In this chapter, we have seen the differences between several philosophical multiverse accounts, as well as the differences between several different scientific multiverse accounts. Furthermore, we have seen that, while philosophical and scientific multiverse theories may come from different motivations and argue for different kinds of multiverses, the two disciplines do not operate independently of one another, with each side often taking and employing information and ideas from the other for their own theories. The result of this information and idea-sharing is a wide range of divergent multiverse theories, varying in terms of composition, value, makeup and origins, among other things.
Overall, this chapter aimed to present an overview of some of the prevailing multiverse views at work today and to demonstrate not only that there is a broad range of ideas at play but also that these views ought to be given serious consideration when considering the adoption of an ontological view.
NOTES
1. One particular area where this can be seen is in the discussion of actual infinites, which can be applied to whether or not a multiverse can contain an infinite number of universes rather than merely an extremely large finite number of universes. Some examples of work on infinites can be seen in Shapiro (2011), Tapp (2011), and Gabriele (2012).
2. For more in-depth survey pieces or additional discussions and accounts of the philosophical multiverse see Kraay (2012; 2015), Stewart (1993), Draper (2004), Forrest (1996), O’Connor (2008), Parfit (1998), and McHarry (1978).
3. I understand that this may appear to be an appeal to authority, but I make no claim regarding the acceptance of any claims regarding the multiverse. I merely want to point out that there is a substantial amount of serious work being done in the area and that, given that, we should not completely dismiss the idea of a multiverse as entirely implausible and outlandish as some might be tempted to do.
4. Some strategic credit here is owed to St. Thomas Aquinas and his presentation of the Five Ways.
5. See Vaidman (2008), Section 1, Tegmark (2003), Jacobs (2009), Section 2a for more detailed discussion.
6. Which he calls a cosmos.
7. Which he calls simple universes.
8. While his discussion is typically confined to discussion of the fourth dimension of time-space, it is compatible with any larger finite number of space-time dimensions.
9. See Kraay (2010), Section 4.
10. This is essentially taken as an extension of free will theodicy which argues that free will is a higher-level good, but I go the extra step in asserting that it could be the greatest possible good. See Plantinga (1965).
11. As it is in the case of the classical God of Judeo-Christian monotheism.
12. In just the same way as a utilitarian is required to maximize utility.
13. It can generally be argued that the kinds of free choices that free will theodicy values are those that are morally significant, but I make or require no such distinction here.
14. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to each of these as simply being a different “kind” of happiness.
15. For additional scientific perspectives on the multiverse see Smolin (1997), Steinhardt & Turok (2007), Wallace (2012), Linde (2000), Veneziano (2006), Ellis (2011), and Carr (2007).
16. See Linde (1987), Abstract.
17. See Linde (1987), Abstract.
18. This is also touched on by Kraay (2010, pp. 359–60).
19. This will be discussed in chapter 7.
As we have seen, the case that is being made for multiverse theories is in full-force from a variety of different perspectives and motivations and also seems to have a level of credibility and plausibility backing it. Coming from both the philosophical arguments and the scientific experimentation and research it appears that there is a solid case for the existence or, minimally, the plausibility of a multiverse with the only questions remaining relating to the particular construct of multiverse of which we happen to be a part. It seems that this being the case, theists could reasonably be willing to accept the existence of a multiverse as an ontological view. But if this is to happen, what exactly does it mean for the theist? Does adopting such an ontological view harm or hurt him in any way? Is it compatible with his theological beliefs? What are the potential drawbacks for a theist in adopting a multiverse view? These are some of the questions that any theist would have to consider before the adoption of a multiverse account in favor of a single-universe account, and these are the issues discussed in this chapter.
The first section of the chapter outlines several of the difficulties that the theist will have to face and account for in accepting a multiverse theory. Some of these difficulties will not apply exclusively to theists; rather, they will apply to anyone considering the acceptance of a multiverse. With that in mind, however, each problem discussed in this section will be one that has to be faced by the theistic-minded multiverse proponent, nonetheless. The next section details how the theistic acceptance of a multiverse theory that calls for the existence of all possible universes entails a deistic God rather than the God of classical theism. And finally, in the last section, I discuss how various accounts of free will and determinism play out in the multiverse in light of a deistic God, showing how various conceptions and combinations of free will and determinism are compatible with the deistic multiverse theory for which I ultimately argue.
Before beginning, I think it is necessary to define precisely what I mean when I refer to theists or the theistic God. As I want this definition to be as inclusive as possible, it will be quite broad yet still set us up with a conception that is narrow enough to understand, grasp and implement. I will first begin with an outline of the God of which I will be discussing, and then from that, one can take a theist simply as one who believes in the existence of such a God. The kind of God of which I am speaking is the traditional “3-O” God of Judeo-Christian theism, attributing omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence (among other things) to Him. The three “omni” attributes are the most important for our concerns here, so the discussion of God will generally only be taken to be a conception in which these three attributes are essential. Of course, the interpretations of what exactly each of these particular divine attributes entails can be widely divergent but, for our purposes at the moment, the particularities and details of the attributes themselves can be set aside, rather the primary consideration is that God possesses these attributes, regardless of their particular interpretation. To be considered a theist one does not need to practice any active worship of this God, be of a particular denomination or organized religion, or anything of that sort, or even accept the veridicality of any particular scripture. The simple act of belief is enough to qualify some individual as a theist, in this sense. Being a theist is simply an ontological status or view, one that is distinct from any religious practice. While it may seem a bit out of place to discuss the attributes of and belief in the God of classical theism here, given that the overall project being presented makes a case for a deistic God, I feel that such a brief mention is necessary. The adoption of the God of classical theism, at this point, begins with establishing a set of attributes that He is traditionally thought to possess. This is done so that, following the discussion of the attributes of the deistic God that will come to be presented, the reader can reflect and see that the
