a situation that is not resolved via the myth so much as laid out for us to observe. Films also deal with conflicts between basic values (e.g., family versus career or moral conviction versus wealth), usually suggesting that the conflict is illusory and we can really “have it all” (e.g., be perfect parents and have great jobs), at least in the mythological universe. The fact that a tension remains between the myth and the reality we know in our daily lives indicates that Smith may be right in asserting that the conflict remains unresolved (at least after we leave the theater). But myths—and by extension, films—may also be more successful at providing resolution than he is willing to admit. Even if we cannot be perfect parents and perfect career women/men at the same time, as our filmic counterparts manage to be, the model proposed in the film can serve as an ideal to which we aspire, however inadequately, and one that helps us partially resolve the conflict in our daily lives. Similarly, the Christian ideal of self-sacrificial love is seldom if ever realized adequately, but the story of Christ serves as a model that Christians seek to follow—for even though they know that they cannot achieve it, it may inspire them to do more than they would otherwise. Smith’s understanding of the basic incongruities involved with religion will be discussed again in the next chapter, in relation to the concept of ritual, and there I will have occasion to say more on this point.
Doniger’s view of myths can also be applied to films, for although she, like Eliade, views them as degenerate forms of traditional mythology, her analysis of myths applies quite well to films. They are narratives that express some of our culture’s understandings of the basic experiences of sex, love, pain, death, and so on and how we construct meaning in the conflicts surrounding such experiences. Films are also like the Hindu myths described by Doniger that conflate the “reality” of dreams with that of everyday experience, suggesting that the line between the “imaginary” world of myth and our own world is fluid—for films also trade in the “slippage” between the world of the film and the world outside the theater, ever seeking greater “realism” in the viewing experience. In both cases, an alternate reality is proposed that is distinguished from the everyday even while it is related to it, providing a different view of reality that can “correct or complement,” as Geertz puts it, our view of the everyday.
Doniger is only really able to denigrate the myths of popular culture through her assumption that they lack the ability to enforce a moral vision. But honesty compels us to admit that few American religions can truly enforce their moral visions anymore, unless they are part of isolated communities that have strict sanctions on those who violate their codes. The greater degree of freedom in modern American society, compared to earlier ages or other cultures, may be the real reason people of many religious backgrounds can basically do what they want without fear of tremendous social repercussions (as long as they do not violate civil law). There is certainly no reason to propose that films lack a moral vision, for while we may not always find the morality of films to be profound or deep, there are clear moral norms that are upheld in most popular films. This does not mean that characters never do a bad thing or that they are always punished for it, but overall, films tend to support a variety of moral positions that are often repeated: for example, violence is justified when used against tyrants or criminals, family and love are more important than money, and individuals who fight for their convictions should be applauded. These moral messages may sometimes go unrecognized by audiences, but they are there nonetheless in the film as well as in the experience of its reception by viewers.
Finally, Doty’s view sees myth everywhere, from the Bible to popular culture, and so avoids the elitist judgments that distinguish “our” myths from “theirs” or view one as better than the other. This does not mean that he suspends the role of judgment altogether, for he looks to find interpretations of myths that are socially progressive rather than regressive. In this way, he neither rejects popular culture altogether (as “ideology”) nor avoids judgment of it out of a supposed attempt at “tolerance.” In chapter 4, I shall look more closely at the question of how to make informed judgments on religion that are based in an effort to understand rather than on mere prejudice, and I will suggest how this might apply to the study of religion and film as well.
This chapter has sought to critique various ideas of myth in order to suggest that the best aspects of them might profitably be applied to film. The next chapter looks at the concept of ritual and how it might apply to film—and also includes some reflections on the third aspect of the definition of religion, a set of morals, which forms the connecting point between myths and rituals. Myths develop an imaginary view of “that which is,” but this is always linked to a notion of “that which should be”—and this ideal is often enacted in ritual.
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