then writes: ‘Why he handed over this task – or whether it was taken away from him – we will probably never know. He was often involved in all sorts of plans and schemes which only he understood. Nevertheless, Coetsee was an intelligent man, and I am convinced that he wanted the conversations to continue, but perhaps he did not have the time or the stamina for it himself.’22
The gloves really come off in the course of three interviews with Padraig O’Malley. In the second interview, in November 1999, Barnard lambasts Coetsee for his role in the problems surrounding the amnesty process. According to Barnard, during the talks prior to the Pretoria Minute in August 1990, agreement was reached on amnesty across the board. However, at the last minute, Coetsee persuaded F.W. de Klerk that this was the wrong approach, and the issue was then omitted from the final formulation of the Minute.
Barnard then goes on to say: ‘To a certain extent … all the difficulties that we to this day have with amnesty were the responsibility of one Kobie Coetsee, who thought that he could think about weird and wonderful ideas. I think when you’re in a process like this and you get an opportunity, you must have a big mind and move as quickly as possible.’
O’Malley: ‘What were his objections [to a blanket amnesty]? This was like wiping the slate clean.’
Barnard: ‘I think that’s one of the issues which one must ask him. He’s a very strange man.’23
However, it’s in his first interview with O’Malley, in September 1998, that Barnard really puts his cards on the table.
O’Malley: ‘You have said that the role Kobie Coetsee played in the process has been greatly over-exaggerated. Could you put that into some context for me?’
Barnard: ‘I will. First of all … he tried to take the line that he was basically the man who had been orchestrating this whole exercise. I think the answer is no. Secondly, if you would have listened to what Mr Botha has been saying, he certainly didn’t command the kind of influence with Mr Botha which he said he did. With a lot of respect, I had to convince Mr Botha, finally, to see Mr Mandela, in person, alone, myself, not Kobie Coetsee, because at the time it was becoming extremely critical and I told Mr Botha in my view if you look at the history of this country you cannot lose if you see Mr Mandela.
‘If it’s a successful meeting and you can lay the foundation for the future political negotiation of this country, you would always be able to say that historic meeting between me and Mr Mandela paved the way, laid the foundation for the present political dispensation in this country, I opened the doors finally, I saw him, I started the discussion. If it is not successful, quite obviously you would be able to take the line, I saw Mr Mandela, it became clear to me that it was not possible to find a solution, I am telling this to the public, I tried, it doesn’t seem to me to be possible, so I cannot help you. So there is only a so-called win-win situation. See the man now so that we can take the process forward …’
At the root of Barnard’s issue with Coetsee, then, was a rival claim to ownership of the secret conversations which laid the foundation for Mandela’s release and, ultimately, his presidency.
Tony Leon, who rose meteorically in white opposition politics from the mid-1980s onwards, and later led the official opposition in parliament for a period of eight years, recalls his experiences of Coetsee in his political biography entitled On the Contrary: Leading the Opposition in a Democratic South Africa (2008). Among other things, it contains a brilliant, often disconcerting, account of the confused and brutal political environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as the often chaotic constitutional negotiations.
He writes: ‘In my capacity as DP justice spokesman, I had got to know Coetsee reasonably well. However, no one (not even his wife, I sometimes suspected) really knew him at all. He seldom revealed his true thinking on matters, and managed to literally smile and wink his way out of many tight corners. However, he was certainly a reformist Justice minister and had the trust of De Klerk. He had been P.W. Botha’s first line of contact with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela, and his close proximity to Mandela and his then wife, Winnie, had also (in my view) led to her under-prosecution for very serious crimes.’24
He then recounts how, to his astonishment, in the course of the constitutional negotiations at Kempton Park, Coetsee leaked to him a draft agreement between Coetsee and the ANC legal negotiator Dullah Omar to the effect that all the Constitutional Court judges would be appointed by the President and cabinet. ‘In other words, the lynchpin of the new legal order would be open to blatant political manipulation, at the level of selection at least, and would simply ape the discredited appointment mechanism of the past. However, this court would be entrusted with far greater and more sweeping powers than any other in South Africa’s history.
‘In terms of the ANC–NP agreement (which I was to learn later, with some stupefaction, had been authored by Coetsee himself), the cabinet, with a likely and hefty ANC majority, and the president, undoubtedly Nelson Mandela, would handpick their own judges! Dumbfounded as I was by the agreement Coetsee had authored and agreed to, I was even more perplexed as to why he was the whistle-blower on his own compact.
‘I later learned that certain of Coetsee’s cabinet colleagues whom he had not consulted before inking his signature to the agreement were appalled at what he had done. He was clearly looking for an escape hatch, and while he would oscillate in all directions over the next few days, blowing both hot and cold on the document, he had apparently decided that I constituted the best getaway vehicle if he needed to resile from his commitments.’
Leon went on to launch a vigorous campaign to overturn the deal, proposing instead that Constitutional Court judges should be drawn from recommendations submitted to the cabinet by a Judicial Service Commission comprising members of government, the judiciary, and the independent legal profession. A political mini-storm ensued, in which Coetsee continued to play an uncertain role.
‘Die Burger, normally the staunchest NP press ally, thundered against Coetsee and claimed in a shattering editorial that his proposal amounted to the “castration of the constitution”. This, and the undoubled internal pressure mounting against him in his own ranks, led finally to Coetsee dropping his legendary equivocation. We were now, finally, on the same track.’
On Wednesday, 17 November 1993, with the midnight deadline for an agreement approaching, negotiations reached a frantic pitch. Cyril Ramaphosa finally agreed that the judges would be nominated by the Judicial Service Commission, and the President could not add any other candidates. More horse-trading followed; at around midnight on Wednesday, 17 November, the ‘much delayed and deeply contested draft constitution was put to the full plenary of the negotiations process, and passed with acclaim’. Leon writes that he felt a sense of relief and accomplishment, and that his ‘fifteen minutes of fame’ were widely appreciated.
The next day, Thursday, 18 November, provided De Klerk and Roelf Meyer with a ‘major hangover’ when, at a 7 am cabinet meeting, senior members of De Klerk’s cabinet, including Tertius Delport, revolted against the terms of the constitutional agreement. A private discussion followed, in which De Klerk aimed to bring Delport and five or six other cabinet members on board. But things got even worse. Delport grabbed De Klerk’s lapels, exclaiming: ‘What have you done? You have given South Africa away.’ Eventually, De Klerk managed to preserve his cabinet’s unity. When parliament met the following week to debate the new constitutional agreement, De Klerk was ‘enraged’ when Leon suggested that the constitutional talks had finally put the lid on the NP’s coffin.
Leon recounts one last, poignant encounter with Coetsee: ‘Towards the end of 1999, I was in Bloemfontein when I received a call from Kobie Coetsee, by then retired from politics and again living in the city. He wanted to discuss a matter with me. We arranged to meet in the VIP lounge at the airport, shortly before my departure
