in the marketplace of the political consumer. One of the inherent strengths of democratic systems is their flexibility and pragmatism. They enable consensus – that aid is no longer a panacea, that regional integration needs to be promoted, that investing in education and skills is essential – to be implemented and institutions to work.24 Democracy makes politics and policies more competitive, something particularly lacking under autocratic regimes and, to be successful, businesses and economies need a competitive edge. Thus, a ‘benevolent dictatorship’ comes with a cost to potential economic growth.
This argument is reinforced by the poor performance of military regimes. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of military regimes and the frequency of coups have significantly declined. Even though there has been a revisionist literature on the impact of ‘good coups’ in Africa,25 the record of economic management and political violence of the coup era speaks for itself, as African militaries have been worse at managing countries than their civilian counterparts.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the difference in economic performance between those governments in sub-Saharan Africa where the military has abstained from a role in politics (Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia), and those elsewhere where it has been involved since independence.
Figure 2.3: Economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa’s militarisers versus non-militarisers (GDP per capita in constant 2000 $), 1981–2011
Source: World Bank Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&preview=on#
Autocracies are typically three times more likely to have sharp economic declines leading to regular periods of crisis. This volatility is partly, though not entirely, due to autocracies’ greater reliance on revenues from natural resources. Moreover, analysis shows that autocracies are more likely to recede in periods of economic stagnation (i.e. when there is per capita growth of less than 1 per cent). Indeed, this matches a wider pattern – globally, the degree of fluctuation of growth in autocratic regimes is substantially higher. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation over mean) for the autocratic growth rate since 2000 is 4.28; for mixed regimes it is 2.11; and for democracies it is 1.48. In other words, democratic growth has been about three times less volatile than that of autocracies. In practical terms, this means that autocracies vary far more widely from year to year and among one another in their growth than do democracies. Consistency matters in growth and development; such volatility undermines the compounding impact of steady growth.26
As noted above, a key component in democratic reform is the role played by the private sector. Where this is weak, it limits economic opportunity and the potential for job creation needed to help turn around a stagnating economy.27 These periods challenge autocracies’ claims of ‘performance legitimacy’ – or, essentially, legitimacy through delivery despite an absence of human rights – and can lead to more abrupt transitions.
Democracies are more peaceful
The second reason for supporting democracy is that, historically, democracies have proved to be much more effective at resolving tensions and conflict within societies peacefully. Therefore, paradoxically, it is entirely in the self-interest of the leaders of authoritarian regimes to move towards democracy because authoritarian regimes often end violently, with serious consequences for the incumbent. Peace and stability, or lack of it, have economic as well as social consequences, as outlined above.
Before 1990, sub-Saharan Africa had experienced 19 democratic elections, 14 undemocratic or contested elections and 77 incidences of undemocratic regime change. Seventeen heads of state died violent deaths in office or shortly after having been deposed in a coup. The post-1990 reality of the continent is starkly different. Since then there have been significantly more elections. By 2016 there had been 118 democratic elections, 77 undemocratic or contested elections and 34 undemocratic regime changes. Eleven leaders suffered violent deaths in office. When the data is further disaggregated into the most recent Freedom House categories of free, partly free and not free countries, it’s possible to see how different trajectories of regime change affect the levels of freedom within a country.
This should not be surprising. ‘Democracies,’ notes Annan, ‘have far lower levels of internal violence than non-democracies. In an era when more than 90 per cent of wars take place within, not between, states, the import of this finding for conflict prevention should be obvious.’28 Democracy produces orderly changes of leadership. It enables people to be patient for their turn, rather than revert to a coup. In this regard, the 1991 Organisation of African Unity Conference on Security, Development, and Co-operation in Africa identified lack of inclusive democracy as the primary cause of insecurity on the continent.29
A viable democratic dispensation offers the possibility of alternative government, and avoids government complacency.
Finally, and probably the foremost good reason for having a democratic system of government in Africa is that it’s the style of government that the citizens favour. The Afrobarometer Index of Demand for Democracy climbed 15 points in 16 countries surveyed between 2002 and 2012, from 36% to 51%. Seven out of 10 Africans in 34 countries surveyed preferred democracy to ‘other kinds of government’ by 2013. The demand for democracy is strongest in West Africa. Africans also see elections as the best sign of a democratic regime.30 There are good examples, too, where democracy has worked in spite of a difficult inheritance.
Ending coups: A personal reflection on Nigeria, by Olusegun Obasanjo, former Nigerian head of state
The military’s intervention in Nigerian politics in January 1966 went on like musical chairs for 33 years, fouling the political air, causing instability and uncertainty, causing destruction of lives and properties, resulting in a civil war and leaving the country divided internally and isolated externally. This peaked when General Sani Abacha ruthlessly and recklessly pursued his programme of self-succession and life-presidency. Nigeria was impoverished economically, politically, intellectually and culturally. It became a pariah state. Nigerians deserted in droves and sought refuge all over the world. Nigeria was left prostrate. Those who raised their voices were either assassinated or put in jail, myself and my second-in-command as military head of state, Shehu Yar’Adua, included. We were arrested for a phantom coup and sentenced to long imprisonment. But for international intervention, we would have been killed. All the same, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, who was considered the winner of the aborted election of 12 June 1993, died in jail.
The sudden death of Abacha was providential, opening the gates of prisons and political reform, reversing the exodus out of Nigeria. General Abubakar Abdulsalami, who succeeded Abacha, lost no time in releasing political prisoners and created a conducive atmosphere for Nigerian exiles to return home. He also opened the way for another attempt at democratic dispensation. It was in this new democratic experiment that I was persuaded to contest for the presidency of Nigeria.
I joined one of the three political parties, the People’s Democratic Party. Since the advent of the military in the political life of Nigeria, there had been debate on how to put an end to the recurrence and persistence of coups d’état. Coups had become more and more destructive and destabilising. No matter the excuses, they had a major negative impact on democracy, governance and unity of the country. Nigeria needed to put an end to its perpetual coups.
The often prescribed solution of specifically putting a ban on coups in the constitution was not the answer. A coup is treason punishable by death only if it fails, and yet it puts the plotter in the State House if it succeeds. It was a destructive and destabilising practice, wasteful for the military itself, and undermining in terms of discipline, good order and military conduct. A junior officer takes a gun and looks at his political boss and senior officers through its sights, bumps them off and puts himself in the State
