Patron-Client Networks
2.4Hypotheses for Reforms Threatening Neither and Both Key Interests
2.5Hypotheses for the International Resources Theory
2.6Hypotheses for the Path Dependence Theory
3.1Development of Central Governing Institutions in Kosovo
3.2Development of Central Governing Institutions in Iraq
3.3Results of Public Opinion Surveys
4.1Development of Defense Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
4.2Development of Defense Institutions in Timor-Leste
5.1Development of the Police in Bosnia and Herzegovina
5.2Bosnian Serb or Republika Srpska Resident Responses to Surveys on Police Restructuring
5.3Main US and Iraqi Leadership
5.4Development of the Police in Iraq
5.5Selected Reports on the Size of the Iraqi Police
6.2Recommendations for Defense Reform and Eventual Outcome
7.1Summary of Theoretical Findings of Case Studies
A.1Major International Interventions with a State-Building Mandate after 1990
PREFACE
Improving state institutions in partner countries is an important, enduring, and challenging task for the United States and the international community. Building partner capacity is a key component of US counterterrorism strategy and US policy to deter both Russia and China. Many scholars and practitioners see institution building as essential to ensuring a sustainable peace in post-conflict societies.
A key unappreciated problem with institution building is that foreign missions often propose changes to state institutions that threaten the interests of the elites and the population within the partner country. This book explores how these proposed changes can provoke opposition that can damage the prospects for reform. I show how foreign missions in the mid-2000s in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Iraq repeatedly undermined their own efforts by proposing changes to state institutions that threatened core domestic interests—namely, nationalist goals and patron-client networks. Drawing from my experience working on a RAND Corporation project in 2015, I observe the same problem in Ukraine, where Western recommendations that posed the least threat to patron-client networks ultimately made the greatest improvement to defense institutions. The book concludes that foreign reformers who proposed changes to state institutions that minimize domestic opposition while still making improvements were ultimately able to achieve the greatest progress.
This book is intended for anyone aspiring to reform state institutions in another country, including students of public policy, government officials, military officers working with foreign counterparts, and international development professionals. The book’s case studies focus on reforms of central government, defense, and police institutions, but the suggestion that foreign reformers select their demands or recommendations to limit domestic opposition also applies to other state institutions. Foreign reformers are right to aspire to make partners’ state institutions more effective, accountable, and law abiding, but reformers need to be selective and patient to avoid counterproductive opposition.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to everyone who agreed to be interviewed for this project. I learned a tremendous amount from foreign officials, other scholars and analysts, and, most especially, the unique perspective of local officials. I am immensely thankful that they took the time to meet with me and offer their expertise. I hope that the book is useful to my interlocutors and that anyone reading this book will appreciate the benefit of talking with researchers in the future.
I am also deeply appreciative of Roger Petersen, Barry Posen, and Fotini Christia for their encouragement, support, and honest feedback. I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues who read the work and offered comments at multiple stages, especially Brendan Green, Alec Worsnop, Austin Long, Miranda Priebe, Joseph Torigian, Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Reo Matsuzaki, David Weinberg, Jon Lindsay, Sameer Lalwani, Kristin Fabbe, Nathan Cisneros, and Paul Staniland. Phil Haun offered feedback and assistance at a final, critical stage.
Funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation was critical to getting this book published, and, ten years ago, for supporting some of the original fieldwork for this project. Research fellowships from the US Institute for Peace, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the University of Southern California, and the International Studies Program at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs also made this project possible. Many individuals offered advice and suggestions on this project, and I would particularly like to thank Philippe Leroux-Martin, Louis-Alexandre Berg, Pellumb Kelmendi, Elton Skendaj, Patrick James, Jacques Hyman, Brian Rathbun, Diana O’Brien, Benjamin Graham, Steve Miller, Kelly Greenhill, Mark Waldman, Marisa Porges, Jill Goldenziel, Jonathan Markowitz, and Jenifer Keister.
I would also thank current and former colleagues from RAND who offered feedback, insight, and encouragement, including Lynn Davis, James Dobbins, Seth Jones, Chris Chivvis, Jonathan Blake, Elina Treyger, Irina Chindea, Abby Fanlo, Rachel Tecott, William Mackenzie, Rich Girven, Charlie Ries, Jack Riley, Olga Oliker, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos. Thanks as well to Rebecca Fowler, Agnes Schaefer, John Coughlan, Denis Flieder, and Michele Platt for helping bring this project to completion.
At Georgetown University Press, my thanks to Don Jacobs for taking an interest in the project and bringing this book to fruition. I also thank Elizabeth Crowley Webber for her care in overseeing the production of the final manuscript. And I very much appreciate the comments and suggestions from Roy Licklider and one anonymous reviewer.
I also could not have done this without the love and distraction provided by my daughters, Hattie and Freya. My wife, Sara, read endless drafts at all hours, made me explain myself, and gave me the support to keep going with this project. I cannot thank her enough. My mother, Miriam, kept cheering me on through good fortune and adversity.
I would
