is almost totally silent. What kind of combination or aggregation brought about the development, even supposing the propositions of Figure 5.2 to be correct?
Whose economic behavior is at issue here―that of prospective workers in capitalist enterprise, that of prospective entrepreneurs, or that of both? And if that of both, is it proposed that the religious values were precisely appropriate for the economic behavior of the workers and for that of the entrepreneurs? For some values, particularly the antitraditionalism central to the “spirit of capitalism,” it is clear that Weber is arguing that this is so. But the absence of a serious consideration of this question shows a major element to be missing from his theory. What is necessary to account for the growth or occurrence of any social organization, whether capitalist economic organization or something else, is how the structure of positions constituting the organization comes into being, how persons who come to occupy each of the positions in the organization are motivated to do so, and how this interdependent system of incentives is sustainable. These are the central problems of the analysis of social organization. Marx’s analysis of the emergence of capitalism from feudalism, polemically marred though it was, came closer to doing this than did Weber’s analysis in The Protestant Ethic.
[…]
Components of the Theory
There are three kinds of components to any theory in which system behavior derives from actions of actors who are elements of the system. These correspond to what are shown as relations of types 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 5.2. Relations of types 1 and 3 involve movement from macro to micro and micro to macro, respectively, and relations of type 2 are based on the principle of action describing actions of the actors. This principle of action constitutes a necessary fixed kernel, which gives rise to different systemic behavior―that is, different social phenomena―when located in different social contexts and when different persons’ actions combine in different ways.
There is, in fact, a good rationale for arguing that social theory, as distinct from psychological theory, consists of theory about the working out of various rules within which sets of persons act. This view, as well as the character of macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro transitions, can be understood by imagining a social-simulation game of the sort that is sometimes used in education. Such a game is composed of the following:
A set of roles that players take on, each role defining the interests or goals of the player
Rules about the kinds of actions that are allowable for players in each role, as well as about the order of play
Rules specifying the consequences that each player’s action has for other players in the game
If the playing out of the game is viewed as simulating the behavior of some aspect of a social system (as it will if the game is well constructed), then there are two naturally separable components: the players and the structure of the game. The players contain within themselves some principle of action (which could hardly be described as other than purposive), and the game comprises the structure which sets in motion these actions and combines them to produce behavior of the system.
It is this structure which corresponds to the two transitions I have described: macro to micro and micro to macro. The first of these transitions is mirrored in the game by all those elements that establish the conditions for a player’s action: the player’s interests, given by the goal established by the rules; the constraints on action, which are imposed by other rules; the initial conditions, which provide the context within which action is taken; and, after the game is in play, the new context imposed by others’ actions. The second transition is mirrored by the consequences of the player’s action: how it combines with, interferes with, or in any other way interacts with the actions of others (which in the play of the game as in reality may be simultaneous with or precede or follow the given player’s action), thus creating a new context within which the next action takes place. […]
The individual-level theory of action I will use in this book is the same purposive theory of action used in Weber’s study of Protestantism and capitalism. It is the theory of action used implicitly by most social theorists and by most people in the commonsense psychology that underlies their interpretation of their own and others’ actions. It is ordinarily the dominant model of action we apply when we say we understand the action of another person: We say that we understand the “reasons” why the person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand the intended goal and how the actions were seen by the actor to contribute to that goal.
For some purposes in the theory of this book, nothing more than this commonsense notion of purposive action is necessary. For much of the theory, however, a more precise notion is required. For this I will use the conception of rationality employed in economics, the conception that forms the basis of the rational actor in economic theory. This conception is based on the notion of different actions (or, in some cases, different goods) having a particular utility for the actor and is accompanied by a principle of action which can be expressed by saying that the actor chooses the action which will maximize utility.
There are a number of points of clarification to be made about the use of this somewhat narrowly conceived version of purposive action as the individual-level component of a social theory. Some of these are in the form of caveats. First, this is clearly a particular specification of the broader idea of purposive action; other specifications are also compatible with that broader idea. For example, Tversky’s (1972) theory of elimination by aspects (which appears to correspond better than standard rational choice theory to the way certain choices are made) implies that purposive choice is made in stages, with selection at each stage made according to a particular dimension or aspect on which the objects of choice differ. The standard theory of rational choice has no way for such dimensions to emerge, and no place for hierarchically structured choice.
In other work Kahneman, Tversky, and others (see, for example, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) have shown conclusively that persons, when intending to act rationally, have systematic biases that lead their actions to be less than rational, according to some objective standard. That is, individuals act systematically to yield outcomes they regard as less good than outcomes that would have been obtained from other actions. One such systematic bias is the overestimation of probabilities of unlikely events. Another is allowing one’s perception of a situation in which a choice must be made (and thus the choice made) to be influenced by elements in the description that are irrelevant to the outcome.
Another deviation from rationality lies in the inconsistency between resolving not to carry out some action and then later carrying out that action (in which case it might be said that one has “succumbed to temptation”). Elster (1979) describes such cases, cases in which persons may precommit themselves in order not to succumb. In these cases, as in the cases that can be explained through a hierarchical structuring of choice, it appears that choice may better conceived as resulting from an organization of components of the self than from a simple maximization of utility.
Apart from different specifications of how individuals act purposively and deviations from the objectively best action when intending to act rationally, there are other actions which appear to be better described as expressive or impulsive (that is, without a goal in mind), actions which lead to outcomes the actor does not prefer, even actions that can be described as self-defeating. […] Without commitment to a position for or against the thesis that such actions can be reconceptualized in a way that is compatible with purpose or rationality, one must accept that certain actions are most straightforwardly described in a way that does not involve purpose.
Still another objection to purposive action as a basis for social theory is an objection to the use of teleology in any theory of action. The concept of purpose is explicitly teleological. It explains current states in terms of (desired or intended) future states, rather than in terms of antecedent states. It gives rise to explanations
