a collective capacity to discover, such as in the statement “if we find a herd of oxen or a great flock,” and personification as a lion would “discover” a deer or a wild goat (Odyssey 12.300; Iliad 3.24).
Homer also attributes a psychological capacity for heuristic discovery not confined to sensory awareness and uses the term “heuristic” to discuss the capacity of subjective self-awareness. Often, this discovery is in terms of projected emotive responses not associated with “rational” self-consciousness, such as “and they discovered Myrmidons delighting his heart with a clear-toned phorminx [lyre]” or Odysseus, who “discovered” himself sitting in the front hall of his home (Iliad 9.185–186; Odyssey 14.5). The use of “heuristic” in self-awareness and discovery is not limited to reflective self-consciousness. Homer often uses the term “heuristic” to indicate a potential capacity for joy or sorrow and even a concept of the negative as when they “did not find the gates boarded” (Odyssey 9.535; Odyssey 13.43; Iliad 12.120–121). Evidence of the bridge between the physical and psychological sense of “heuristic” is evident in Homer’s passage where the suitors “found the spirit of Achilles” in the sense of its representation as a physical form (Odyssey 24.15).
All of the examples mentioned indicate mortal heuristic capacity for a range of power that extends from its use in the most physical sense to the most esoteric, futuristic modalities of subjective expression. This human techne for heuristics is central to understanding the inventive processes of the discovery and relationship of thought and discourse—that is, the human techne to discover and express complex thought and sentiments. Homer frequently discussed the power or human faculty of heuristics for discourse (heuremena dunamai), and several general modalities of heuristic processes are revealed (Odyssey 4.374, 467; Odyssey 19.157–158). Specifically, Homer discusses the human power to discover and contrive through words. Clearly evident is the idea of appropriate or suitable expression that can be “discovered.” Nestor is characterized as being particularly sensitive to effective schemes for discourse and quick to point out shortcomings, as when he says, “For some time do we quarrel, nor do we have any capacity to discover any contrivance, for all our time here” (Iliad 2.342–343). Nestor’s criticism is a revealing one, for he expects his colleagues to demonstrate a faculty to discover some ability to devise a sign or technique through deliberation to resolve strife (Odyssey 12.393; Odyssey 19.157–158; Iliad 16.472). Language is viewed as an awareness to discover a solution to a problem. This discovery process can not only occur collectively among individuals but even in a self-dialogue, as when Odysseus “took counsel with myself” so that he could invent a solution to outwit the Cyclops (Odyssey 9.421–423).
There is a clear association in Homer with the notion of discovery and the translation of the findings into wily language. Odysseus, with his epithet of “many wiles” stands as an illustration of the human capacity to invent techniques to compose language. Examples of his conniving abound throughout Book Nine of the Odyssey, but particularly revealing is the passage when Odysseus tries to discover some way to “compose all sorts of cunning [plots] and contrivances” when trying to deceive the Cyclops Polyphemus (Odyssey 9.421–423; see also, Odyssey 9.19–20, 33). Odysseus is, in fact, lauded by Homer and proud of his ability to invent and compose devious discourse and is even told explicitly by his colleagues not to “conceal with crafty cunning what you really think but to speak up” (Odyssey 8.548–49). The notion of inventional language as deception would be a central grounding for Gorgias’s Sophistic rhetoric. Here we see the notion of language as a deception of reality invented through human capacity centuries earlier in Homer (see DK 82.B.11. 6, 8, 11, 14).
Homer’s writing reveals a sensitivity to the human capacity to invent discourse and to compose or weave such language for effect. The modalities of this human capacity are present in two types of discourse, eristic and protreptic. The Homeric notion of eristic discourse is taken to be more than the mere symbolization of thought and sentiment but rather the inherent power of the language itself. Eris or strife is a personification and can be god-induced (Iliad 4.440; Iliad 5.518, 740; Iliad 11.3, 73; Iliad 18.535; Iliad 20.48; Odyssey 3.136, 16l). It can also come into being as a result of discord or disagreement, particularly when induced by wine (Iliad 20.55, Odyssey 6.92, 3.136, 20.267, 19.11). It is the human power to create strife through discourse that is particularly revealing here because Homer conjoins the notion of eristics with wrangling. The association of “strife and wrangling” occurs so frequently in Homer that it can almost be classified as formulaic (Iliad 2.376; Odyssey 20.267). According to Ben Edwin Perry, the frequency of such coordinating notions is not only characteristic of Homeric language but is a paratactic structure encouraging the “spontaneous absorption” of notions through a “strung-along style” (4l0–418, especially 412).
The relationship of “strife and wrangling” is important to understand. Homer often combined strife and wrangling. On some occasions, strife provoked wrangling, while in other instances, the opposite happened. Yet, just as Greeks later bonded concepts of the true and the beautiful together, so also did Homer equate strife and wrangling. This coexistence of strife and wrangling forged a unity of reciprocal relationships. Strife, particularly when mixed with wine, induced wrangling, but wrangling also produced strife, as when Athena characterizes taunting words as a “reproachful attack,” or when the suitors are told to “restrain your spirit from rebuke and blows, so that no strife or wrangling may appear”—and they all “bit their lips “(Iliad 1.210–211; Odyssey 20.266–268). In such moments of passion “winged words” are sent to the gods so that no violence can be caused when one is “burning on fire” with rage (Iliad 21.359–361, 368; see also, Odyssey 2.269). For Homer, the concept of wrangling holds no great esteem; in fact, his clearest view of the term is when he has Aeneas say, “to forcibly quarrel with strife and wrangling between us” is “like women who engage in bitter wrangling” (Iliad 20.251–255). While such lowly prattle has no place in a Homeric man’s world, it is clear that manly argument rarely occurs in a climate of quiet, dispassionate reason. In fact, Telemachus tells his own mother the queen that, despite her well-reasoned views, it is not her function but his—and that of men in general—to be the spokesperson of the home (Odyssey 1.356–359).
For Homer, the eristic power of language is bonded with emotion and the possibility of violence. The clearest association with “strife and wrangling” is that violent thoughts lead to violent words and, eventually, violent deeds. Individuals are often told to curb their violent words so that strife and wrangling do not lead to blows (Iliad 1.210; Odyssey 19.11; Odyssey 18.13; Odyssey 20.266–267). Conversely, strife would continue if not for the power of words to thwart it as when Homer writes that “strife would have [protreptically] gone forward . . . had not Achilles spoken” (Iliad 23.490–491). In brief, man has the power to generate strife though discourse, as do gods. Man has the power to resolve strife through discourse, as do gods, and man, like the gods, has the capacity to generate discourse which will create and mitigate violent words and create and mitigate violent acts of “strife and wrangling.” Words can sting or be sweet and their power is often seen in terms of emotive and sensory responses, as when Odysseus says, “your speech has bit my heart” (Iliad 1.247–249; see also Odyssey 8.183–185). To this point we can see that Homeric characters had some concept of an inventional capacity to generate discourse but that this self-consciousness of their “heuristic” capacity produced discourse that was eristic, or emotive-based as well as emotive-directed, by arousing some sort of attitudinal disposition. Odysseus frequently mentions that an individual could or could not “persuade the heart within my breast” (Odyssey 9.33).
Yet, discourse can have the capacity to check a “strong-hearted spirit” and induce “kindliness” (Iliad 9.255–256). Words can have the capacity to “turn” or direct human thought (Odyssey 11.18; 12.381) in a way approaching rationalism rather than in strictly sensual terms, which leads to the Homeric notion of protreptic (instructionally directive) discourse. We know that when rhetoric was established as a formal discipline it not only gave treatment to ethos and pathos but also to logos, the rational capacity to persuade other minds (Aristotle, Rhetorica 1356a). Certainly, any position which argues for an emerging notion of rhetoric must inquire into the human capacity to structure discourse toward
