of a new architecture, new system software and new hardware that let a Macintosh computer ingest, process and output a video signal to scalable video windows and flicker-free 24-bit signal to composite video.
It was hoped Touchstone could be combined with Apple’s upcoming QuickTime system extensions to make digital video more versatile to use and less expensive to produce.
Apple pushed the narrative:
Today, users can pass video across the NuBus, or the Macintosh motherboard, and display it on the monitor using a video card. A video window of 640x480 lines at 30 frames per second is the limit of what the NuBus can handle. Therefore, to manipulate the video in any way such as compressing it and storing it on a hard drive in real time a user would be required to reduce the resolution, make the window smaller or cut the number of frames being displayed.
The engineers had achieved a way to increase the quality of the video image as it was run through image enhancement, compression, digitizing and resizing. The eight subsequent Touchstone patents included work on Apple-designed custom chips and a new architecture called HBus (H stood for high performance).
HBus moved video traffic off NuBus. High bandwidth video information was processed quickly without slowing concurrent operations of the computer.
Touchstone technologies are not necessarily dedicated to one product, a single “super video” card, but will be used in a wide variety of products in different combinations over the coming months and years.
Additional processors or dedicated daughter boards could be connected through an HBus slot which would sit on the NuBus cards. In a significant move, Apple announced that it was to license Touchstone to third parties rather than keep it in-house.
The decision appeared to signal a move away from hardware compression to a software approach like QuickTime. Spokesperson Patty Tulloch:
Apple is concentrating on system software and platform development, and has chosen to offload resource-intensive NuBus development projects to those third parties that have more incentive to bring them to market.
CEO Barry James Folsom of monitor maker Radius saw:
...Touchstone as the “universal common denominator for multimedia developers”.
Radius planned to produce 24-bit Touchstone style multimedia boards capable of capturing and outputting 30 fps video with support for 16.7 million colors.
REELTIME
SuperMac had generated consumer interest at the 1991 Boston MacWorld Expo in DiskFit and ReelTime but it was not positioned to sell software-only products. It decided to sell off the two applications. DiskFit was traded back to the original developer Dantz and ReelTime was ‘shopped around’ to prospective buyers. Steve Blank told the press:
There's a feeding frenzy of companies trying to buy it, but no matter what, we will bundle ReelTime with Video Spigot for the first 90 days.
A short-lived bidding war between Microsoft, Aldus and Adobe Systems ended when the company that had defined, and dominated print publishing on the desktop agreed to buy ReelTime.
Blank told the press that selling ReelTime was like:
...trading away a first-round draft choice.
Having co-ordinated video development between Adobe and Digital F/X during the development of TitleMan and Hitchcock, Tim Myers was well suited to be Product Manager for ReelTime.
I knew enough about editing from my University days and then with our work alongside Digital F/X, not a lot but probably more than most others at Adobe!
He told the press at the time:
Adobe plans to bring the product ‘in line’ with its professional products.
Denise Caruso wrote in her ‘Digital Media’ newsletter:
Adobe plans to add minor enhancements to ReelTime before the initial release. It will be working closely with SuperMac to create versions 1.0 and 1.1. Sources say that the specifications for 2.0 will also be worked out between the two companies. But Adobe will be calling the shots.
First, the product's name will be changed, although the new name is still being cleared through copyright lawyers. Then programmers will write software connections, or "hooks," to Photoshop, Adobe's image manipulation software.
The acquisition was significant for Adobe because it had never released a video product.
For SuperMac, the deal officially signaled its exit from the software market.
Robert Gruttner adds perspective:
I don’t think SuperMac imagined they were losing what would become Premiere, KeyGrip, and Final Cut Pro. It was all about making monitors and video cards back then. Hardware, not software, was the money machine for SuperMac.
Tim Myers concludes:
Obviously, SuperMac had decided to focus on hardware and couldn’t justify further development and support of Randy’s application. Adobe started to get serious about the acquisition. They had experimented a little with video, mainly with PICT image applications and so forth but nothing at this level.
I think it was a combination of feeling that there was a chance that desktop video may take off but they were probably just being opportunistic. ReelTime was a low-risk, low-cost chance to get into video and if it turned into something, great. If it didn’t, not too much would be lost because Adobe was very much a print-focused company.
HITCHCOCK
The acquisition of ReelTime was long planned by Adobe but it came at a time of considerable uncertainty. Avid was doing well but its future was unknown. EMC was still a small player and Digital F/X continued to struggle. Video F/X programmer Michael Olivier recalls:
There was a point when Steve Horowitz and Richard Snee and I had a kitchen table discussion where we all asked, “Where should this product line go?" and we pretty quickly came to the realization that we should be build a low cost ‘Avid killer’.
At this time Avid was selling systems for $50,000-100,000 and we knew it was possible to make a much cheaper system, so we got approval from the Digital F/X leadership to make our Avid killer product.
We 'fired the gun in the air', and took the code base from our existing Soft F/X product and modified it. Our battle cry was to make NAB 1993.
The new product was called Hitchcock.
Steven Horowitz recalls:
We realized then that the Hitchcock product was probably what they (Digital F/X) should
