guard had already been reduced to 4,000 men, and General Sir Harold Alexander, to whom Lord Gort had given this command, made it known that he had orders to withdraw this last contingent on the following night. However, as a result of a decision of the Supreme Allied Council, he actually held on for another 24 hours. Nevertheless, during the last 48 hours—the most critical period of the entire evacuation—the French found themselves alone in manning the defenses of the entrenched camp.
At sea, collaboration was infinitely easier. Even after departure of the last man of the British Expeditionary Force, the Royal Navy, exhausted as it was, continued its efforts for another two days—all for the exclusive benefit of the soldiers of France. That, France will never forget.
Meantime the state of the defense perimeter was precarious in the extreme. The Navy could provide some precious artillery support for that front—four coastal batteries with 164- and 194-mm. guns (not counting the less important batteries), and the two mobile batteries of 155-mm. guns which had fought at the Scheldt and on the Aa. Whenever the enemy came within range, these batteries never stopped firing, notwithstanding intense enemy air attacks and counterbattery fire. When not a single shell remained, the crews destroyed their guns, but continued to resist with small arms alone. Particulary notable was the Third Mobile Battery, under Lieutenant Henri Jabet. After destroying their guns, the crew of this battery, only a few thousand yards from the embarkation points, fought the Germans for every inch of ground during the night of June 3 to cover the escape of their comrades. Jabet was killed in this action.
In the matter of seaborne artillery, the French Admiralty could provide a great deal more support to Dunkirk and the evacuation. Two veteran battleships, the Courbet and the Paris, each with ten 305-mm. guns, were overhauled in 96 hours at Brest, equipped with antiaircraft guns, and sent to Cherbourg on May 28—there to await the Admiral’s orders as “expendable.” It was Admiral Abrial’s intention to use these ships at pointblank range to support a counterattack planned to extend the perimeter of the Dunkirk entrenched camp to the westward, toward Calais. If successful, this enlargement would have greatly facilitated the troop evacuations. Lacking sufficient ground troops, however, the operation was cancelled.
On account of shallow water and enemy mines, the evacuation and escort ships—even those of shallow draft—could not enter and leave Dunkirk by the shortest route. Only two routes existed—or
