in protected towns. The inmates’ houses were burnt and their livestock confiscated. The mortality rate was particularly high and approximately 125 000 people died in the camps. Weyler’s methods acquired a stigma of excessive cruelty.
In 1897 a South African newspaper described his actions as a blot on the reputation of the ostensibly civilised Spanish nation. During the Anglo-Boer War, the prominent Cape politician John X. Merriman wrote in a letter to his mother: ‘What can an Englishman say of our doings in the Free State, burning, plundering and turning helpless women and children adrift in this weather. Doing as Weyler did when he made the reconcentrados in Cuba.’[2]
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Riding but not without resting: Boer forces busy securing one of their camps, or laagers |
Similarly, the influential David Lloyd George said in July 1900 in the British House of Commons that the leadership of the British army seemed to be following in Weyler’s footsteps.
Besides the events in Cuba, other similar trends in warfare can be observed in the war between the United States and the Philippines from 1899 to 1902, when certain civilians also bore the brunt of the conflict.
Therefore, the camps in the Transvaal and Orange Free State were, among other things, part of a broader pattern of the increased professional nature of armies and military affairs. The trend also manifested in other parts of the world, and featured widely in the press. Although the British military leaders did not deliberately base their policy on Weyler’s, they were, nevertheless, generally aware of the direction in which warfare had started moving by the end of the nineteenth century.
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British forces parade in Bloemfontein following their capture of the Orange Free State capital in March 1900, but the first taste of conquest was not destined to be sweet. |
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Far left: Not a veteran of Britain’s earlier colonial wars for nothing, Field Marshal Lord ‘Bobs’ Roberts, commander-in-chief of British forces from January 1900, brought with him past experiences of crushing challenges to the empire in India, Afghanistan and Abyssinia. Left: Anything but a pushover for Britain: the bittereinder general, Christiaan de Wet |
Surrendered burghers and the first concentration camps
After the capture of the republican capitals (Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 and Pretoria on 5 June 1900), the British supreme command believed that the subsequent formal annexations of the republics would lead to the end of the war. They were not prepared for the guerrilla warfare, launched by Boer leaders such as generals Christiaan de Wet, Koos de la Rey and Louis Botha, that was to frustrate the British army for a further two years. However, it was a depleted Boer force that began a mobile war in the guerrilla phase.
Many burghers (republican citizens) surrendered voluntarily: nearly 26 per cent of those who had been eligible for military service at the outbreak of the war and about 40 per cent of those who had been mobilised initially. This was the result of the proclamation of Lord Roberts, the British commander-in-chief, which promised that those who took the oath of neutrality could return to their farms and not take part in the war. This attempt to create division in the Boer forces was one of the more immediate factors leading to the formation of concentration camps.
But events did not go smoothly, and those who laid down their arms came under considerable pressure from both the Boer and the British forces. The Boer forces did not recognise the oath of neutrality and forced these men, known as surrendered burghers or hendsoppers (handsuppers) in popular parlance, to rejoin the commandos. The British were unable to exercise complete military control in many districts and often failed to protect surrendered burghers. Yet they insisted that the Boers honour their oath of neutrality. Being in an invidious position, some burghers rejoined the Boer forces and others tried, under difficult circumstances, to avoid being drawn back into the conflict. The number of surrendered burghers grew as burghers became increasingly war-weary.
The British authorities needed to institute measures to protect and give recognition to those who had surrendered voluntarily. General E.Y. Brabant (commander of Brabant’s Horse, a Cape Colony regiment) realised this and on 13 May 1900 he proposed that Free State burghers be sent to Aliwal North, on the Cape side of the Orange River, because he believed this was an appropriate location in which to protect them.
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A political divide almost as wide as the ocean: left, a defiant group of bittereinder prisoners at Broadwood prisoner-of-war camp on St Helena |
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The home soil of Irene camp for those hendsoppers who had accepted the Crown. |
Sir Alfred Milner, the British high commissioner, supported Brabant’s proposal in principle but had doubts about its feasibility. Roberts had the same concerns and hypothesised that such a decision might actually strengthen the hand of the Boer leaders, who could then convince burghers that they would be sent to the Cape Colony as prisoners of war if they surrendered.
Nevertheless, Brabant’s proposal had great merit for the British supreme command and provided a practical solution for removing these burghers from the scene of the war. Failure to do so might have caused the war to drag on indefinitely, Milner maintained.
Lieutenant General Sir Redvers Buller shared Brabant’s view and suggested that burghers who had surrendered be sent with their livestock to Natal, where they could be accommodated on the unoccupied farms of Natal rebels. By 25 July 1900, one person had been relocated in this manner. But, before the policy could be implemented further, Buller had to obtain the approval of the Natal government, which raised well-founded objections and concerns about the military’s ability to carry it out correctly.
By August 1900, the British military authorities still had no effective way of protecting the Boers who had capitulated. On the contrary, British actions were characterised by futile reprisal measures against those suspected of violating their oath of neutrality. The lack of British protection caused some people to flee to towns and cities under British control. The district commissioners encouraged these people to move, as it was often the only way to protect them. In Pretoria burghers were accommodated in empty houses and received rations of two shillings and sixpence per day. The military authorities also devised a scheme to employ them as municipal workers to offset the rations they were given and enable them to earn money. But the scheme had limited appeal and, despite the distribution of 2 000 notices, only 12 people presented themselves for employment (six of them wanted to work as foremen).
The British authorities could not accommodate all the surrendered burghers in towns and cities indefinitely because of the lack of housing, and the burghers were not allowed to bring their livestock. Consequently, the notion of protection camps received increasing support. If carried out successfully, these would solve the problem of accommodating the burghers. On 23 August 1900, Milner informed Roberts: ‘I think, if once we can make up
