Europe, then in the Americas, then in Asia. It’s when the population goes from a phase where you have many children born and many who are dying. Then the death rate goes down and [some time later] the birth rate follows.’20
Figure 1: UN medium variant population predictions, 2015–2100
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2014 Revision, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/
Between now and 2050, the populations of 28 African countries are projected to more than double. By 2100, 10 African countries are projected to have increased their populations at least fivefold: Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. There is a link between poverty and population growth, where the latter is especially high in the group of 48 countries designated by the UN as the least developed countries, of which 27 are in Africa. Africa’s increases are projected despite an anticipated substantial reduction of fertility levels. The UN’s medium variant projection assumes that average fertility will fall from 4.7 children per woman in Africa (in 2010 to 2015) to 3.1 from 2045 to 2050, reaching 2.2 by 2095 to 2100. After 2050, Africa is expected to be the only major continent still experiencing substantial population growth. As a result, the continent’s share of global population is projected to grow to 25 per cent by 2050 and 39 per cent by 2100.
To highlight the disruptive nature of the population growth that Africa will experience, Figure 2 displays the growth of three countries: Burundi (relatively small), Ghana (a medium-sized country) and Nigeria (the continent’s behemoth).21
Figure 2: National populations in selected years (in millions), 1950–2050
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2014 Revision, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/
Each country’s population will have grown by an order of magnitude between 1950 and 2050. In the relatively short period (by demographic standards) between 2015 and 2025, they will grow between 20 per cent (Ghana), 33 per cent (Burundi) and Nigeria by 31 per cent. Therefore, all three will certainly be radically different in 2035 compared to their populations in 2015.
Africa’s population growth compared to the rest of the world’s demographic decline means that it will be increasingly differentiated by the age of its population. Africa will be much younger than the rest of the world. As The Economist has noted, ‘Africans will make up a bigger and bigger share of the world’s young people: by 2100, they will account for 48 per cent of those aged 14 and under.’22 Or, put differently, 10 of the world’s youngest countries are in Africa.23
Niger is both Africa’s and the world’s most youthful country, with a median age of just 14.8, half the global figure of 29.6 years, a function of a high birth rate and low life expectancy. The average fertility rate in Niger is 7.6 children, compared to a global figure of 2.5, and life expectancy is just 58 years. Uganda is the world’s second most youthful country, and Chad the third, where the median age is 16.
Figure 3: Projected median age of total population in 2050
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2014 Revision, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/
By contrast, much of the rest of the world is ageing. In 2015 the segment of the population over 60 was equivalent to 12 per cent of the global population. At the current growth rates of over 3.2 per cent per annum, by 2050 all major continents of the world except Africa will have nearly a quarter or more of their populations aged 60 or over.
If properly harnessed, and properly planned for, Africa’s population increase and the resultant proportion of so many young people present a tremendous force for change, providing opportunities to fill the resulting labour-force gap. (A similar situation is seen in other parts of the world where ageing populations create an opportunity to provide services for that age group.) Sixty per cent of Africa’s population and 45 per cent of the labour force are under 25, with some 10 to 12 million youths entering the labour market every year. Youth as a proportion of the total population is projected at over 75 per cent by 2015, and is not expected to decline before another generation or more. The World Bank, for example, has estimated that the demographic dividend could generate 11 to 15 per cent GDP growth between 2011 and 2030. But such growth depends on providing improved education and skills, suitable infrastructure and the systems to employ young people, as well as efficient government to make it all happen.
Without such planning and a conducive set of policies for development, there could ensue a demographic disaster and a spur for social unrest and increased migration both within Africa, and to Europe and elsewhere. The choice is in the hands of Africa’s policymakers.
Critically, the large number of young people who will come of age in the next few years will need jobs.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that, in order to maximise its booming population dividend, the continent will need to produce an average of 18 million high-productivity jobs per year until 2035. The surge in young people will necessitate an extremely rapid, possibly unprecedented, rate of job creation. The IMF also notes that over this period policies are required to gradually transition jobs from the informal sector, which accounts for about 90 per cent of the 400 million jobs in low-income sub-Saharan African countries, to the formal sector.24
To date, Africa’s job creation has not kept up with existing birth rates. The African Economic Outlook 2015, for example, reports that only 7 per cent of the continental population aged 15 to 24 in low-income countries had a ‘decent’ job. In African middle-income countries, this figure increased marginally, to 10 per cent.25 Underlining the challenge, the World Bank has forecast that, by 2030, despite major efforts, some 19 per cent of Africa’s population will still live in poverty. Those 300 million people will then represent 80 per cent of the global population living on less than the (2005 equivalent of) $1.25 a day.26
The risks stemming from large numbers of digitally connected youths without jobs are high.27 They are unlikely to sit idly by waiting for change: they will demand it. In the future, increasingly, the political focus will shift to the cities, the youth and to the technologies that they employ.
At the same time, where people live and work in Africa is changing. The countries south of the Sahara, are projected to constitute the most rapidly urbanising region on the planet. The percentage of people living in this region’s cities will rise by 16 per cent to reach a level of 56 per cent by 2050.28 Over this period, some 2.5 billion people will be added to the urban population worldwide, with almost 90 per cent of the increase occurring in Asia and Africa.29 For example, Lagos – which had a population of 1.4 million in 1970, and 5 million in 1991 – will increase to 25 million by 2020, rivalling Cairo as the continent’s most populous city. Africa’s urban growth will far outpace the historical rate of developed and developing regions. While the population of London grew at 2 per cent annually from 1800 to 1910, doubling every 35 years, some African cities’ populations are doubling every 10 years, with growth rates at over 7 per cent annually.30
So far, as will be seen, African urbanisation has not correlated with economic growth on a similar scale to that experienced elsewhere. As the World Bank has put it, African cities ‘cannot be characterised as economically dense, connected, and liveable. Instead, they are crowded, disconnected, and costly.’31 Urban migrants have largely moved from low-productivity jobs in rural communities to equally
