the case of some religious movements, without necessarily blaming any social actors for the state of things they intend to modify.
However, insisting on the presence of conflict as a distinctive trait of movements need not force social movement analysts away from the investigation of those instances of collective action where a conflict is difficult to identify, such as those oriented to personal change (e.g. the human potential movement, or many countercultural, alternative lifestyle networks) and those focusing on the delivery of some kind of help or assistance to an aggrieved collectivity (e.g., solidarity movements: Giugni and Passy 2001; Brown and Yaffe 2013). This perspective implies, instead, that analysts recognize the presence of several social mechanisms or dynamics within each instance of collective action, and focus their efforts on exploring how such mechanisms operate and interact with each other.
1.2.3 Social Movements, Events, and Coalitions
We have a social movement dynamic going on when single episodes of collective action are perceived as components of a longer‐lasting action, rather than discrete events; and when those who are engaged in them feel linked by ties of solidarity and of ideal communion with protagonists of other analogous mobilizations. Identity building also means that a sense of collective belonging can be maintained even after a specific initiative or a particular campaign has come to an end. The persistence of these feelings will have at least two important consequences. First, it will make the revival of mobilization in relation to the same goals easier, whenever favorable conditions recur. Movements often oscillate between brief phases of intense public activity and long latent periods (Melucci 1996) in which self‐reflection and cultural production prevail. The trust and solidarity links, activated in the European antinuclear movements during the mobilizations of the second half of the 1970s, for example, represented the base on which a new wave of protests gathered momentum in the wake of the Chernobyl incident in 1986 (Flam 1994a). Second, representations of the world and collective identities that developed in a certain period can also facilitate, through a gradual transformation, the development of new movements and new solidarities. For example, the close relationship existing in several countries between different waves of activism has been noted on a number of occasions (Dalton 2008; Grasso 2016; della Porta 2018b).
Reference to other examples of informal networks of collective action, such as coalitions, also illustrates why collective identity is such a crucial feature of social movements. In coalition dynamics, collective actors are densely connected to each other in terms of alliances, and identify explicit opponents, but those links are not necessarily backed by strong identity links. The networks between actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely contingent and instrumental nature. Resource mobilization and campaigning is then conducted mainly through exchanges and pooling of resources between distinct groups and organizations. The latter rather than the network are the main source of participants’ identities and loyalties. Actors instrumentally share resources in order to achieve specific goals, yet do not develop any particular sense of belonging and of common future during the process. Once a specific battle has been fought, there need not be any longer term legacy in terms of identity and solidarity, nor attempts to connect the specific campaign in a broader framework (see e.g. Lemieux 1997, 1998). Of course, nothing prevents a coalitional dynamic from evolving into a social movement one, but it is still important to recognize the analytical difference between the two processes (Diani 2015).
It is worth stressing that associating movements to a distinctive collective identity implies no assumptions about the homogeneity of the actors sharing that identity. We have a social movement identity dynamic to the extent that groups and/or individuals feel part of a collectivity, mobilized to support or oppose social change; that they identify shared elements in their past, present, and future experiences; and that other social or political actors be held responsible for the state of affairs being challenged. Whether a specific collective identity will be inclusive or exclusive, and the degree to which holders of such identity will share one or several traits, is an empirical question (see chapter 4).
1.2.4 Social Movements and Organizational Processes
Social movements have traditionally been compared with political parties and interest groups as different types of political organization (for a classic formulation: Wilson 1973), as well as with religious sects and cults (see e.g. Bromley 2016; Robbins 1988). However, the difference between social movements and these and other organizations does not consist primarily of differences in organizational characteristics or patterns of behavior, but of the fact that social movements are not organizations, not even of a peculiar kind (Oliver 1989; Tilly 1994). They are networks which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on shifting circumstances. As a consequence, a single organization, whatever its dominant traits, is not a social movement. Of course it may be involved in a social movement process, but the two are not identical, as they reflect different organizational principles: “all too often we speak of movement strategy, tactics, leadership, membership, recruitment, division of labor, success and failure – terms that strictly apply only to coherent decision‐making entities (i.e., organizations or groups), not to crowds, collectivities, or whole social movements” (Oliver 1989, p. 4).
Treating specific organizations like Oxfam or Greenpeace as movements does not add very much to the insights provided by concepts like public interest group. Similarly, religious organizations like Nichiren Shoshu or Hare Krishna may be more conveniently analyzed as sects. This concept takes into account the greater organizational rigidity and the more hierarchical structure that these organizations display by comparison with social movement networks (Robbins 1988, pp. 150–155). It also recognizes the higher degree of social control that is exerted over members. In contrast, what both “public interest group” and “sect” do not really capture are the interaction processes through which actors with different identities and orientations come to elaborate a shared system of beliefs and a sense of belonging, which exceeds by far the boundaries of any single group or organization, while maintaining at the same time their specificity and distinctive traits.
To shift the emphasis from single organizations to informal networks allows us, furthermore, to appreciate more fully the space reserved for individuals within movements. Individual participation is essential for movements, and one of their characteristics is, indeed, the sense of being involved in a collective endeavor – without having automatically to belong to a specific organization. Strictly speaking, social movements do not have members, but participants. The participation of the individual, detached from specific organizational allegiances is not necessarily limited to single protest events. It can also develop within committees or working groups, or else in public meetings. Alternatively (when the possibility arises), one may support a movement by promoting its ideas and its point of view among institutions, other political actors, or the media. However, the existence of a range of possible ways of becoming involved means that the membership of movements can never be reduced to a single act of adhesion. It consists, rather, of a series of differentiated acts, which, taken together, reinforce the feeling of belonging and of identity.
If social movements are analytically different from social movement organizations, any organization which is involved in a social movement dynamic (i.e., which fulfills the requirements we have indicated: interactions with other actors, conflict, collective identity, and recourse to protest) may be regarded as a “social movement organization” (Diani 2012; 2015, p. 9). This may also hold for bureaucratic interest groups, and even political parties. By saying that political parties may be part of social movements we do not mean to suggest that social movements is a broader theoretical category in which several type of organizations (interest groups, community groups, political parties, and so forth) are represented as many subtypes. Rather, we suggest that under certain and specific conditions some political party may feel itself to be
