Return to Winter. Douglas E. Schoen

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as the two men sat back in their chairs, barely audible over the videotape, Obama could be heard saying, sotto voce: “Tell Vladimir.”

      Obama and Medvedev were trying to iron out a long-running dispute between the two countries on American plans to deploy a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe—a system that the U.S. conceived mainly as protection against Iranian nuclear ambitions. The United States insisted that the missile-defense shield was intended to counter Iranian nuclear ambitions; Russia claimed that the real target of American missile-defense plans was Moscow. What mostly spooked the Russians about the American plan was the missile shield’s final phase, then in development, which would allow the U.S. to use interceptors to shoot down long-range ICBMs, a core part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Those U.S. plans angered Putin, who saw them as an encroachment on his sphere of influence and a betrayal of his cooperation with the West after 9/11—much as he had seen a betrayal in the American plans to expand NATO. He made clear that he would resist the American missile-defense effort at any cost.

      “When we talk about the missile-defense system, our American partners keep telling us, ‘This is not directed against you,’” Putin said. “But what happens if Mr. Romney, who believes us to be America’s No. 1 foe, is elected as president of the United States? In that case, the missile-defense system will definitely be directed against Russia as it is technologically configured exactly for this purpose.”35 General Nikolai Makarov, who was then Russia’s chief of the general staff, said of the missile-defense standoff: “A decision to use destructive force preemptively will be taken if the situation worsens.”36

      Happily for the Russians, the situation didn’t worsen: In March 2013, just before the Xi-Putin summit meeting, President Obama blindsided them, and American allies, with a unilateral retreat on missile defense. The U.S. announced that it would deploy 14 new missile interceptors on the West Coast or in Alaska, in response to the increasingly bellicose words and deeds of North Korea—but that the U.S. would pay for this redeployment by canceling the last phase of the planned missile shield in Poland and Romania. That last phase, which involved interceptors, had concerned Putin most. Thus the United States, in the absence of any concessions from Russia, had scuttled the most vital aspects of its missile-defense plan for Eastern Europe. (Some GOP senators are urging the administration to reconsider the policy and restart the Bush-era plan for the missile shield, especially in light of the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine.37)

      The announcement illustrated how strategically off-balance the U.S. remains under President Obama. The missile-defense shield had been geared to protect the region against prospective Iranian nukes, which Iran pursues with Russian assistance. There is no sign that the Iranian danger has lessened; on the contrary, it has grown. Thus, the shield is more needed than ever, but with North Korea acting up, the U.S. merely pulled resources from one dangerous area and shifted them to another. This is not leadership; this is lurching from crisis to crisis.

      It’s hard to overstate the magnitude of Obama’s capitulation—one, it’s important to note, that came as a surprise to the Russians, who had no inkling that the U.S. was about to back down. The move telegraphed, yet again, that America lacks a clear strategy and sense of what it is trying to accomplish in the world. Meanwhile, Russia and China show every sign of having clear plans.

      Xi and Putin have moved closer together on missile defense, as they have in so many other areas; their expression of unity on the issue may have been the single most important document they signed at their March 2013 summit. The two leaders pledged to work together while voicing common concerns about the deployment of missile-defense systems around the world. They were talking about the U.S., although they didn’t say so.

      On the surface, the Russian-Chinese statement of concern about missile defense could have sounded like a note of weakness, a futile complaint against American power. It may have been, too, but for Obama’s big announcement a week earlier, making clear just how “flexible” he intended to be. This American and Western “flexibility”—really, an abdication of responsibility—will only make America’s eventual task harder, should we ever wake from our neo-isolationist slumber.

      ECONOMIC COOPERATION

      Among the agreements signed during Xi’s March 2013 visit was a deal to proceed with the Power of Siberia natural-gas pipeline, which would provide energy-hungry China with Russian natural gas beginning in 2017. As part of the agreement, the Chinese gave up to $30 billion in loans to Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil company, in exchange for a massive boost to their supplies of Russian oil. Both sides benefit: Russia obtains the capital needed to finish an acquisition of the British-Russian oil firm TNK-BP, while China secures the fuel source to power its workhouse economy.

      More broadly, both Russia and China play leading roles in the efforts of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) to create an independent international financial structure—efforts that include starting a development bank and pooling their foreign reserves to protect against currency crises.38 Independently, China has expanded its economic reach across not just Asia, where it projects its economic might through investment and trade, but also deep into Africa and Latin America. Russia uses its growing oil and energy industry to increase its state power and international political leverage, especially in Central Asia and Europe. Russia’s economic ties with nations operating against U.S. interests—especially Syria, but also Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea—are broadening.

      NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND “NON-INTERFERENCE”

      The Moscow meeting also included several expressions of agreement on a less specific, but hugely significant principle: what both nations speak of as non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Xi urged China and Russia to “resolutely support each other in efforts to protect national sovereignty, security, and development interests.” At the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, he said, “We must respect the right of each country in the world to independently choose its path of development and oppose interference in the internal affairs of other countries.”39 Those were friendly words to the ears of Vladimir Putin, who has long opposed what he considers internal interference—code language for U.S. involvement in Central Asia and the Middle East. (He shows no such compunction, of course, when it comes to his own interventions.) Now, the Chinese find the concept of national sovereignty amenable as well, given their concerns about American support for Japan in the South China Sea and other strategic concerns in the Far East. It was all part of a broader expression of “strategic partnership” that included support for each other’s territorial claims and goals. In a press conference with Xi, Putin even referred to Japan and Germany as “the defeated powers” from World War II.40

      A WAKE-UP CALL

      In spring 2013, the world braced for a potentially catastrophic war on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s mysterious young leader, Kim Jong Un, was systematically cutting ties with the South, making threatening statements, and preparing a new missile launch. While periodic provocations from North Korea have become almost commonplace over the last two decades, the crisis unfolding in March and April 2013 seemed more severe, and it highlighted how destructive the leadership gap in Washington is becoming for our national security. While the Obama administration seemed to take the Pyongyang crisis seriously, it appears to lack an understanding of the bigger picture—the role China plays here and elsewhere, and the broader challenge all these crises present to U.S. interests.

      There are exceptions to the general lack of understanding. “Chinese behavior has been very disappointing,” said Senator John McCain. “Whether it be on cyber security, whether it be on confrontation on the South China Sea, or whether it be their failure to rein in what could be a catastrophic situation.” Warning that accidental war could break out on the Korean peninsula, McCain blamed China as an enabler of the North Korean regime and its nuclear program. “China does hold the key to this problem,” McCain said. “China could cut off their economy if they want to.”41

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