The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen

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The Russia-China Axis - Douglas E. Schoen

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of antagonism between the two nations that lasted until the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, however, the old adversaries came to realize that they had more goals—and more fears—in common than not. Today, three core concerns hold the alliance together:

       • A mutual wish to reduce American influence in Central Asia, where both countries would like to increase their clout—a goal that seems more attainable with the U.S. strategic retreat under President Obama

       • A mutual interest in opposing radical Sunni movements, such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Though these organizations are best known for their opposition to the West, their historical and religious roots make them anti-Shia (Iran is a predominantly Shiite nation) and anti-Russian as well.

       • A mutual desire to oppose and defeat secessionist movements—in Iran, from the Kurds, and in Russia, from the Chechens—and to clamp down on internal dissent against their own regimes37

      Understanding these shared interests is crucial if the United States is to grasp fully why the Russians act as they do. From the U.S. perspective, Iran is simply a rogue regime: It is working to develop nuclear weapons, despite UN sanctions; it is the world’s leading nation-state sponsor of terror, especially of Hezbollah in Lebanon; it is the staunch ally of the Assad regime in Syria; and it oppresses and even kills its own people when they attempt political expression. To be sure, President Rouhani has made substantial headway in dispelling this image of Iran. In pitching a new, moderate Iran, Rouhani told the United Nations General Assembly in September 2013, “No nation should possess nuclear weapons, since there are no right hands for these wrong weapons.”38 He made a sharp contrast with his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who came to New York last year to criticize Israel, deny the Holocaust, and suggest that the 9/11 attacks were the handiwork of Americans. That said, Rouhani called on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons and sign the Nonproliferation Treaty while insisting on Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program.

      The Obama administration has tried repeatedly to get Moscow’s help in increasing pressure on Iran. And although the Russians cooperated at the negotiating table in connection with the November 2013 Iranian nuclear accords, the agreement, as we noted in Chapter 1, is fatally flawed and will do nothing to halt or even hamper Iran’s nuclear program. Benjamin Netanyahu justifiably called the agreement “the deal of the century” for Iran.39 Somehow American negotiators saw fit to allow Tehran to continue enriching uranium and proceed with major components of its nuclear program—centrifuges, weaponization, and ballistic missiles—all while Iran continues to deny access to its military sites, particularly the Parchin base, where weapons work is believed to have taken place.40 Yet the United States is moving ahead with its $7 billion in sanctions relief.

      But the Russians see things differently. For them, Iran is a bulwark against American meddling and influence. Tehran’s intransigence and its challenge to U.S. regional prerogatives force the Americans into enormous expenditures of capital, resources, and diplomatic energies. As Russian scholar Alexei Arbatov notes, Moscow views Iran as a growing “regional superpower” that can balance the power of Turkey and American military and political encroachment in the Black Sea/Caspian region and the Middle East.41 Vladimir Putin also places Iran at the center of American plans to intervene in the Middle East. He believes, according to former Kremlin adviser Sergei Markov, that the U.S. is actually trying to destabilize the region, and he is convinced that the best policy is to bolster Iran and assure its leadership that it will not meet Libya’s fate.42

      The Russian-Iranian relationship has many components. Economically, the two countries have a trade relationship worth about $4 billion annually, much of it military trade. Russia is Iran’s biggest source of foreign weapons, supplying $3.4 billion in arms sales since 1991. The trade has helped Iran modernize its defenses while serving as a shot in the arm for Russia’s military-industrial sector, helping it survive many lean years.43

      Putin and the former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, not only collaborated to protect the Assad regime in Syria, they also worked “to dominate Iraq—Russia, by signing oil and arms contracts; Iran, by bribing politicians and tribal chiefs and maintaining sleeper cells in the Shiite-majority provinces,” argues Amir Taheri. He points out that Iran hosted a Russian naval task force that was making a “goodwill” call on the Strait of Hormuz, through which passes a quarter of the world’s oil. If Russia and Iran together gain the upper hand in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, they could secure “a contiguous presence from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.” All of this would also put more pressure on NATO ally Turkey and weaken the West in the region.44

      But the nuclear alliance is most worrisome. The Russian-Iranian nuclear relationship began in the 1990s, when a troubled Russia began transferring nuclear technology and expertise to Iran. Russian scientists were soon traveling to Iran as part of an extensive, clandestine network, offering the Iranians assistance with missile and nuclear-weapons programs. A mid-2000s CIA report issued this finding: “Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and technology to Iran. . . . Specifically, Russia continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran’s weapons program.” The head of Israeli intelligence accused the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry of using Iran as a source of employment for Russian nuclear scientists and also as a source of foreign reserves, desperately lacking in Russia at the time.

      At the urging of the U.S., Russia scaled back some of its work with Iran in the late 1990s, cancelling a number of technology-related contracts. And as more information came to light about Iranian intentions to acquire a nuclear bomb, Russia became more hesitant—at least in public—about its support. Iranian nuclear engineers continue to train in Russia, but under tighter protocols.45

      Still, it’s important not to miss the forest for the trees here. By the time Russia began scaling back its support of Iran, it had already transferred significant quantities of information to Tehran. The ongoing work at Bushehr proceeds under the older contracts, and the Iranians have accumulated enough expertise to carry it on for years. Moscow trained hundreds of nuclear scientists to operate the plant, despite the urging of the U.S. and other Western nations to abandon the project. Hundreds of Iranians have been trained in Russia.46 The Russian nuclear-energy firm Rosatom operates the Bushehr plant today, supplies all fuel from Russian sources, and recovers all spent fuel, which is processed and disposed of in Russia.47 The Russians have no intention of walking away from Bushehr. If anything, they will expand their presence: Rosatom suggested in May 2012 that it would consider Iran’s request to help construct a second reactor there. In April 2014, Iran announced that it has signed a protocol with Russia to start construction of the second reactor.48

      Just as China’s scolding of North Korea by no means suggests a fundamental shift of policy, Russia’s role in brokering the Iranian nuclear accords should not be read as a serious rupture in the Russia-Iran nuclear alliance, which has endured many bumps in the road. Perhaps the low point came in 2010, when, under President Dmitri Medvedev, the Russians voted for another round of UN sanctions against Iran. But as noted earlier, those sanctions were weak and watered-down at Russian insistence.49 And even this agreement came only with enticements from the U.S., including the lifting of bans on Russian arms exports and an agreement not to block sales of Russian arms to Iran.

      The 2010 sanctions, along with the Russians’ agreement not to sell Iran the SS-20 missile-defense system, represented the high-water mark for the U.S.-Russian “reset.” Since then, and especially since Vladimir Putin retook presidential power in 2011, the Russians have resumed their strong support for Iranian nuclear and military procurement while making only occasional complaints. In January 2011, the Russians did voice disapproval over reports that the Iranians were enriching uranium at Qum. The foreign ministry said that Iran was “continuing to ignore the international community’s demands on dispelling

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