was near. All night long the poor unhappy Moors called on Muhammed to help them, but the dead can neither hear nor succour their vota- ries. In the morning, Stephen de Gama was sent to execute his former orders. He boarded the ship, and, setting fire to it, drove the Moors into the poop, who still defended them- selves ; for some of the sailors would not leave the vessel till it was half burnt. Many of the Moors, when they saw the flames approach them, leaped into the sea with hatchets in their hands, and, swimming, fought with their pursuers. Some even made up to, and attacked, the boats, doing much hurt ; however, most of them were at length slain, and all those drowned who remained in the ship, which soon after sunk. So that of three hundred persons, (among whom were thirty women,) not one escaped the fire, sword, or water." 1
1 GREENE'S Collection of Voyages and Travels, vol. i. pp. 51-2.
INTRODUCTION. li
If this is the same act of piracy recorded by Thome Lopez, which appears tolerably certain, it occurred on the 29th of September 1502. The main incidents are identical, and he dilates with admiration on the gallant defence made by the Arabs, and stigmatizes the conduct of the Portuguese admiral as cruel and barbarous. But as all the unfortunate Arabs perished on that occasion, the case alluded to in Varthema's narrative, wherein several ships are said to have been captured and some of the crews to have escaped, must be a different one, though perhaps both were connected. The desideratum is supplied by Thome Lopez, who, in continuation of his account of the pre- vious engagement, describes, the chase of four Moorish ships immediately after, of which three escaped, and one was stranded, and the capture of two others on the 22nd and 26th of* October following. 1 The six or seven months which elapsed between these out- rages and Varthema's arrival at Aden, would allow time for any of the surviving crews to reach that place, and the coincidence thus established is another striking example of the accuracy of our author's state- ments.
In order to illustrate this still further, it will not be irrelevant to the subject to give a general outline of the political condition of Yemen at that period, referring the reader to the annotations on the text for the corroboration of particular facts mentioned in the course of the original narrative.
During the reign of the more warlike Khalîfs, the
1 See RAMUSIO, vol. i. pp. 136-38.
xlii INTRODUCTION.
turbulent tribes of Yemen appear to have been kept in tolerable subjection; but towards the end of the tenth century the authority of the 'Abbasides became virtually extinct, and the country was divided into a number of petty sovereignties, each assuming differ- ent titles, and exercising various degrees of territorial jurisdiction. This state of things continued till the accession of Salâh ed-Dîn, the first of the Ayyubite Sultans, whose brother Tooran Shah captured Sanaa, the capital of the province, about A.D. 1173, and reduced many of the independent chiefs both in the interior and on the coast to submission. Successive princes of that family continued to exercise a limited supremacy over Yemen long after the dynasty had been superseded by the Báharite Mamlûks of Egypt ; but the country gradually relapsed into complete anarchy until about A.D. 1429, when the government was seized by two brothers of the Beni Tahir, named severally Shams ed-Dîn 'Ali and Salâh ed-Dîn 'Amir surnamed El-Melek edh-Dhâfir, claiming descent from the Koreish tribe, who eventually succeeded in taking possession of Sanaa, and in establishing their joint sway over the southern provinces of Yemen. The capital, however, was soon after retaken by its former governor Muhammed ibn Nasir, and in a fruitless attempt to recover it Salâh ed Din 'Amir lost his life. The surviving brother was succeeded in 1454 by Mansiir Taj ed-Dîn 'Abd el-Wahhâb, on whose death in 1488 the government fell into the hands of his nephew 'Amir ibn 'Abd el-Wahhâb, who was the ruling sovereign of southern Yemen during the time
INTRODUCTION. xliii
of Varthema's visit.1 On the accession of 'Amir ibn 'Abel el-Wahhab the government of the peninsula, according to the author of the Ruah er-Ruah, was divided as follows:— "The Tehama, and Zebid, and Aden, and Lahej, and Abyan, as far as Radaii, were under 'Amir. Sanaa and its districts were subject to Muhammed ibn el-Imam 2 en-Nasir. Kaukaban and its districts under El-Mutahhir ibn Muhammed ibn Suleiman. Esh-Shark, and Edh-Dhawahir, and Sii'a- dah, with their dependencies, were divided between El-Muweyyed, the Sherîfs of the Al el-Mansur, and the Imam el-Mansiir, Muhammed ibn 'Ali es-Seraji el-Washli."
1 He mentions him by name as " Sechamir" or Sheikh Amir. See p. 83.
In a religious sense, this title ordinarily designates the leader of the services in the Mosque, and as the Khalifs were recognized as spiritual as well as temporal presidents, they early adopted it. When the authority of the 'Abbasides declined in Yemen, it was assumed by the regents at Sanaa, who moreover usurped that of Amir el-Mu 'amanin, or Lord of the Faithful. In course of time, however, other rulers of Yemen seem to have called themselves "Imam ;" so that eventually it came to signify nothing more than a presiding prince, or one having authority over subordinate chiefs. At the present day, it would be difficult to trace the right of bear- ing the distinction to lineal descent; in fact, those who now use it in Yemen cannot lay claim to it on that score. On the other hand, in 'Amman it appears to have been conferred, by the general consent of the people, for some real or fancied excellence in the person of the sovereign ; and it is remarkable that whereas all the predecessors in the dynasty of the late Seyyed Sa'id bore the ap- pellation, he himself was never so styled except by Europeans, and his successor at Maskat is known only by the title of "Seyyed." I may also add that the title of "Imam" has fre- quently been given to renowned authors, either because they have at some period taken the lead in the religious services of the Mosque, or on account of their acknowledged learning and piety.
xliv INTRODUCTION.
It is easy to imagine, from the bare enumeration of these petty chiefdoms, that the country at this period was in a most distracted state but the genius and military prowess of ‘Amir soon effected a great change. One after another, most of the inland chiefs submitted to his sway, and in A.D. 1501 he made an attempt to capture Sanaa, but was ignominiously repulsed. Determined, however, not to abandon the project which he had conceived of removing the only impediment to his complete ascendancy over Yemen, he two years after collected a vast army, which according to the Ruah er-Ruah consisted of 180,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry, and after a severe conflict entered the capital in triumph.
Comparing the dates given by the Arabian historian with the probable time of Varthema’s arrival at Kadaa, there can be no doubt that the 80,000 troops which he saw reviewed there, and which he tells us marched two days after towards Sanaa, headed by the Sultan, was a portion of the army which shortly after, as has just been stated, succeeded in capturing that city. The coincidence is as perfect as it was undesigned, and the inference substantiates with the highest proof the authenticity of our author’s narrative.
After a similar digression, wherein he describes in detail the arms and military equipment of the Sultan’s army, Varthema invites us to return to his prison. There he would probably have languished for an in-
1 Prisons in many parts of the East arc attached to the palace or residence of the governor.
INTRODUCTION. xlv
definite period but for the intervention of one of the Sultan’s wives, whom he honors with the title of “queen,” who, impelled by various motives, interested her- self in his behalf, and employed her maidens to minister to his necessities. But Varthema, intent on effecting his escape, and reasonably doubtful whether the queen’s liberality alone was likely to promote that object, drew lots with his companion which of the two should feign madness—a stratagem of ancient date, if not of authority. (see 1 Sam. xxi. 13 — 15.)
