and jazz. There are, of course, very different categories of music involved here—categories which Adorno sometimes distinguished between, but often did not […] (Paddison 26).
This analysis points out that Adorno’s treatment of different musical categories indicates a great level of vagueness. My argument is: such a blurred usage of terms can be interpreted as a weakness of his theory, more than once forcing the reader to ask: which category does he mean? His all too loose and relaxed treatment of the musical category of ‘folk music’ exemplifies this kind of doubtfulness, which his theory has to be treated with, particularly when it comes to the work of a folk singer like Joan Baez:
‘Folk music’ as a category increasingly tends in the later writings to blur into a general concept of ‘popular music’ which is itself very hazy, and Adorno sometimes seems to make little distinction between popular songs (Schlager), jazz, and ‘light music’ (leichte Musik) […] (Ibid.).
The fourth chapter of this present study outlines the relevance of folk music, the famous Folk Music Revival of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the artistic role of Joan Baez in this musical movement. It contradicts Adorno’s philosophy, who wrongfully predicted in 1932 that there was no ‘folk’ left anyway (Ibid. 26-27). Baez and other artists during the beginning years of her career up until today falsify Adorno’s predictions about the doubtful existence of folk music. All in all, Baez’s efforts differ from Adorno’s theoretical point of view not only in regard to the falsification of his negation of folk music or the authenticity in the political impetus of popular artists, who are trying to mould the boundaries between art and politics: The most relevant dimension of my doubts about Adorno’s theory is the fact that any kind of theory about society and the question of how to change it for the better necessarily has to stay limited to the passive boundaries of words. This juxtaposition emphasizes the significance which a politically active singer like Joan Baez personifies in the combination of her artistic with her political accomplishments. Adorno harshly (and often rightfully) criticizes problems of society and, all the same, is not willing to do more than write complex philosophical explanations about it.
1.5.2.3 On the Passiveness of Theories
The most incisive juxtaposing element in the comparison of Adorno’s philosophical work with Baez’s work as a singer and activist is that a theoretician always has to stay passive when it comes to criticism towards society. Adorno and his colleagues at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research more than once emphasize the exclusiveness of the work of thought, ignoring the fact that good intentions to change society stay mere intentions as long as they are limited to theory only. Particularly during the last years of his life (which were also the first decade of Baez’s career), Adorno had had to face this kind of dilemma when he came under serious attack from the New Left for refusing to take part in political activities (see also Paddison 11) during the socially troubled times of the 1960s. He and other outstanding figures of the Frankfurt School were considerably confused about this new interpretation of their Critical Theory. Paddison summarizes this kind of confusion and outlines the reaction of Adorno and other devotees of Critical Theory to this political attack:
They had never considered Critical Theory to be a model for political action and were dismayed at the possibility of their ideas providing an excuse for the use of violence to bring about political change (Ibid.).
This kind of defense implies a wrongful and biased position, as it presupposes political activism to always result in violence, dismissing even the option of non-violent resistance—the only kind of revolution Joan Baez has always supported. Adorno is convinced that the only form of active resistance is organized violence. A closer analysis of Baez’s work during the last 60 years, as done in the following chapters, refutes this conviction. A collection of essays about Adorno’s work, which was published soon after his death in 1969, deals with this kind of divergence between activity and passivity. Adorno is quoted from one of his early essays on this topic:
Thinking actionists answer: among other things, it is important to change the state of separation of theory and practice. In order to get rid of the rule of the practical people and the practical ideal, practice is required. This, however, turns into a ban on thinking […]. One clings to actions for the impossibility of action7 (see Adorno in Schweppenhäuser 10, transl. by Jaeger).
Without giving reasons for his accusation that anyone who is active necessarily articulates the mechanisms of authoritarian governance, Adorno claims a radical impossibility of being politically active and separates theory from practice in a totalitarian manner, because, as he puts it, “[…] according to its sheer form, praxis tends toward that which, in terms of its own logic, it should abolish […]” (Adorno 241). This leads to an obvious question: how shall society, which involves the kind of ugliness that also Adorno criticizes, be changed, if no one takes action at all? Another dimension, which can only be hinted at, but should not be neglected either, is the question: to what extent could the modern democratic parliamentary right to vote be considered to be a form of political action? Applying Adorno’s point of view on the primacy of thought over action to the modern democratic parliamentary system would mean to dismiss (or even abolish) one of the most incisive political activities: the right to vote.
The work of thought doubtlessly marks the first condition to influence society—still, can this be enough? Theodor W. Adorno is convinced that we ourselves cling to action just for the sake of action’s impossibility. My reason to reproach Adorno for this pessimistic conviction is that this total negation of the necessity to be active, in order to influence society, offers no alternative to the countless misfortunes in society (injustices, which he, all the same, does not stop criticizing). His obviously depressing conclusion is that all actions were senseless and in this simplifying manner opens an artistic and political debate about the question: if this was true, then why do we need (not only his) theory at all?
The life and work of Baez contradicts Adorno’s passive theoretical assumptions. Two steps are necessary to set the course for a successful analysis of this contradiction: first, a biographical summary of Baez’s childhood and her experiences as an adolescent depicts the most relevant roots of her political and artistic background. The early years of Baez’s life have influenced her impetus as a forthcoming artist as well as her work as a political activist; this is the reason why a synopsis of this significant period is helpful for any further debate. The following sub-chapter about Baez’s childhood offers this kind of synopsis.
In addition to that, a definition and closer analysis of political disobedience and organized non-violence—the most incisive conditions for her work—finishes the theoretical background of my study. Henry David Thoreau and his famous “Essay on Civil Disobedience” can be interpreted as one of the most influential sources of inspiration for Baez; this is the reason why a discussion about this outstanding figure in the cultural history of the United States of America reflects relevant reasons for Baez not to fall into the trap of resignation; an approach which Adorno’s philosophy obviously is based upon. In chapters 4 to 10 of this study, a chronology of when and how Baez took action—with a focus on her position as a singer of national and international renown—then refutes Adorno’s pessimism and verifies my main thesis.
1 Joan Baez, Bowery Songs, Proper Records, 2006.
2 „Popmusiker haben erfahren, daß es in ihrer Macht liegt, sowohl ihre Musik als auch ihre Position zu nutzen, um Kommentare abzugeben, […] große Geldbeträge zu sammeln und den Gang der Geschichte widerzuspiegeln […] so wie es die früheren Troubadoure der Folkmusik-Bewegungen auf der ganzen Welt getan haben […]“ (Denselow 382).
