them with tractors beyond the norms… It won't be easy to do, and I'm afraid the equipment will have to be taken away from the artillery regiments…”
“Comrade Marshal, without mobility we can't do anything. Anti-aircraft regiments must be able to maneuver quickly within the position area, otherwise the enemy will simply start routing transport planes to bypass the identified air defense sites and try to suppress them with artillery and aviation. ”
“Okay, let's say you're right. But there is another questionable point in your plan – controlling the fire of several position areas from a single center. As I understand it, you want to transmit data directly, by radio and telephone, for input to PUAZO-3s, the artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices?”
“Yes, Comrade Marshal.”
“How do you plan to have time to receive data from radars and air defense posts, process it and transmit it to the 12 position areas? The slightest delay in data transmission will cause them to lose relevance. Are you sure you can handle it?”
“I'm sure. If it weren't for PUAZO, I really wouldn't have time to do all this, but these automatic devices will do some of the work for me, and the anti-aircraft batteries would be able to open fire in time. In addition, all 12 regiments of 52k are unlikely to fire at the same time.”
Artillery anti-aircraft fire control unit PUAZO-3. Developed in 1939. In August 1940 it passed testing, was accepted for service and put into series production. A significant disadvantage of PUAZO-3 was the large combat crew of seven men, who manually entered into PUAZO the data taken from the rangefinder about the range, altitude, and direction of target movement, as well as meteorological data on wind speed and air temperature and humidity. Another problem was that the PUAZO-3, like similar devices of previous models, provided data only on visually observed targets.
To be honest, the PUAZO-3s, with which the batteries of 85mm anti-aircraft guns were equipped, were very primitive devices, but for the 1940s of the 20th century they represented a significant step forward in anti-aircraft fire control. A crew of seven men entered data from rangefinders and radars into the PUAZO, the device calculated the coordinates of the target and lead and transmitted data to the guns for firing.
For me the value of this system was that the anti-aircraft gunners were good with it and I had no need to control the fire of each gun, but I could greatly increase the accuracy of the data, entered into the fire control device, and that should have made a big difference in the efficiency of the firing.
“Okay,” Shaposhnikov finally made a decision, “I will present your plan to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. I hope, Comrade Nagulin, you realize the degree of responsibility you are taking on. To conduct this operation, we will have to overhaul the entire system of anti-aircraft coverage of the outer front of the encirclement.”
The air bridge was impressive. The satellites allowed me to see it in all its glory. This was probably the first time in Earth's history that a warring party has conducted such a large-scale supply operation using transport aircraft.
Of course, no uninterrupted line of planes flying in a chain stretching for hundreds of kilometers was observed.This tactic can be used only in the absence of any opposition from the enemy. A stretched chain of transport planes can be attacked anywhere, and there are not enough fighters to cover the whole 'sausage'. Therefore, the Germans used the method of "air convoys", they gathered Junkers and Heinkels in groups and escorted them to the airfields in the Moscow Pocket.
There were five or seven air groups in the air at one time. Together with their fighters, they each had about 50 planes. The Germans chose different routes, but in any case they had to overcome the territory occupied by our troops.
I, of course, could not predict the path of each particular plane, but the computer processed an array of information on all German flights into the pocket and identified the most promising locations for the deployment of air defense positioning areas. Now any group of Luftwaffe transport planes trying to break through to the surrounded troops would come within range of at least one of my 12 anti-aircraft regiments, on average, three times out of five.
In case the Germans changed their flight patterns, reserve positions were prepared in each area, and the anti-aircraft gunners could quickly move their 85 mm guns there. Naturally, the armament of the air defense position areas was not limited to 52-K guns alone. The medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns, not very effective against low-flying targets, were densely covered by automatic guns of the more modest caliber – 37 and 20 millimeters.
My interaction with the range and radar posts, as usual, was largely a spectacle, and I was honestly playing my part in this one-actor theater. To those around me, the scheme of my work looked something like this: the RUS-2 "Redoubt" radar stations were the first to spot groups of German planes. These stations transmitted data on the altitude, course and speed of the target to my command post. Then the airborne observation, warning, and communications posts set up surveillance of the enemy, and when it became clear whose area of responsibility the Junkers were flying into, I put the appropriate air defense positioning area on alert.
It was believed that, based on the information I received from the rangefinder and radar posts, I would calculate the initial data for the PUAZO and transmit it to the batteries of 85 mm anti-aircraft guns by radio in telegraph mode. In reality, of course, all this could not work, but I tried very hard to make my tumultuous activities look as realistic as possible. In fact, it was the computer transmitting data for the PUAZO to the batteries via the nearest satellite. For the radio operators who received these signals and the anti-aircraft fire control device teams, as well as for the soldiers and commanders who helped me organize the work at the command post, everything looked quite natural. The signals, of course, passed without any delays and interference, and were corrected by the computer, taking into account the time required for data input and processing.
It took three days to deploy and set up the air defense system. I closely followed the movements of the Germans. So far, they were not ready to launch either a conventional or a chemical attack. According to my estimates, the enemy needed about a week more, so I had some time at my disposal, although knowing the Germans, I could expect them to strike in a shorter time.
“Comrade Lieutenant Colonel, the check is over. All communication channels are functioning normally. We can switch the flow of data to you.”
“Turn it on.”
I put on my headphones and sat down in a chair around which there were transmission equipment and telephone exchange on the tables and on the floor. All this electromechanical equipment was flashing with a multitude of neon lights and scales of devices, and there was a multitude of wires all around. I reminded myself of a character in a rather funny comedy about a mad professor who fell into the past together with his student; the film I had seen as a child, a long time ago.
The first report came in just a couple of minutes.
“"Mole", this is "Owl 4". We have a signal! Target is group. Altitude 5,300, speed 320, distance 105, course… ”
Within a short time I received reports of two more groups of German planes. In fact, there were more of them, but not all of them were in the field of vision of the "Redoubts". Well, the first to go into battle was the air defense positioning area south of Vyazma, and then two more anti-aircraft regiments would have to act, unless, of course, the Germans decided to change course abruptly. In fact, they didn't usually do that, though, and I saw no reason for the enemy to change his habits yet.
“"Viper-2", this is "Mole". There's a group of Junkers coming your way. Altitude 5,300. Approach
