failure of engaging China at any price. His warnings were demonstrably worth heeding. Now in Getting China Wrong he makes the case that the United States and other democracies still underestimate the struggle ahead. But this is no counsel of despair: instead, Friedberg articulates a multi-layered action agenda, arguing that the best form of defense could well involve a willingness to impose costs.”
Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College,
Australian National University, and author of Indo-Pacific Empire
“A telling account of how and why policy-makers, academics, and business embraced a form of engagement with China that proved to be a sincerely optimistic but hopelessly wrong gamble. A trenchant and accessible foray into the geopolitics of our time and our future.”
George Magnus, Research Associate,
China Centre, University of Oxford and SOAS
“In Getting China Wrong, Aaron Friedberg lays out a balanced and practical approach for managing relations with China. Most compellingly, he argues that liberal democracies must begin by taking their own side in this rivalry, making clear the stark differences of a future defined by the Chinese Communist Party. This book is essential reading for anyone seeking to navigate a multipolar world order.”
Admiral John Richardson, USN (Ret.),
31st Chief of Naval Operations
“Friedberg’s Getting China Wrong nails down half a century of mistaken American assumptions about China’s future path. This essential non-partisan primer highlights the increasingly bold strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to defeat Western expectations.”
François Godement, Senior Advisor for Asia,
Institut Montaigne, Paris
“A splendid book with deep insights into the nature of the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship and an urgent message about the need to uphold and expand the liberal international order in Asia.”
Nobu Kanehara, former Deputy National
Security Advisor to PM Abe of Japan
Dedication
For Nadège Ma chère femme, je te remercie pour tout.
GETTING CHINA WRONG
Aaron L. Friedberg
polity
Copyright © Aaron L. Friedberg 2022
The right of Aaron L. Friedberg to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2022 by Polity Press
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ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4513-1
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Preface
Writing about contemporary China from the perspective of an American concerned with US and wider Western strategy towards that country is like trying to hit a very fast-moving object from the pitching deck of a ship at sea: both the target and the platform from which it is being observed are in constant, if irregular, motion.
This book was completed during the summer of 2021. Since that time, there have been a number of significant developments, many of which (like the US–UK–Australia nuclear submarine deal and Xi Jinping’s recent crackdown on China’s high-tech giants) are not discussed here. Between the writing of this preface (in the fall of 2021) and the publication of the book (spring 2022), there will no doubt be other noteworthy incidents and occurrences.
That said, the overall trajectory of events is already quite clear and, at least for the foreseeable future, nothing seems likely to deflect it. China is moving towards deepening political repression, expanded economic statism, and a more aggressive posture towards the United States, its partners and allies. Albeit belatedly and with an as yet insufficient sense of urgency and common purpose, the democracies have begun to face up to these facts and the dangers they pose, and to start the painful process of hammering out new policies with which to meet them. What remains to be seen is whether they can do so quickly enough to deter overt aggression while better defending their societies and economies against the subtler threats of penetration, manipulation, and exploitation.
As regards China, what has happened over the last several months is consistent with the broad patterns described here and with the overarching explanation offered for them. At home, the Chinese Communist Party brooks no opposition to its rule, claims for itself the authority to exert control over every aspect of social, political, and economic life, and uses that control to tighten its grip on its citizens and to build up the nation’s coercive power on the world stage. Xi Jinping’s recent directives extending ideological indoctrination down to the primary school level, cracking down on video games and pop culture, and reining in Alibaba, Tencent, and other nominally private companies are merely the latest manifestations of the normal functioning of China’s Leninist political system.
Similarly, Beijing’s stepped-up military pressure on Taiwan, dramatic test of a new type of hypersonic missile, and strikingly confrontational approach to dealing with a freshly elected US administration represent a continuation of trends that have become unmistakable over the course of the last two decades. As their assessments of China’s relative strength have grown more positive, its leaders have pushed harder and more openly
