the main strength of his Army and Air Force from the East and hurl it upon this Island, which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his crimes. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles[11].
One can’t but admit that Hitler chooses a very singular way of invading Britain: without winning it over from the start, he goes on to attack the Soviet Union, only to resume his campaign against Britain sometime in the future!
He would probably have done better to use all his forces against Britain from the first, without any such “cunning” plans. Why attack the Soviet Union just to return to the Channel having already no able fleet to neutralise the British one? Such questions do not normally go down well with historians.
As we know, all anti-British adventures and campaigns of all sorts meet the same end. Some three years after Napoleon’s Russian campaign, the great French Empire was erased from the global map. It took Hitler’s Third Reich less than four years to come to ruin after a similar attempt.
Now if such astute state leaders as these two men (for only an astute politician is capable of taking over power in a country) – if such persons commit apparently self-destructive actions that precipitate their empires into the abyss with equal and surprising rapidity, then we are inevitably left with one idea. Might it be that these politicians are not inept dense-headed laymen (as one would be forced to think), but we are deliberately being kept partially in the darkness about the reasons why both Napoleon and Hitler chose the road to hell for themselves and for their countries?
As is appears, the “darkest” part of this information is also the most essential. What kind of information is it?
Not only the Nazi leader’s actions seem enigmatic, but often those of British, French and American politicians. Suffice it to recall that the beaten Germany after the First World War was completely disarmed. How did it then happen that the best forces of the world were engaged in a six-and-a-half-long desperate struggle against one German army in the Second World War – the army that Germany was not supposed to have? How could Germany have recuperated and indeed enhanced its military power between the two world wars? How did Germany’s neighbours let it slip by? And most of all, how such a politician as Adolf Hitler could at all have gained power, after laying out his plans openly in his Mein Kampf?
Questions, questions, questions… One could put endless questions and have the same cock-and-bull stories for an answer. These countries, they overlooked him; they didn’t have enough strength to stand up against him; they did not recognise any threat in him; they trusted him; etc. etc. Some game of hide-and-seek, not big politics. Describing any of such “fatal blunders” of some of the largest political figures of that time, Word War II historians will as often as not use quotations that impugn their prior statements. Here is one example – an extract from the testimony of Hjalmar Schacht, former Minister of Economics under Hitler, at the Nuremberg Trials.
I must say <…> it was a disappointment to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way replied to by any actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany’s part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. <…> Military missions were sent to Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to stop Germany’s rearmament[12].
The history of the Second World War that we are being fed with cannot account for the motives and actions of most state leaders of the time. Those persons were the locomotives of history. It was the decisions made by Hitler, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt that directly affected the course of the future events. Turning over the pages of historical books and memoirs, we cannot realise why these otherwise “sensible” and certainly outstanding figures erred so grossly and so obviously. What does it all mean?
It means that the whole history of the Second World War that can be considered the “official version” of modern historiography has been concocted with one single purpose – that of disguising the truth about the horrors of that time.
Disguising the truth and concealing some real criminals who must bear responsibility for millions of deaths from the trial of man and of history – that is the ultimate purpose. Nuremberg tried and convicted only those villains whose crimes lay on the surface. Blood-handed executives went to prison and up the gallows, while the masterminds of World War II were sleeping soundly in their beds.
Nowadays tampering with historical evidence is picking up momentum. You can now hear some people say that it is the Soviet Union to blame for this war; that it was the “bloody” and “rapacious” Stalin who actually helped the obsessed Hitler to his position in Germany; that is was the aggressive Soviet Russia that aided and abetted the vicious Führer in turning Europe into a bloodbath. But once the USSR failed to invade the whole world in 1945, it means that the Russians (together with all the other Soviet nations) lost the war.
Well, let us try to make some sense of the mess that those now far-off years presented.
And we’ll start by the simplest question —
Where did Adolf Hitler find money to be able to occupy the whole planet?
Who helped Hitler with money?
It was immaterial whether they laughed at us or reviled us, whether they depicted us as fools or criminals; the important point was that they took notice of us…
There will be no revolution in Germany, for all revolutions are banned in that country.
On September 12, 1919, a meeting of a tiny political party held in the Sterneckerbräu, a Munich beer hall, was joined by an unknown war veteran. His name was Adolf Hitler. Millions of people were just starting to recover from the First World War, when human history had insensibly taken a path that lead to still more dreadful battles, still more harrowing crimes – to the hideous ovens of Majdanek and Treblinka, to the Siege of Leningrad, to the Battle of Stalingrad and the Kursk Salient.
The date when that meagre sprig that was eventually to grow into the Cyclopean tree of the German national socialism can be established with some accuracy. On March 7, 1918, one Anton Drexler founded a society under the poetic title Freien Arbeiterausschuss für einen guten Frieden (Free Workers’ Committee for a Good Peace) that totalled some forty workers as the members. At their quite harmless meetings during the World War, that set of lotus-eaters would sit around there with their beer mugs, theorizing on the pleasures and benefits of universal peace.
There are but three ways to reach peace in any war – to win it, to lose it, or to end it in a tie by parley. While Drexler’s followers were jabbering it in the beer hall, events in Germany went along the first possible scenario – the Kaiser’s Empire, subverted by external revolutionary propaganda and the “live” example of the Russian Revolution, went all to pieces. Peace did settle in, but not the one Drexler and his ilk had been dreaming of. It was the treaty of Versailles. It was that town near Paris where, on June 28, 1919, the well-known Treaty was signed, to give rise, in the long run, to the Nazi Party and a new, more terrible, war. But why should we consider this peace treaty as a forerunner of a new war? The fact is, this “treaty” was daylight robbery in the guise of a harmless – and important – international document, which, nonetheless, didn’t change its true face. What may be most surprising, the Treaty was thus condemned not only by Lenin and not only by German politicians, but by members of the Triple Entente! For example, Marshal Ferdinand Foch of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies from 1918, is famous for saying that the Treaty was
Ibid. P. 174.
Quoted from: Nuremberg Trial Proceedings V. 12, 118th day (Wednesday, 1 May 1946), Morning Session // Contents of The Nuremberg Trials Collection at the Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/05–01–46.asp
