with the Unitarians, and therefore supposed that a portion of them acknowledged the Divine origin of Christianity; if I was misinformed, I am very sorry for it."
The italics are mine; and if Mr. Collier meant to imply that he received this information from his client or his attorney—the only persons from whom he should have received information bearing on the conduct of this case—he still further dishonoured himself, because the utmost candour was shown him in laying the facts before him, and most assuredly no such statement as that quoted could have been made to him by sane men who knew the facts.
But to return to Mr. Collier's speech. I will give just two more quotations, and then leave it:—
"I should be extremely sorry," he said, "if I were understood, as the advocate of Mr. Bradlaugh or anybody else, as for one moment defending any circulation, either by printing or by word of mouth, of anything libellous, seditious, or blasphemous. … If Mr. Bradlaugh had been permitted to preach, and if he had preached anything improper, blasphemous, or seditious, I should not have complained of the superintendent; on the contrary, I should praise him if he had taken the proper measures for bringing him before a court of justice."
"I will conclude," he further said, "with this remark, that I cannot help thinking that if the doctrines of this Secular Society, or any other Society, are preached, which you and I and all of us may think pernicious, by far the best thing is to let them alone. 'Truth is great and will prevail,' and we need not fear that the foundation of our religion will be shaken by a thousand Bradlaughs; and I cannot think of anything so pernicious and likely to prevent that very object we seek to accomplish, and to elevate persons such as these from obscurity into fame, as by making them unjustly martyrs. I cannot help thinking that the superintendent of the police, although acting from the very best motives, was acting with very great haste and indiscretion."
If Mr. Collier had been briefed by the other side also, he could hardly have made a more equivocal speech; and it will be easily understood how much it was likely to prejudice both the judge and jury against a man whose opinions were so well known, and who had made no pretence of concealing them. The defence made every effort to avail themselves of the odium theologicum when it came to Mr. Bradlaugh's turn to take his place in the witness-box. Mr. Montagu Smith, Q.C., counsel for the defence, wished to cross-examine Mr. Bradlaugh on some former lectures in which he expressed his disbelief in the Bible; Mr. Collier objected; Mr. Smith persisted; Baron Channell then allowed the question, taking note of Mr. Collier's objection; Mr. Smith again put his question, and my father replied: "I object to answer that question on the ground that if I answer it in the affirmative it will subject me to a criminal prosecution." Then came a little scene, which will strike those who have been in the law courts with Mr. Bradlaugh as by no means unfamiliar:—
"His Lordship then asked for the Act of Parliament, and
"The Plaintiff immediately replied: It is the 53rd William III. Archbold recites the statute.
"His Lordship and the learned counsel were then engaged in finding it; and after having spent some time in vain, the plaintiff asked for a book, and on its being presented to him, he immediately found the statute in question, which he handed to his lordship. The learned judge then read it to the counsel, and said, this statute only applies to those educated in or making profession of Christianity. In answer to his question,
"The Plaintiff said: I was educated according to the Church of England.
"His Lordship: I allow the objection, witness claims exemption, and he is entitled to it."
Six times Mr. Montagu Smith put similar questions to Mr. Bradlaugh, and six times Mr. Bradlaugh answered him in the same words. In his summing-up the judge, Mr. Baron Channell, seemed determined not to be outdone by Mr. Collier in evoking the religious prejudices of the jury. From Mr. Smith, for the defence, such conduct was in some degree pardonable, even if not altogether in accordance with ordinary un-Christian notions of strict honour; but in Mr. Collier, counsel for the plaintiff, and Mr. Baron Channell, presiding over what was supposed to be a Court of Justice, it was unpardonable. His Lordship regretted "that the constitution of the plaintiff's mind was such as to render him unable to believe in those great truths which afforded so much comfort and satisfaction to others; the notion of going about and delivering lectures on those views he considered fraught with mischief and calculated to produce the greatest possible evil," while he further enlarged upon the "wickedness of disseminating such opinions."
After the summing-up of this just judge the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff, with one farthing damages. The evidence was so strong, and some of the witnesses for the defence were so extravagant and unsatisfactory, that in spite of their prejudices the jury could not do other than decide in Mr. Bradlaugh's favour; but they did it as grudgingly as they could, and recorded their animus in the "damages" they awarded. On the following morning Mr Baron Channell carried this a step further, and when Mr. Collier made the formal application for the plaintiff's costs he refused to certify.
In spite of all the prejudice roused against him, Mr. Bradlaugh met with considerable sympathy from the press, from foes[63] as well as friends.
Mr. Bradlaugh was not the man to remain content with such an unsatisfactory verdict, and accordingly he moved for a new trial. The motion was heard in the Court of Common Pleas, Westminster, on November 4th and 5th of the same year, before the Lord Chief Justice, Sir William Erle, and the Justices Williams, Byles, and Keating. Mr. Bradlaugh asked for a new trial on the grounds of misdirection, improper rejection of evidence tendered by the plaintiff, improper reception of evidence tendered by the defendant; and that the verdict was a perverse one and against evidence. After reciting the course of the trial at Exeter, he pointed out that in that trial he "laboured under a double disadvantage, not only in having all the jury selected from the county [of Devon], where there was great feeling existing in the matter, but that they were selected from among men who had to pay the costs in the action,[64] and who would have to pay further damages and costs if in my favour, which a verdict of the jury would have given me."
After a lengthy discussion, in which all the judges took active part, the Lord Chief Justice said that they would consult "brother Channell" before they gave their answer.
Judgment was given the following day. The rule was refused, and the plaintiff insulted. Said Lord Chief Justice Erle—
"I know not in the least what are the opinions of the plaintiff that he was bent upon publishing; all that I am certain of is that there are opinions which are most pernicious. There are opinions which are in law a crime, and which every man ought—that is, every man of sound sense and generally esteemed of sound sense, would generally consider to be wrong. I do not know what these opinions are, but there are such opinions. If the plaintiff wanted to use his liberty for the purpose of disseminating opinions which were in reality of that pernicious description, and the defendant prevented him from doing that which might be a very pernicious act to those who heard him, and if the estimate I have mentioned be the true one, might be a matter he might afterwards deeply regret, it might be that the jury thought the act of imprisonment of the plaintiff under such circumstances was in reality not an injury for which a large money compensation ought to be paid, but on the contrary was an act which in its real substantial result was beneficial to the plaintiff, and so the nominal wrong would be abundantly compensated by the small sum given."[65]
The other judges concurred with their leader, Mr. Justice Keating making a yet further addition to the remarkable record of intolerant utterances in this case.
"I think," said he, "that questions should be put within a certain limit to the witness as to his opinion and belief, and that it is right the jury should have an opportunity of judging either from his answer or from his refusal to answer—should have an opportunity to form their own sentiment of the
