of it.
As a final remark, it is worth pointing out that a well-entrenched view of aesthetic value adds to Livingston’s neo-Lewisian characterization a quality of “subjective universality.” That is, aesthetic value is, following Kant, typically thought to be partly defined by a subjective judgment that nevertheless claims universal assent. The idea of universally held judgments of taste or values has fallen on hard times. In recent years, “to each their own” seems not just to be received wisdom, but a kind of politically virtuous view. The problem, however, is that it makes aesthetic value something that is private and not shared. In contrast, it is the claim to universal assent of aesthetic judgments and aesthetic value that makes aesthetic value something that is shared and available to all—a public value.
Notes
1 1 Macdonald’s claims are useful here because they are succinctly stated, but it is important to recognize their similarity to a number of other views—most notably those advanced by members of the Frankfurt School. See Carroll (1998) for sustained criticisms of scepticism toward mass art by Macdonald and the Frankfurt School members, among others.
2 2 Scruton’s argument is more complex and careful than we can indicate here. For a sustained critical discussion, see Carroll (2008, 7–34).
References
1 Arnheim, Rudolf. [1933] 1957. Film as Art. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
2 Canudo, Ricciotto. [1911] 1980. “The Birth of the Sixth Art.” Translated by Ben Gibson, Don Ranvaud, Sergio Sokota, and Deborah Young. Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media 13: 3–7.
3 Carroll, Noël. 1998. A Philosophy of Mass Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4 . 2008. The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
5 Lindsay, Vachel. [1915] 2000. The Art of the Moving Picture. New York: Modern Library.
6 Macdonald, Dwight. 1953. “A Theory of Mass Culture.” Diogenes 1 (3): 1–17.
7 Perkins, V. F. 1972. Film as Film. Baltimore, MD: Penguin.
8 Scruton, Roger. [1983] 2006. “Photography and Representation.” Reprinted in Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology, edited by Noël Carroll and Jinhee Choi, 19–34. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
9 Sesonske, Alexander. 1974. “Aesthetics of Film, or a Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Movies.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 38 (4): 51–57.
1 A Plurality of Values Art, Fine Art, and Motion Pictures
Paisley Livingston
This chapter addresses philosophical questions about the value of art, focusing especially on the nature of exclusively artistic value. Although these questions, and the proposed answers to them, are highly general, I indicate some ways in which they readily apply to motion pictures.
Answers to questions about art’s value depend in part on assumptions about art. In this regard, I emphasize the distinction between a broad and well-entrenched conception of art that covers many different kinds of skills, and a more narrow and controversial conception that singles out only the fine arts—identified as those arts, the primary but not exclusive end of which is the realization of aesthetic value. Fine-artistic value is, then, a species of aesthetic value. As I explain below, my proposal about the nature of fine-artistic value is consistent with the observation that artistic works and achievements, including art films, typically manifest a plurality of values, both public and private.
Here is a brief outline of the chapter. Section 1 sets forth a broad, skill-centered conception of the arts. Section 2 focuses on the question of the exclusively artistic value of art, given that broad conception. My point of departure for explicating exclusively artistic value is some ancient anecdotes pertaining to the relation between artistic success, skill, and luck. I also draw on Aristotelian ideas about the relations between instrumental and intrinsic (or final) values. Section 3 develops the distinction between art and fine art with reference to a C.I. Lewis-inspired proposal regarding the nature of aesthetic value and experience. In Section 4 I turn to the relationship between aesthetic and fine-artistic merit, and identify a kind of exclusively fine-artistic value based on the admiration of displays of skill or virtuosity. I conclude with some remarks about the topic of the relations between different kinds of value manifested by a particular work of art.
Art as a Capacity for Skillful Making or Doing
The term “art” derives from the Latin “ars,” which was the standard translation of the Greek “technē.” As Tom Angier points out in his book on Aristotle, the term “technai” covered what we today call “crafts,” “skills,” “arts,” and various sorts of practical expertise (Angier 2010, 1). Angier adds that the word “technē” derives from the Indo-European root “tek,” meaning to put together the woodwork of a house. A tekton was a carpenter. Carpentry is obviously something that cannot be done well without skill, and to become good at it requires practice and training. To exercise a technē is to activate one’s acquired capacity in an effort intentionally to bring about the desired results. Clearly, not all such attempts are successful, and those that are successful manifest varying degrees of skill.
In this connection, an important passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics runs as follows: “Now since building [oikodomikē] is an art [technē] and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity [dunamis] to make [logou poietikē], and there is neither any art that is not such a state, nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning” (Aristotle 1984a, 88, 1040a). With regard to an art’s status as a capacity or power [dunamis], Aristotle comments in Metaphysics that “all arts, i.e., all productive forms of knowledge, are potentialities; they are principles of change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other” (Aristotle 1984b, 124, 1046a).
Aristotle’s conception of technē has been very influential. In a usage that is still prevalent, the term “art” refers to an extremely diverse category of purposeful human practices, each of which requires some level of acquired skill. The OED thus defines “art” as “skill, its display, application, or expression,” especially as the result of knowledge or practice. With this conception of art in mind, people speak of the culinary arts, the martial arts, the arts of torture, divination, massage, body-building, upholstery, manicure, investment, origami, fly fishing, poker, pottery, motorcycle maintenance, persuasion, gardening, juggling, azuelos, millinery, and so on. As some of the items on that long list indicate, many useful distinctions are commonly drawn within the general category of the arts. For example, “medicine” names a type of art covering a variety of more specific health and illness-related skills and practices, such as ocular surgery.
Given the definition of “art” that we have just evoked, there can be no serious doubt whether the ability to use motion picture technologies also qualifies as an art. Anyone who asks whether film is an art, and if it is one, how that could be so, must have some other, far more restrictive idea of art in mind (for a discussion of such concerns, see Stecker 2009). It should be uncontroversial as well that motion pictures can manifest specifically artistic value—assuming that there is such a thing, which is the topic of the next section.
