1940. On the annexation of Łódź, and for more precise details on the Wartheland’s territorial extent and its administrative structure in general, see Marczewski, Hitlerowska koncepcja, 112–16. The German ideological claim to Łódź was further justified by archaeological finds that allegedly indicated an early Germanic settlement; see Furber, “Near as Far,” 557.
91. Decree on the strengthening of Germandom, signed by Hitler, Göring, Lammers, and Keitel, October 7, 1939, BArch R 43 II/1412, 575–77. Reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 176–78; and Moll, Führer-Erlasse, 100–102. As Philip Morgan rightly notes, assignments like Himmler’s were “a good example of standard fascist practice: creating ‘shadow’ fascist bodies” with powers that were inadequately separated from those of the state administration, and which began competing with the latter (Morgan, Fascism in Europe, 133–38).
92. Quoted in Jäckel, Hitlers Herrschaft, 34. Hitler had already become open to relinquishing South Tyrol by late 1922, as reflected in an article in the Münchner Post on his speech of November 11, in which he also abandoned its German populace (Jäckel and Kuhn, Hitler, 728). See also Gottfried Feder’s officially approved commentary on the Nazi Party program, in which the party platform’s first point, namely, the demand to unify all “Germans” into a “Greater Germany,” also listed South Tyrol alongside the Sudetenland and Austria—but only until 1928. In the fifth edition, published in 1929, South Tyrol was no longer mentioned (Broszat, National-Sozialismus, 32–33). The clearest rejection of the claim to South Tyrol, with lengthy argumentation, is ultimately found in Hitler, Hitlers Zweites Buch, 189–215.
93. Aly, Endlösung, 64. On South Tyrol, see Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol, 1: 30–86.
94. August, “Entwicklung des Arbeitsmarkts,” 306–8.
95. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 291.
96. SS Senior Assault Unit Leader Rudolf Creutz to HSSPF Hildebrandt, March 1, 1940, archived in BArch BDCSSO file on Rudolf Creutz; thanks to Götz Aly for this document. See also undated presentation by Greifelt (probably January 1939), Bavarian State Archives, Nuremberg NO 5591, reprinted in Loeber, Diktierte Option, 4–7.
97. On the rivalry between SS Senior Group Leader Werner Lorenz and Himmler, see Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol, 1: 245–46.
98. Ibid., 1: 249–50.
99. Unsigned memo on meeting at office of HSSPF Southeast Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, November 27, 1939, Nuremberg NO 5055, reprinted in Długoborski, Polozenie ludności, 139; see also Aly, Endlösung, 64; Umbreit, “Auf dem Weg,” 125; Longerich, Heinrich Himmler, 434–37.
100. Himmler to Lorenz, Heydrich, Forster, Greiser, et al., October 11, 1939, Nuremberg NO 4613.
101. Decree on the strengthening of Germandom, signed by Hitler, Göring, Lammers, and Keitel, October 7, 1939, BArch R 43 II/1412, 575–77. Reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 176–78; Moll, Führer-Erlasse, 100–102.
102. Himmler’s first directive as RKFDV, undated (probably signed on October 17, 1939), Nuremberg NO 3078. On this dating, see Koehl, RKFDV, 56. See also Stuhlpfarrer, Umsiedlung Südtirol, 1: 251.
103. Chief of the Security Police and the SD to top-level Reich authorities, BArch R 43 II/1412, 55; Heydrich to top-level Reich authorities, October 13, 1939, BArch R 3001/20043, 1. See also Koehl, RKFDV, 54; Koehl, Black Corps, 187–88; Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 189–92; Leniger, Nationalsozialistische Volkstumsarbeit, 148–51. On the RKFDV, see Stiller, “Reichskommissar.” On the EWZ, see Strippel, NS-Volkstumspolitik.
104. Himmler’s first directive as RKFDV, undated (probably signed on October 17, 1939), Nuremberg NO 3078.
105. Umbreit, “Auf dem Weg,” 6. Umbreit does not explore the remarkable parallels between this instituting of the CdZ (which did not significantly change thereafter) and the Reich Interior Ministry’s plans for the future structuring of the occupation administration in Poland.
106. See Hess to Lammers, October 25, 1939, quoted in Stelbrink, Preußischer Landrat, 167.
107. Here, see particularly Frick’s “second directive for implementing the decree of the Führer and Chancellor on the subdivision and administration of the eastern territories,” November 2, 1939, reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 89–92; also Frick’s decree of December 27, 1939, reprinted in ibid., 92–95. Exceptions were made for the territories annexed to the provinces of Silesia and East Prussia. See also the legislation on the structuring of the administration in the Reichsgau of the Sudetenland, April 14, 1939, reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 84–86.
108. Sommer to Stuckart, October 11, 1939, BArch R 1501/5401, 73.
109. Stelbrink, Preußischer Landrat, 103–11; also Pohl, “Reichsgaue Danzig-Westpreußen und Wartheland,” 4–5. Pohl also explores the claim, repeatedly found in the relevant research, that a large proportion of the personnel were shunted to Poland for disciplinary actions or other transgressions, or else were particularly motivated by ideology, and he highlights this especially for the Wartheland, see ibid., 7. On this topic in the General Government, see Lehnstaedt, “‘Ostnieten’ oder ‘Vernichtungsexperten.’”
110. Kaczmarek, “Zwischen Altreich und Besatzungsgebiet,” 351; on their enhanced standing, see 351–55.
111. Jansen and Weckbecker, Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz, 61 and 67.
112. Witte et al., Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, 49.
113. Frick’s “second directive for implementing the decree of the Führer and Chancellor on the subdivision and administration of the eastern territories,” November 2, 1939, reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 89–92. See also the appointments of HSSPFs within the Reich itself on August 25, 1939, in Birn, Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer, 13.
114. Himmler’s decree on the organization of the Gestapo in the eastern territories, November 7, 1939, reprinted in Pospieszalski, Hitlerowskie “prawo” okupacyjne, 101–3.
Reinforcing the German Occupation Regime through Population Policy
The Expulsion and Killing of Potential Opponents
The total defeat of Poland, alongside the agreement with the Soviet Union, gave the Nazis free rein on its side of the demarcation line, but also limited it to this.1 Although this dependency on the Soviet Union was conceived from the outset as only a temporary arrangement, it nonetheless helped accelerate the projection of the “Lebensraum” dystopia onto Poland: if this central promise of Nazi ideology was not to be postponed even further, meaning to the time after the “final victory” in the west and the subsequent annihilation of the Soviet Union, then the only opportunity was in Poland.
The “Lebensraum” concept, although previously seen as a utopian daydream even by many Nazis, now became a driving force in conceiving occupation policy. Its political practicability seemed to face no obstacles, at least none that could not be overcome through
