target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_9758aae2-aa47-57b5-8ff4-66e789462761">18Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
19James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43; Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29, no. 2 (October 1, 2004): 85–120; and Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 32.
20See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, “We Need to Begin Nation-Building in Syria Right Now,” New Republic, September 24, 2014, https://newrepublic.com/article/119556/obamas-syria-strategy-must-include-nation-building. Jeremy Suri writes that Americans are “a nation-building people” and observes that American’s commitment to building a democratic nation-state at home has ineluctably led them toward nation-building abroad. Suri, Liberty’s Surest Guardian, 1–9.
21By examining reforms within Kosovo, Elton Skendaj also examines institution-level reforms rather than intervention-level outcomes. Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 3.
22See, inter alia, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order; Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
23Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 320. See also Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?,” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 314–40; and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective,” Center for Global Development, April 2005, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.997377.
24Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
25Another group of works offers normative suggestions for what types of institutions foreign actors should build to achieve positive outcomes, including recommending specific electoral systems or suggestions of best practices for what form institution should take. Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics”; Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace; David A. Lake, The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 15–16; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007).
26For example, Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace; and Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building.
27Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, chaps. 3, 4, and 7; Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay, chaps. 4 and 11; and Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruesche-meyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91.
28Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build?”; Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38–39.
29William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007); and Fukuyama, State-Building, 139.
30Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53.
31Michael Barnett, Songying Fang, and Christoph Zürcher, “Compromised Peacebuilding,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 609.
32Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, and Nora Roehner, Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 29. Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker also describe how the divergent interests between the United States and elites in partner countries can undermine security force assistance, but they do not explore in detail how particular local interests lead to different forms of opposition. “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 89–142.
33Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
34Astri Suhrke writes, “[The concept of local ownership] in itself accentuates the external origin of the programmes; local ownership clearly means ‘their’ ownership of ‘our’ ideas, rather than the other way around.” Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: The ‘Post-Conflict’ Project in Afghanistan,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1292; see also Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace & Change 34, no. 1 (January 2009): 3–26.
35For example, Philippe Leroux-Martin, Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Louis-Alexandre Berg, “From Weakness to Strength: The Political Roots of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 2 (2014): 149–64; Stefanie Wodrig and Julia Grauvogel, “Talking Past Each Other: Regional and Domestic Resistance in the Burundian Intervention Scene,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (September 2016): 272–90; and James D. Savage, Reconstructing Iraq’s Budgetary Institutions: Coalition Statebuilding after Saddam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
36See, for example, Berg, “From Weakness to Strength”; and Skendaj, Creating Kosovo. While Skendaj studies specific institution-building efforts, he predicts that building effective state institutions is more successful when international missions “insulate public administration from political
