4 August 1983, soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers from all military services and all units, in a surge of patriotism, have decided to sweep away this unpopular regime – the submissive and grovelling regime established on 17 May 1983, by doctor and Commander Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo, under the tutelage of Colonel Gabriel Somé Yoryan and his henchmen.
Today, 4 August 1983, the patriotic and progressive soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers have thus restored the honour of our people and their army and have given them back their dignity, enabling them to enjoy once again the esteem and respect that everyone, both in Upper Volta and abroad, accorded them from 7 November 1982 to 17 May 1983.
In order to achieve these goals of honour, dignity, genuine independence, and progress for Upper Volta and its people, the current movement of the Voltaic armed forces, having drawn the lessons of the bitter experiences of the CSP, has on this day, 4 August 1983, formed the National Council of the Revolution. This body now assumes state power, putting an end to the bogus regime of the CSP of Commander Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo, who moreover had arbitrarily dissolved it.
People of Upper Volta, the National Council of the Revolution calls on all Voltaics – men and women, young and old – to mobilise and remain vigilant, in order to give the CNR their active support. The National Council of the Revolution invites the Voltaic people to form Committees for the Defence of the Revolution everywhere, in order to participate in the CNR’s great patriotic struggle and to prevent our enemies here and abroad from doing our people harm. It goes without saying that the political parties are dissolved.10
On the international level, the National Council of the Revolution pledges to respect the agreements between our country and other states. Likewise, it maintains our country’s membership in regional, continental, and international organisations.
The National Council of the Revolution is not directed against any country, state, or people. It proclaims its solidarity with all peoples and its intention to live in peace and friendship with all countries, in particular with all of Upper Volta’s neighbouring countries.
The basic purpose and objective of the National Council of the Revolution is to defend the interests of the Voltaic people and to achieve their deep aspirations for liberty, for genuine independence, and for economic and social progress.
People of Upper Volta:
Let us all move forward with the National Council of the Revolution in this great patriotic battle for the radiant future of our country!
Homeland or death, we will win!
Long live the Voltaic people!
Long live the National Council of the Revolution!
Power must be the business of a conscious people
(Press conference, 21 August 1983)
On 21 August 1983, Sankara gave his first news conference as president of Upper Volta to the international press. It was broadcast live over national radio. Below are major excerpts.
Question: Mr. President, 4 August is seen by some as an act of revenge against those who held power after 17 May. How would you portray this action?
Thomas Sankara: I too have heard such analyses. But after all, you have to understand that for some people the Voltaic people’s problem is just a matter of cliques. You have to understand, too, that it is completely normal for some people to view every action as an act of revenge, as taking back and going back, and so on.
We believe that 4 August was simply the logical outcome – the concretisation – of the popular will that you have been able to witness here in Upper Volta. Moreover, we say that all the Voltaics who mobilised in Ouagadougou and elsewhere, after the famous coup of 17 May, did not mobilise just because of Captain Sankara and his comrades, but because of a process to which they were very committed – the process of freeing the Voltaic people. They mobilised so that the people might take charge of their destiny and their development. They fought because they did not accept how the Voltaic people were being pushed around. They fought because the Voltaic people’s interests had been betrayed – a betrayal they could not accept.
If there was revenge, it was the revenge of the people against the forces of reaction, which had taken form around a few men, a few individuals. There was no revenge of one group against another.
Question: Mr. President, is the National Council of the Revolution [CNR] a continuation of the pre–17 May Council of Popular Salvation [CSP]?
Sankara: Yes. We affirm that the CNR both continues the pre–17 May CSP and goes beyond it. It was the pre–17 May CSP that enabled us to link up with the Voltaic people, to get them to express themselves and tell us what their deepest and most sincere aspirations were, to get to know them. This then made it possible to define a policy – that of the CSP at the time – which was to get the Voltaic people to increasingly take power and run it genuinely in their own interests.
As you know, the pre–17 May CSP ended precisely on 17 May – that is, someone, somewhere, betrayed the people. That betrayal took place on 17 May.
Question: Mr. President, in an interview you had with reporters from Carrefour africain when you were prime minister, you said that the CSP was looking for a strategy that would put an end to military coups in Upper Volta. Now that you preside over the destinies of the Voltaic people, do you think the CNR might be the army’s last intervention in the political affairs of the Voltaic state?
Sankara: We hope so at any rate. We are convinced that the best way to limit the usurpation of power by a group of individuals, military or otherwise, is to place responsibility in the hands of the people from the outset. Plots and coups can be perpetrated between factions and between cliques. No lasting coup can be perpetrated against the people. Consequently, the best way to avoid the army usurping power by and for itself is to already have the Voltaic people sharing this power. That is our goal.
Question: Mr. President, many political observers said you were behind the CSP’s coming to power on 7 November 1982. If this was true, why did you not assume the political leadership of the CSP? Could the 17 May events also have been avoided that way?
Sankara: It is really a shame that there are observers who look at political problems as if they were comic strips. There must be a Zorro, there must be a star. No, the problem in Upper Volta is more serious than that. It was a serious error to have looked for one man, a star, whatever the cost, even going so far as to create one – that is, going so far as to say that the person behind the scenes was Captain Sankara, who was supposed to be the mastermind, and so on.
Let me tell you that 7 November has a complex history. There are plenty of episodes to tell about. 7 November gave birth to a government that was quite heterogeneous, with many components and inevitable contradictions. On 7 November all the efforts of my comrades and myself were aimed at preventing the coup from going ahead. Curiously, we were in Ouagadougou only by coincidence. And curiously, we had done everything possible to convince those who had an interest in making 7 November happen to abandon their project. But you understand that not everyone has the same political views. For some, it’s enough to have arms and to have a few army units with you in order to take power. Others believe differently. Above all, power must be the business of a conscious people. Arms therefore constituted only a limited, occasional, and complementary solution.
You should know that on 7 November some well-hidden players were trying to win support for their project, or in any case to achieve their ambitions, by using and exploiting others. These were the people who wanted to put a particular
