them instead as “consensus-producing bodies”. (Egon Flaig 1995, 77–91; 2003, 155–74; 184–93.)
What then about the contiones (informal non-voting public meetings), which Millar saw as the place where ambitious politicians employed persuasion to prepare the ground for later voting? (Millar 2002 6, 23, 136, 142, 158–61, 181–2.) As Hölkeskamp has stressed, these speeches do not necessarily imply a situation of open decision making. Rather, it was a situation where “…senators spoke and asserted what needed to be done, the People listened and followed their advice” (Hökeskamp 1995, 27–49; 2010 88 f).
Referring to the Senate, Millar remarked that, “The notion of that body as an ‘aristocracy’ in the modern sense has confused the study of the Republic for decades.” (Millar 2002, p. 86.) It is not clear whether this remark refers only to the “early-middle- Republic” of about 390 to 218 BCE, or to later times as well. (Ibid., p. 85 f.). After consigning the Conflict of the Orders to the realm of myth and also rejecting the historicity of the Conflict of the Orders and of the “patricio-plebeian elite” that has generally been accepted as emerging after the resolution of that conflict, Millar provides us with a table purporting to show “Political Power in Mid-Republican Rome”. (Ibid., p. 99.) However, the table, which covers the period 362 to 217 BCE, contains only ten items, most of which are examples of laws proposed by tribunes of the plebs. The purpose of this table is to illustrate “…that the constitutional structure of the state, the conditions of office-holding, and the duties of office are for determination by the People via the medium of leges [laws].” (Ibid., p. 98.) So what? Modern writers on ancient history tend to be dazzled by anything that smacks of democracy and especially of “direct democracy”. (I note the same tendency in regard to Athens in Chapter 6.) It would, however, be a serious mistake to assume that we are dealing here with a genuinely deliberative assembly.
“Elective Dictatorship”
The present-day British constitution provides an apt parallel. The bedrock principle of the British constitution is the sovereignty of Parliament. Parliament, and more particularly the House of Commons, is where the debates take place, and no statute can be passed without a majority in both houses of Parliament, together with the royal assent. However, as Lord Chancellor Hailsham pointed out in his book titled The Dilemma of Democracy, the British system of government is really an “elective dictatorship,” in which a government with even a narrow majority in the House of Commons can push through nearly any legislation it likes because of the iron grip that it has over its party members through the whip system, leaving not only the voters and Queen without any say but also even Parliament itself. So, though the sovereignty of Parliament has validity as a constitutional and legal concept, in practical terms, it is a sham. (Hailsham 1979.)
“Significance of Graduated Voting Absurdly Exaggerated”
Electoral system: As for elections, it is important to realise that voting in the Comitia Centuriata, the assembly which elected the top magistrates, namely the consuls, praetors and censors, was in wealth-order, and voting stopped once a majority was reached. This assembly was reorganised in 241 BCE to make it slightly more democratic. The Comitia Tributa (Tribal Assembly), which elected the lower magistrates, was more democratic, as the “tribes” voted in a random order selected by lot. But again, voting ceased once a majority was reached. The Concilium Plebis (Council of the Plebs) was essentially the same body as the Comitia Tributa but with the exclusion of patricians. It elected the Tribunes of the Plebs and Plebeian Aediles, according to tradition as a result of the so-called Conflict of the Orders. The Lex Hortensia of 287 BCE gave plebiscita (Concilium Plebis decisions), the status of leges (laws), after which most laws were in fact plebiscita but were called leges.
Millar, however, asserted: “The significance of the graduated voting, in descending sequence by groups belonging to different property levels, as found in the ‘assembly of centuries’ has been absurdly exaggerated.” (Millar 2002, p. 178–9.) For more see Chapter 6 p. 208.
Millar did at least concede that “The consulate, for instance, was dominated by nobiles, the descendants of office-holders” for which he gave credit to Ernst Badian’s sterling work (Ibid.). But Millar then goes on the attack again. I will quote Millar, with my own comments in italics.
“Does that of itself prove that in political terms the res publica was, or could be, run by an oligarchy for its own benefit? No: firstly, public office was, as indicated earlier, conceived of as a favour conferred by the people.” M.A. Maybe not “of itself”, but, until the convulsions of the Republic’s death-throes, the res publica actually was run by an oligarchy for its own benefit.
Millar then provides us with “four fundamental points”:
1 Millar: “(F)irstly, elections to the consulship tell us a lot, but not everything, about Roman political life.” M.A. Granted. But whoever said that consular elections told us everything about elections? Millar’s point is a classic Aunt Sally or Straw Man.
2 Millar: “Secondly, other offices, and above all the tribunate, were also reflections of popular support, and vehicles of popular politics. M.A. Absolutely. The tribunate came into existence to protect the original plebeians in the Conflict of the Orders, the historicity of which Millar rejects. Later on, the tribunate became an important weapon used by Populares, demagogues with popular support like the Gracchi, against the Optimates, upholders of the dominant oligarchy, who finally lost out to Julius Caesar and then his heir, the future Augustus, who turned the oligarchic republic into a monarchy, all of which Millar rejected.
3 Millar: “(T)hirdly, the use of words, oratory, before the people, was central to the political process in Rome. M.A. Not at all. This is part of the illusion of the Roman Republic as essentially democratic. As Egon Flaig has shown (see above), the popular assemblies almost always agreed with the bills presented to them, on the basis of which Flaig denied that the assemblies were decision-making bodies, labelling them instead as “consensus-producing bodies.” (Egon Flaig 1995, 77–91; 2003, 155–74; 184–93.)
4 Millar: “(A)nd fourthly—the most important thing of all—the central focus of politics was not election to office but conflict about laws.” (Millar 2002, p. 178.) M.A. That there was a certain amount of conflict about laws is undeniable. Sometimes, this conflict turned violent, but this was all part and parcel of the conflict between Optimates and Populares, in which the latter (and, no doubt, the former as well) had lower class support. It is an illusion to see this conflict in terms of swaying voters by argument in debate. The violent conflict over the Gracchan reforms marked the beginning of the end of the oligarchic state that we know as the Roman Republic .
“Rem Publicam…in Senatus Populique Romani Arbitrium Transtuli”
Augustus’s vaunted restoration of the Republic: In his autobiography, Augustus claimed that, in 27 BCE, “I transferred the state from my own power to the control of the Roman Senate and People.” (Aug. R.G. 34.) Fergus Millar appears to have taken this literally, meaning the “…restoration of the citizen body to its rightful place within the constitutional structure of the res publica and its politics,” which “…provides the analytical framework for a very different understanding of what happened in 27 BC than we might gather from reading the Annals of Tacitus.” (Guy MacLean Rogers,“Intro: Polybius Was Right” –Millar 2002, p. xiv.) Rogers emphasizes the phrase “and the Roman people” as if that is in some way significant. This is a misunderstanding of the passage in Augustus’s autobiography, which is simply that he transferred the res publica (the state) from his own power to the arbitrium (discretion, or better,
