History of the Inquisition of Spain. Henry Charles Lea

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to this privilege, but in the frequent troubles arising from its assertion, the inquisitors acted with their customary truculence. A writer, in 1609, who deprecates these quarrels, suggests as a cure that the king issue a decree that the representatives of the Inquisition shall have preference in purchasing and, at the same time, he tells of a case in Toledo where a regidor, who told the steward of the tribunal to take as many eggs as he wanted, but no more, was arrested and prosecuted, and of another in Córdova, where a hidalgo, who had bought a shad and refused to give it up to an acquaintance of a servant of an inquisitor, was punished with two hundred lashes and sent to the galleys.[1261] In 1608 the Suprema issued an injunction that purveyors of inquisitors should take nothing by force, the significance of which lies rather in the indication of existing abuses than in its promise of their removal.[1262] The claim of preference was pushed so far that in Seville, in 1705, there arose a serious trouble because the servant of an inquisitor detained boat-loads of fish coming to market, in order to make his selection, and it required a royal cédula of March 26, 1705, forbidding inquisitors to detain fish or other provisions on the way, or to designate by banderillas the pieces selected for themselves.[1263] When we consider the character of the slaves and servants thus clothed with authority to insult and browbeat whomsoever they chose, in the exercise of such functions, we can conceive the wrath and indignation stored up against their masters in the thousands of cases where fear prevented an explosion. It is true that the Suprema issued instructions that all purveyors should behave themselves modestly and give no ground of offence and that no one should be summoned or imprisoned for matters arising out of provisions, but as usual these orders were disregarded. Insolence would naturally elicit a hasty rejoinder which, as reported by the servant to his master, would imply disrespect towards the Holy Office, and severe punishment would be justified on that account.

      Perhaps less irritating but more serious in its effects was the use made of the fuero by those engaged in trade. Inquisitor-general Deza, in 1504, issued a stringent prohibition against any salaried official having an interest, direct or indirect, in any business. Daily experience, he said, showed how much opprobrium and disturbance it brought upon the Inquisition, wherefore he decreed that it should, ipso facto, deprive the offender of his position and subject him to a fine of twenty thousand maravedís; he should cease to be an official as soon as contravention occurred and the receiver, under pain of fifty ducats, should cut off his salary. All officials cognizant of such a case should notify the inquisitor-general within fifteen days, under pain of major excommunication, and this order was to be read in all tribunals in presence of the assembled officials.[1264]

      OFFICIALS AS TRADERS

      The severity of this regulation indicates the recognized magnitude of the evil, and its retention in the compilation of Instructions shows that it was considered as remaining in force. Like all other salutary rules, however, it was slackly enforced from the first and the Catalans took care to have the prohibition embodied in the bull Pastoralis officii. It gradually became obsolete. A royal decree of August 9, 1725, in exempting from taxation the salaries of officials of the tribunal of Saragossa, adds that, if they possess property or are in trade, those assets are taxable, showing that their ability to trade was recognized.[1265] How aggravating was the advantage which they thus enjoyed can be gathered from a Valencia case of about 1750. Joseph Segarra, the contador of the tribunal, entered into partnership with Joseph Miralles, a carpenter, to bring timber from the Sierra de Cuenca. In the settlement Segarra claimed from Miralles a balance of 1779 libras; they entered into a formal agreement to accept the arbitration of Doctor Boyl, but Segarra rejected the award and Miralles sought to enforce it in the royal court. Then the tribunal intervened, asserting the award to be invalid because Segarra could not divest the Inquisition of its jurisdiction and it refused the request of the regent for a conference and a competencia.[1266] Evidently it was dangerous to have dealings with officials; they always had a winning card up the sleeve, to be played when needed.

      As regards the great army of familiars, it was of course impossible to prevent them from trading. In fact traders eagerly sought the position in view of the advantages it offered of having the Inquisition at their backs, whether to escape payment of debts or to collect claims or to evade customs dues, or in many other ways, not recognized by the Concordias but allowed by the tribunals. The Suprema occasionally warned the inquisitors not to appoint men of low class, such as butchers, pastry-cooks, shoemakers and the like, or traders whose object was protection in their business,[1267] but no attention was paid to this; a large portion of the familiars was of this class, and the space occupied in the formularies by forms of levy and execution and sale and other similar matters shows how much business was brought to the tribunals by the collection of their claims.[1268] The opportunities thus afforded for fraudulent dealings, for evading obligations and for enforcing unjust demands were assuredly not neglected and may be reckoned among the sources of the animosity felt for everyone connected with the Holy Office.

      In the remarkable paper presented, in 1623, to the Suprema by one of its members, many of the abuses of the Inquisition are attributed to the indifferent character and poverty of the officials. It would be well, the writer says, to appoint none but clerics, holding preferment to support themselves and unencumbered with wife and children. They would not, when dying, leave penniless families, which obliges the inquisitor-general to give to the children their fathers’ offices, thus bringing into the tribunals men who cannot even read; an increase of salaries, also, would relieve them of the necessity of taking bribes under cover of fees, and thus would put a stop to the popular murmurs against them. The inquisitors moreover should have power of removal, subject to confirmation by the Suprema, for now their hands are tied; their subordinates are unruly and uncontrollable. The greatest injury to the reputation of the Holy Office arises from its bad officials, who recognize no responsibility. No one should be appointed to office, or as a familiar, who is a tailor, carpenter, mason or other mechanic; it is these people who cause quarrels with the secular authorities, for they have little to lose and claim to be inviolable. In short, if we may believe the writer, the whole body of the tribunals, except the inquisitors, was rotten; none of the officials, from the fiscals down, were to be trusted, for all were eagerly in pursuit of dishonest gains, robbing the Inquisition itself and all who came in contact with it, and to this he attributed its loss of public respect and confidence.[1269]

      COMPLAINTS OF FEUDALISM

      Matters did not improve, for the Suprema always defended the tribunals from all complaints, and its tenderness towards delinquents assured them of virtual impunity. At length, as we have seen, in 1703, Philip V made an attempt at reform. It was probably owing to this pressure that, in 1705, the Suprema issued a carta acordada prohibiting a number of special abuses and pointing out that, in regard to the proprieties of life, neither inquisitors nor officials obeyed the Instructions, consorting with improper persons and intervening in matters wholly foreign to their duties, thus rendering odious the jurisdiction of the Holy Office.[1270] From various incidents alluded to above it is evident that this produced little amendment but, when the vacillation of Philip V was succeeded by the resolute purpose of Carlos III and his able ministers, the power of the Inquisition to oppress was greatly curbed.

      It was not alone the commonalty that had reason to complain of the extended jurisdiction claimed by the Inquisition. The feudal nobles, whose rights were already curtailed by the growth of the royal power, were restive under the interjection of this new and superior jurisdiction, which recognized no limitations or boundaries and interfered with their supremacy within their domains. Thus in 1553, the Duke of Najera complained that, in his town of Navarrete, the commissioner of the Inquisition had insulted his alcalde mayor and then, with some familiars, had forcibly taken wheat from his alguazil. Inquisitor-general Valdés wrote to the tribunal of Calahorra to investigate the matter and punish the officials if found in fault; the alcalde and alguazil were not to be prosecuted save for matters pertaining to the Inquisition and this not only in view of its proper administration but because he desired to gratify the duke.[1271]

      A still more serious cause of complaint, to which the nobles were fully alive, was the release of their vassals from jurisdiction by appointment to

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