Mbeki wing, or maybe even the SACP or Cosatu? For the most part, even to the eyes of outsiders, there appeared to be tension between the ANC’s internal and external wings. The latter had, by then, returned to the country in great numbers. The overarching goal of liberation united them all, however.
Of crucial significance for the ANC were the supportive masses, a vital building block of ANC negotiation strategy that was shored up by three powerful elements. First, the masses would ensure that the ANC won the democratic election. So, they had to be handled with kid gloves. Their whims, not to mention their years of bottled-up anger, had to be considered continuously. The clarion call was that all negotiation on the peace process had to focus on rescuing the masses from oppression. This permeated virtually every discussion, along with a hefty dose of anti-apartheid bile.
Secondly, the masses were the ANC’s excuse. When the organisation was forced into a corner in a debate, the escape route was to declare that the masses would ‘never agree’ to it. Time and again this proved an effective tactic: a support base of this size could not be ignored.
Thirdly, the masses were there for mass action or violence should the negotiations stall and the ANC not get its way. ‘We will mobilise the masses to put an end to your obstinacy’ was the threat. We could not deny the truth that politicians are there to serve the people. Those who disregard this will always, in the end, pay the price for doing so.
Then, inside South Africa and throughout the world, too, there was a veritable host of sympathisers; they supported the ANC in word and deed and included, among others, the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (later the African Union), the European Union (EU), countless international mega-companies and banks, religious bodies, non-government organisations (NGOs), sports governing bodies, universities … all of whom gave advice and money to the ANC to force the evil Pretoria to its knees.
Africa stood solidly behind the ANC, a continental tsunami bent on freeing Africa from the last bastion of white colonial domination. Until this was done, Africa’s liberation would be incomplete. So, every conceivable form of support was garnered: from military bases for MK fighters to diplomatic pressure and endless provocation at international forums. Some of these countries had paid a high economic price for giving their support, but, in brotherly fashion, they stood shoulder to shoulder in the struggle.
Then, there were those whom we in government circles referred to as the ‘fifth-columnists’: people who came from the bosom of the old order, but had decided to leave the fold – some with much fanfare, others quietly – to give their passionate support to the liberation struggle. They believed in justice and wanted to fight against the wrongs of the past in every way possible. In this process, they often became estranged from family and friends. Many led a lonely life in exile, were reviled locally but believed steadfastly in their moral mission, were ideologically brainwashed, and could talk endlessly. The tragedy is that many of them, after a life of selfless sacrifice, were pushed aside by the ANC, especially during the period of Zuma rule.
Still others came from diverse backgrounds, persuasions, ages and racial or ethnic groups. More often than not, they could not be tackled without wearing gloves; they were often talented and wilful people who defied the existing order, especially if it was based (actually or reputedly) on injustice.
In the 1980s, increasing numbers of people from the elite of the old order began to throw their weight behind the ANC: business people, church leaders, academics, sports personalities, artists, journalists, lawyers … many of them donated money to the ANC, and others gave intellectual support. This also gave the ANC a moral anchor.
The government’s team
Dr Gerrit Viljoen was initially the chief negotiator on behalf of the government and the National Party. However, this good-natured and often brilliant academic had made the transition into the harsh world of politics not with entire success. For example, he could never understand why his colleagues were prepared to stab one another in the back to climb one rung higher on the political ladder.
Sometimes, he lacked sufficient firmness when it was required. For example, he was not man enough to come down hard on Kobie Coetsee, who habitually arrived late at meetings and then wanted to hear everything he had missed from the beginning. Furthermore, he was not careful enough when certain senior officials would take chances and ‘just quickly’ get his signature of approval when he was in a hurry to go somewhere.
On other occasions, his firmness was uncalled for. More than once, he reprimanded officials in a belittling manner, until I issued him with a threatening ultimatum. Officials are not cannon fodder for politicians.
Viljoen’s chairmanship of the Policy Group for Negotiation and the Core Group for Negotiation was of short duration. In May 1992, he resigned due to poor health. His term of office was characterised by a lack of strategic leadership, authoritative decision-making and practical experience.
However, the Core Group presented some excellent strategic arguments on the negotiation process under his leadership, on occasion. Unfortunately, they were not followed through with binding decisions and clear objectives. Key ministers would turn up late for meetings or simply not attend; others would excuse themselves early in the proceedings, with the result that key issues had to be discussed over and over again to give everyone an opportunity to contribute.
The outcome was that the agendas of the Core Group became an illogical and drawn-out business, with the same points being repeated ad nauseam and with no clear direction. Together with secretary Nelius Volschenk, I would sometimes tinker with the agenda in the interest of sharper focus and less repetition, but the government’s planning gained little from our intervention.
President De Klerk appointed Roelf Meyer to succeed Viljoen. Meyer brought specific skills and leadership qualities to the negotiating table. On his appointment as minister of constitutional development, he contributed his talents of heaps of energy, enthusiasm, management insight and engaging human relations. Meyer was easy-going in social circles, a good listener, and well able to grasp the core aspects of challenges and sum them up succinctly for further discussion.
However, for a politician he was not a fluent speaker and regularly struggled, particularly in public and sometimes also in meetings, to express his point of view clearly. As a public speaker, he was unable to convey the government’s negotiation plans successfully. His strong point was smaller discussion groups, in which his personal charm stood him in good stead. He liked to seek compromises; I can recall very few occasions where he took an unyielding stand on a fundamental issue.
There is a difference between being small-mindedly stubborn and taking a firm stand on your considered opinion. Meyer often landed somewhere between these two poles; being ‘lukewarm’ cost him dearly in the eyes of many of his political colleagues who regarded him as spineless and soon began to suspect that he might even be hand in glove with the ANC.
In addition to Meyer, a number of other young agterryers or back-benchers appeared on the scene as newly appointed ministers and deputy ministers. They soon discovered, to their shock, that there was a difference between tending the horses in the background, at a safe remove from the battlefield, and fighting in the heat of battle from the saddle of the foremost horse. More often than not, even the most senior ministers in the De Klerk Cabinet were neither prepared nor equipped to do so.
Meyer and De Klerk appeared to get along well enough, particularly in the early stages of the proceedings. This strengthened Meyer’s position considerably.
Kobie Coetsee will probably be remembered for two things: becoming the first NP politician to meet the imprisoned Nelson Mandela on his visit to the latter in hospital in 1985; and, with his ducking and diving during the negotiations, playing directly into the hands of the ANC. While he was not a member of the government’s active negotiating team,
