36–47.5 Pierre Bourdieu, Science de la science et réflexivité (2001), and idem, “The Scholastic Point of View” (1990), and “Participant Objectivation: The Huxley Medal Lecture” (2003).
6 Gaston Bachelard, La Formation de l’esprit scientifique. Contribution à une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective (1938), and Georges Canguilhem, Connaissance de la vie (1952). A lucid and compact presentation of the tenets of “historical epistemology” is Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay (2010 [2007]). Bourdieu’s indebtedness to historical epistemology is fully documented in his book (with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron), Le Métier de sociologue. Préalables épistémologiques (1968, 2nd ed. 1973).
7 Pierre Bourdieu, Fields of Cultural Production (1993c).
8 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason” (1991), and idem, La Noblesse d’État. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps (1989), Part 4; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, “From Ruling Class to Field of Power” (1993); and Pierre Bourdieu, “Champ du pouvoir et division du travail de domination” (2011).
Through two decades of heated debate initiated by the Harlem blackout riots of 1977, the “underclass” remained a stubbornly incoherent, heterogeneous, and specular notion, plagued by a host of semantic ambiguities, logical deficiencies, and empirical anomalies. Its spectacular, if fleeting, success expressed first and foremost the class fear and caste horror of the educated middle classes and state managers in the face of the deteriorating condition of the black precariat, and the desire to affix blame for mounting urban ills on this outcast category.7 Its sudden demise in public debate in the mid-1990s (contrasting with its continued silent circulation in social science as a descriptive stand-in for a variety of subalterns) reveals the fundamental heteronomy of the category: after the “welfare reform” of 1996, policy-makers abruptly pivoted to other worrisome populations and conditions, and social scientists followed suit, finding new problem subgroups to study and shepherd: “fragile families” expected to transition “from welfare to work,” parolees going through “prisoner reentry,” and inner-city residents redistributed in space through housing subsidies and “moving-to-opportunity”-type programs.
Through the reflexive sociology of the rise and fall of the “underclass,” I offer a critique, not just of the normal science of “race and poverty” in the American “inner city,” but of a particular style of sociology one might call normalized empiricism. This sociology is empiricist in that it borrows its categories unfiltered from the social world, it is driven by data collection and mining, and, paradoxically, it is maximally distant from the phenomenon. This sociology is normalized in that its parameters, tools, and sources are embraced as a matter of course, without systematic examination or explicit justification. In that regard, the present book is an extension of, and a complement to, my earlier critique of moral empiricism in the normal practice of urban ethnography in America.8
I use the strange career of the “underclass” to raise several questions that can shed light on the trials and tribulations of other concepts. What accounts for the “lemming effect” that drew a generation of scholars of race and poverty over a scientific cliff? What are the conditions for the formation and bursting of “conceptual speculative bubbles”? What is the role of think tanks, journalism, and politics but also academic reproduction in imposing “turnkey problematics” soaked in moral doxa upon social researchers? And what are the special quandaries posed by the naming of destitute and stigmatized categories in scientific discourse? Answering these questions constitutes an exacting exercise in epistemic reflexivity in the tradition of Bachelard, Canguilhem and Bourdieu.9 This exercise leads me to elaborate a minimalist set of criteria for what makes a good concept in social science, liable to minimizing epistemic troubles such as those epitomized by the “underclass.”
In conclusion, I draw on these epistemological criteria to tackle the most ductile and flammable category of them all: “race.” I propose to rethink race as veiled or denegated ethnicity, a pure form of symbolic violence through which a classificatory schema trading on the correspondence between natural and social hierarchies is turned into reality – inscribed in the subjectivity of socialized bodies (habitus) and in the objectivity of institutions (social space).10 The dialectic of classification and stratification based on quantum of honor supplies the core of an analytic of race and distinguishes it from other bases of division (class, gender, age, etc.). I advocate for breaking down ethnoracial phenomena into the elementary forms of racial domination that compose them: categorization, discrimination, segregation, ghettoization, and violence. Reversely, I spotlight the dangers of lumpy notions such as “structural racism” as guides for knowledge production and civic action.
At multiple junctions in this inquiry, I sound a clarion call against epistemic promiscuity – the tendency of scholars to deploy a mix of instruments of knowledge and criteria of validation circulating in different universes (science, journalism, philanthropy, politics and public policy, everyday life), without duly checking their origins, semantic span, logical coherence, and the social unconscious they carry. The Invention of the “Underclass” will have fulfilled its mission if it increases the epistemological vigilance of its readers and assists them modestly in the “perpetual reconstruction of those concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality.”11
Chasing after an urban chimera
In his reflections on the philosophy of science, Max Weber stresses that every social scientist “operates with the conceptual stock-in-trade of [their] time” and that “concept-construction depends on the setting of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture itself.”12 In other words, the formulation of a problematic in the social sciences – in contradistinction to the natural sciences – is doubly influenced by the state of the scientific field and by the state of the surrounding society. As a French citizen landing in Chicago in the summer of 1985 to pursue a doctorate in the Mecca of American sociology, I was initially attracted to the intellectual stream drawn by the “underclass.” The emerging notion was a hot intellectual commodity that promised to energize urban sociology, extend class theory, and nourish bold arguments across the academy and the policy world. Its dramatic tenor seemed to match the lunar landscape of black dispossession surrounding on all sides the rich white enclave of Hyde Park, home of the University of Chicago.
My novice fervor for this thematics, lasting about a year, came from a close reading of William Julius Wilson’s The Declining Significance of Race, in which the term designates a fraction of the working-class marginalized by the forward march of capitalism.13 It was further stimulated by Bill’s infectious passion for the study of the social transformation of the ghetto, correlated with the shift of the flashpoint of ethnoracial conflict from the economy to the polity. So, when he offered me the opportunity to work closely with him on his new team study of the topic, I eagerly accepted. Class, racial domination, ghetto, state: those were the categories that I naively associated with the term “underclass.” I soon discovered that the keywords of the emerging debate on the topic were welfare dependency, female-headed family, teenage pregnancy, concentrated poverty, high school dropout, and violent criminality.
My initial enthusiasm thus turned quickly into a cautious stance of principled skepticism. My intellectual training in a European tradition at once more theoretical and more historical than the American alerted me to the danger of characterizing as novel and unprecedented a phenomenon that must surely have had historical precedents or analogues. Indeed, the comparative social history of marginality in the industrial city, as represented by such classic studies as Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England, Louis Chevalier’s Classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses, and Gareth Stedman Jones’s Outcast London, readily revealed that the intersection of capitalist industrialization and urbanization had repeatedly destabilized laboring populations and spawned the belief, among the coalescing
