forces deployed around the world and took to maintaining a long-term presence overseas, especially in Germany and Japan. The forward deployment of these forces was based on geopolitical considerations in the post-World War world, and the need to deal with the growing threat of the Soviet Union. This rivalry became more pronounced when the Soviet Union sought to grow its own power projection capabilities through airpower, nuclear weapons, and the development of its own amphibious capabilities. In Dominik G. Nargele’s study of the Soviet Union’s military during the Cold War, he assesses that the Soviet Navy had the largest number of warships in the world with an amphibious lift that included about one hundred amphibious ships with naval infantry specifically trained to conduct amphibious warfare. The Soviet Union looked at having an amphibious warfare capability to protect its core interests in Eurasia by being able to seize choke points and coastal regions from the United States such as the Straits of Denmark, the coast of Norway, and the entrances to the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan.14
While military technology transformed the conduct of war, its application to amphibious warfare changed the balance of power in the international system. No longer was military power monopolized by Europe, but instead resided with America. Bevin Alexander’s study of the United States in the aftermath of World War II reveals that the American republic had emerged as the supreme political, economic, and military power in the world. It not only had 12.5 million people in uniform, but also had 1,200 warships, 2,000 heavy bombers, and a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This power enabled the United States to establish the foundations of a new international system that was shaped by American political, social, and economic values. By creating a new world order in the aftermath of World War II, the United States became the indispensable power on earth.15
The importance of amphibious warfare and its impact on American geopolitical strategy from 1898 to 1945 is a problem today because some political and military leaders no longer view amphibious warfare as either vital to national defense or effective for diplomacy. However, amphibious warfare remains a viable option for the United States and other competing powers in today’s geopolitical environment. In his assessment of America’s geopolitical strategy dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, Henry Kissinger believes that if the United States disclaims its strategic interests, it would only mean more aggressive powers would overrun the world.16 Therefore, America’s continued use of amphibious capabilities, as well as other power projection abilities, would not only shield the Western Hemisphere from outside powers, but also serve as tools for maintaining international peace. Despite the results promised by new technological innovations in air, sea, or cyber warfare, amphibious warfare should not be disregarded as irrelevant. Henry Kissinger points out, “No other society [than the United States] has asserted itself that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual—a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu’s raison d’état [reason of the state]. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such but the method of change, especially the use of force.”17 In fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States will still need to be able to conduct amphibious operations against hostile state and non-state actors because of America’s loss of overseas bases and a national economy that is closely tied with the rest of the world.
It is important to study the influence of amphibious warfare and what it did for America’s geopolitical position because it will provide insight into the reasons amphibious warfare was important back then and why it remains so today. While projecting air, naval, and cyber power against a hostile state might exploit potential critical vulnerabilities to make it change its actions and stance on certain policies, the ability for a nation to land military forces and occupy ground continues to make any country nervous and, therefore, willing to give diplomacy a chance. Colin Gray observes in his understanding of technology that it is simply a waste of time to quarrel over whether or not there is a revolution in military affairs. Instead, Gray recommends that the military should simply accept the appearance of technology, and he considers its usage through a different context geared toward achieving strategic superiority.18 In addition, while airpower, nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, or special operators might be argued to be the only viable, realistic options in the twenty-first century, the fact is that each has its own drawbacks and limitations. Airpower alone could not force the enemy to surrender, as seen during World War II, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Yugoslav Wars. In addition, nuclear weapons are simply too destructive because of the moral, environmental, and humanitarian implications attached to their use, as seen with the Mutual Assured Destruction Doctrine during the Cold War. Finally, cyber warfare is still in the experimental phase with its force projection potential still being explored; special operations are geared toward internal foreign defense and high-value targeting, but are not heavy enough to retain possession of a country, as seen during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
With the twenty-first century well under way and the Cold War over, the United States is slowly reverting to the geopolitical position it occupied at the beginning of the twentieth century: having to operate increasingly from North America and its own overseas territories. The 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy spelled out this reality because while it still advocates for a strong, modern military, it specifically emphasizes the need to work within the world’s international and regional institutions, as well as cooperate with America’s allies and partners. In addition, the national security strategy goes on to state that protecting American interests, resolving conflicts, and promoting global security requires the use of soft power that employs diplomatic, educational, cultural, and economic actions in a comprehensive, peaceful manner.19
While President Obama called for the increased use of soft power with most state and non-state actors, he also wanted the American military to be a tool of last resort and advocated maintaining a strong military at home that is “ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters.”20 Therefore, relying on long-term garrisons and facilities in overseas stations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East is a dangerous, unrealistic course of action. Having withdrawn from two inconclusive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while dealing with significant economic and social issues at home, the United States must reconsider its geopolitical strategy and options. With the Middle East in chaos and with potential hostile state competitors such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea rising up to challenge American leadership, the United States simply cannot rely on options that neither provide enough punch nor send a powerful strategic message, as in the case of air strikes, cyber warfare, or use of special operators. Revisiting history to study how the United States used amphibious warfare in conjunction with technology from its geostrategic base in North America can help the United States prepare for today’s future challenges.
2
Amphibious Warfare Helps Win the Spanish-American War
Establishing the American Geopolitical Base
The United States’ need for a modern amphibious capability did not become apparent until the Maine exploded in Havana Harbor during the Cuban War of Independence, triggering outrage across the United States and demands from the American people for retribution against Spain.1 The months spent attempting to find a peaceful resolution for Cuba’s independence were set aside as both the United States and Spain mobilized for war. According to Howard Jones, “Ideals and reality had again come together in the U.S. decision for war. For many Americans the war with Spain constituted a crusade to free Cuba from Old World oppression.”2
Prior to the Spanish-American War, the United States spent most of the nineteenth century undergoing a period of expansion and maturation that established the foundations of its geopolitical dominance in the world. John L. O’Sullivan, an influential New York City magazine and newspaper editor, states, “[American] national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and
