it among the five of us and, of course, rejected it. And Madiba then, of course, drafted a reply, which we all agreed to. We all helped with the reply and then, of course, he drafted the speech that Zindzi read at a rally in Jabulani.’ If this account is correct, it is instructive to note that Mandela was not the only Rivonia trialist who, in the mid-1980s, started to make overtures to the Botha regime.2
In the meantime, numerous other ‘security prisoners’ quietly accepted Botha’s offer. They included the Rivonia trialist Denis Goldberg, who had been held in Pretoria Central for 22 years. Goldberg was released on 28 February 1985 and put on a plane to Israel where he was reunited with his family. He later worked for the ANC in London, and returned to South Africa in 2002. He was made to sign a document. He said later that he had grown tired of prison, and he knew in any case that negotiations had effectively begun.
3
Tardy ministers and the State Security Council
‘The SSC resolved that certain ministers, after collaboration with one another and with relevant role players … would devise a strategy for releasing, from a position of power, security prisoners from both the right and the left, before Christmas …’
BOTHA’S OFFER of release and Mandela’s response seem reasonably straightforward – a simple binary of action and reaction. However, the Coetsee archive reveals that this was far from the truth. Indeed, key documents in the archive contain some startling revelations that substantially rewrite previous histories of this period.
The first is a top-secret memorandum written and signed by Kobie Coetsee, and addressed to the chairman of the State Security Council (unnamed, but known to have been P.W. Botha). Dated 13 December 1984, it was written in preparation for an SSC meeting the next day. A translation of the complete memorandum follows:
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL: 14 DECEMBER 1984: SECURITY PRISONERS
On 3 December, the State Security Council took the following decision (item 3 of the Minutes):
(a)‘That the relevant ministers, in collaboration with one another and with institutions such as President Matanzima and Chief Minister Buthelezi, will work out a strategy for releasing, from a position of strength, certain security prisoners from the right and left before Christmas;’ and
(b)‘That the Minister of Justice would submit the strategy to the State Security Council on 14 December 1984.’
The relevant Ministers are Ministers Botha, De Klerk, Le Grange, Viljoen and myself. I have consulted the Ministers both verbally and telephonically, and asked them via their staff to submit any inputs to me by Wednesday 12 December. No written inputs have been received. Minister Botha indicated that he wanted to hold more consultations, that he would prepare inputs, and that those inputs would be sent to me by 13 December, failing which they would be submitted to the meeting. [While this was not stated, it is reasonably clear that ‘Minister Botha’ was a reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, an ex officio member of the SSC, and not its chairman, P.W. Botha.]
Officials of the Departments of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs as well as the Directorate Security Legislation have deliberated about the available statutory powers for removing relevant people born in the Transkei from the RSA to the Transkei. The identified possibilities are discussed in Appendix C. To summarise, the conclusion is that no legal authorisation for such a forced removal exists that does not hold serious risks of revision in the Supreme Court, and of possibly being set aside. Such litigation could also bring with its serious political disadvantages, especially as it would involve issues such as citizenship, guaranteed rights, and the removal of persons …
Appendix B contains deliberations about each of these prisoners … with relevant political and security considerations … as well as recommendations about release. Immediate release (that is to say, before Christmas) is only recommended in the case of G[ovan] Mbeki. In respect of Mandela, the recommendation is also positive, with a time scale to be determined either via negotiations with the Transkei and suitable legislation, or the model for Mbeki, based on experience with his release. As far as this person and others are concerned, the question is whether this could be done so that release could hold the maximum advantage and the minimum disadvantage in respect of political and security – so that we will not be worse off after release than we are now.
In formulating these recommendations, I have taken the following into consideration: legal authorisation for removing relevant people to the Transkei …; the contents of the ‘Green Book’ (Total Planning – Book 1 / Policy); the National Intelligence Assessment, which has just become available; the ANC Strategy as adopted by the State Security Council and the draft UDF strategy. Communication and action can only be planned after decisions have been taken.
STAMPED: H.J. COETSEE, Minister of Justice, 1984-12-13
The appendices then follow. Appendix A analyses the eligibility of prisoners in terms of the length of their sentences, their age, and the time spent in prison. Those in category I – prisoners serving life sentences who were older than 65 and had served 20 years of their sentences – include only ‘G. Mbeki, N. Mandela and W. Sisulu’. Appendix B analyses the pros and cons of their potential release in terms of seven categories, namely policy considerations; grounds for release; means of release; political aspects; security aspects; strategy (effectively, the recommendations); and time frame.
In the case of Mandela, no fewer than six ‘possibilities’ are mapped out across all seven categories. Possibility One comprises handing ‘subject’ to the Transkei for detention, either at the full discretion of the Transkei, or on conditions and guarantees approved by the RSA. After citing a host of political and security disadvantages, this option is rejected as ‘not feasible – at least not in the short term’.
Possibility Two comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation to the Transkei, with the legal implication that Mandela’s ‘host’ could deal with him at will. This option, the document says, would only be feasible if the legal uncertainties could be eliminated.
Possibility Three comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation, but preceded by negotiations with the subject aimed at (a) securing his agreement to be released in the Transkei; and (b) an undertaking that he will not make it necessary for him to be rearrested. This is recommended as the ‘second option’.
Possibility Four comprises unconditional release in the RSA after ‘successful negotiations with the subject’, aimed at securing his agreement to do nothing that would make it necessary for him to be rearrested. ‘However, it is doubtful that subject will sign such document.’ As a result, this option is ‘not regarded as feasible’.
Possibility Five comprises unconditional release on the grounds of age; the fact that ‘subject’ has served 20 years of his sentence; as well as requests by black leaders, ‘not because they regard him as their leader, but because they regard this as advisable’. This is recommended as the ‘first option, in tandem with experience in respect of Mbeki’s release. Simultaneously with Mbeki’s release, it could be announced that Mandela was also under consideration, but proof should be provided that this would not lead to unrest – or that such a step could only be taken in a climate of public order.’
Possibility Six comprises conditional release (parole), aimed at restricting ‘subject’. It could include employment, as well as reporting to the South African Police. Negative factors would include continued agitation for his unconditional release, and the deliberate flouting of parole conditions. This would create opportunities for conflict with the authorities. ‘It will not be possible to restrict
