unloaded discourse about – real or hypothetical – problems, organise open-ended debates about the causal connections of problems, and make social disputes about solutions possible. Only after all of this has taken place should decisions about what to do next be made. These, in turn, are best designed as majority decisions, because this is precisely the way to create pressure for the widest possible consideration of various opinions and interests. Of course, the majority principle established in this way also includes the protection of minorities. And this political approach has to go hand in hand with a basic attitude of always being ready to start learning anew.
The name given to a political system operating according to these kinds of rules is pluralistic democracy. Among its characteristics are a willingness to accept, and even revere, diversity – not only in matters of skin colour, but also political opinions; acknowledging the right of the individual to define his interests independently and responsibly as a matter of course – and there, especially those that one objects to oneself; and the legitimacy of dispute – even when one is at risk of losing the argument. It is also important for pluralistic democracy that the area that can be disputed, without the parties risking social ostracism, be kept as broad as possible. On the other hand, the areas that are not open to question should be kept as small as possible. It is a fact that dictatorial regimes and their subservient societies are characterised by the minimisation of what can, and the great increase in what cannot, be questioned. This ranges from the dominant role of a single party to the law of God directly influencing politics.
The name given to the “non-dispute” area of a pluralistic democracy is “minimal consensus” and it is made up of three partial consensuses. There is the consensus of values that is principally composed of the consensus that everyone has the same human rights, including that of being different from others in terms of appearance, sexual orientation, religion, and political leanings. Then there is procedural consensus. It includes non-violence and the majority principle, together with the protection of minorities. Non-violence is an especially important aspect. Intimidation through the threat of violence, the anticipation of violence, and violence itself reduce the diversity of viewpoints and interests that are freely brought into the dispute. This is precisely what reduces the opportunities for learning in and through dispute and this deprives a pluralistic democracy of its central advantage. And there is finally regulatory consensus; for example, a consensus that demonstrations on the street are allowable, but that final decisions will be made in parliaments or by the courts. Shaping a state in a way that there can be disputes about as many topics as possible and that, as a result, the ability of politics and society to learn is optimised, is the “highly effectual secret” of pluralistic democracy and the great advantage of functioning civil society.
An additional, extremely special, value of this kind of society is that it is possible to criticise those in power and the existing conditions, and that it does not demand the affirmation, the justification or defence, of what already exists. It is much more the case that, in a pluralistic democracy, the citizenry always takes a critical stance towards any claims that somebody or something is right because that is the way it has always been – going beyond the minimal value, procedural, and regulatory consensus. However, criticism is more than just emotional grumbling. The demonstration of standards for judgement, complete with their rational justification, and likewise the assessment of those already existing based on the same standards, which claim to be logically correct, are also part of this. In other words: Pluralistic democracy is strengthened through rational criticism, not through the emotional defence of existing conditions.
These rules of the game of pluralistic democracy are based on experiences made by trial and error in designing political systems and the societies supporting them. Ultimately, they integrate the “algorithm of evolution” into political practice. However, when all we know about the development of complex systems, from biology, over culture, and into the world of institutions, is taken into consideration, this is really the best possible way for guaranteeing the ability to learn and efficiently coupling systems with their environment. The four steps of the evolutionary algorithm are variation, selection, retention, and as differential reproduction, which looks like this in society and politics: A wide variation of perspectives, priorities, proposed solutions, and self-evident actions required for solving new problems arises through the practical use of the right to diversity, as well as the fear-free articulation of opinions and interests, in continuous controversial discourses. This then leads to an internal selection from the variety offered; i.e., that which is not appropriate to the existing system of pluralistic democracy with its proven routines, or does not fit into the current discoursal structure, is dismissed. This kind of internal selection is carried out in a sensible manner based on a minimal consensus on human rights, non-violence, the principle of majority, and protection of minorities, as well as tried and tested organisational structures. This is followed by the external selection in such a way that not all of those political measures that have been agreed on in pluralistic discourse – with or without a majority decision being reached – will prove themselves in political practice. It is a fact – and this is especially true in politics, which usually acts under conditions of uncertainty – that the path to be followed hardly ever leads to learning from, at best, “well-intentioned” attempts, from inevitable errors and political corrections. Retention then means the preservation of what has proven itself – in the interim or often just until further notice. This can later develop into a component of the internal selection factors that prefilter whatever will actually be tried out in praxis.
Two basic political attitudes usually come into play when dealing with internal selection factors. Conservatives attempt to be guided by what is already tried and tested, while progressives want to experiment with new things, especially under new conditions. Both are really necessary if political structures are to remain stable over the long term and maintainable if the contexts around them change. If the latter fails, there is the danger of slipping into a fragile form of statehood and, in the worst case, into a state of civil war and anomie. However, if it is possible to preserve what is fundamentally time-proven through reforms, structures of this kind can expand even further; for example, institutions such as the rule of law, separation of powers, and periodic elections can take the place of their authoritarian alternatives in an increasing number of countries. That is precisely what is meant by “differential reproduction” as the concluding step in the evolutionary algorithm. It is clear that this kind of differential reproduction forms the foundation of the global expansion of the democratic system elements that have taken place over several “waves of democracy”.
Seeing that the conditions for political action are repeatedly changing, and that it is necessary to deal with new challenges from time to time, it is sensible to attempt to not bring this “algorithm of evolution” to a standstill – especially in the state and the civil society that supports it. But that is exactly what happens when attempts are made to protect things or structures that are taken for granted through subtle threats – or even crass use – of violence against people who question what already exists and expect changes. Damage to the foundation of a civil society and its state therefore begins with the avoidance, suppression, or disruption of controversial discourses. Unfortunately, conservative concepts and structures all too often become an irresistible political temptation for those who, for the time being, exercise political-cultural hegemony, benefit from the prevailing situation, and are, therefore, satisfied with the status quo and – in spite of new challenges – act in a purely affirmative manner, i.e., not critically rational as would correspond with the utilisation of the algorithm of evolution.
4. Radicalism as an acceptable ferment; extremism as a poison to be eradicated
A radical is a person who gets to the bottom of things, develops an argument until it is absurd, drives a thesis to the utmost exaggeration, and represents a position without any sense of proportion. Radicalism is therefore equally disturbing to moderates and conservatives – and that can even be good and desirable. It is precisely radicalism that drives discourse and political projects forward and presses for those innovations that moderates and conservatives
