Czechoslovakia’s borders. President Beneš, fearing civil war and Soviet intervention, accepted the Communists’ demands for a new administration. The Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk fell to his death from his office window, having almost certainly been pushed by a Communist mob. Beneš resigned and Czechoslovakia was thereafter firmly embedded in the Soviet camp.57
Czechoslovakia’s fate demonstrates that it is not fair to blame the Red Army alone for the collapse of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. An important part in this was also played by the naiveté and ignorance of Western democracies concerning events in Central and Eastern Europe, and the weakness of the democratic traditions and democratic political parties in that region. The states and societies of Central and Eastern Europe were often poorly integrated, there were segments of society with no commitment to the state; civil society and political competition were weak and often the population had become habituated to authoritarianism and state interventionism. These factors were exacerbated by the impact of the war and Nazi terror, which destroyed the cornerstones of society as most former leading politicians were forced into exile or killed. In this situation it was easy for the Communists to present themselves as the only effective force capable of filling the power vacuum. According to George Schöpflin, the non-Communist politicians were also part of the failure. Schöpflin writes that ‘they were indeed victims, but they contributed to their own marginalisation knowingly and, to a greater extent, unknowingly’.58 They lacked political skills and were too uncertain to summon the determination to face down the Communists. They tended to see the Soviet occupation as a definitive and incalculable constraint in the face of which they were helpless. It is possible that even stronger opposition to Communism would have ended in the same way; nevertheless, the flaws of the non-Communist opposition made the Communist’s triumph easier than it might otherwise have been, breaking, as it did, something in people’s souls. Schöpflin also asks why a surprisingly large part of the population was prepared to cooperate with the Communists in the 1940s, hinting at the rapid growth in the membership of Central and Eastern European Communist parties after the Second World War. It can be linked to the use of nationalist, anti-German feelings and growing radicalisation. The Communists also opened the way for the new ‘elites’ to emerge, supporting the development of a large state bureaucracy. The number of administrators in Poland, for example, increased from 172,000 before the war to 362,400 in 1955.
Prison for political prisoners in Sighet, Romania
At the same time, it is often forgotten that there were at least two other countries that almost suffered the same fate at Stalin’s hands as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; namely, Austria and Finland. What saved these countries from Communist domination has not yet been the subject of sufficient research – what is clear, however, is that it was not Stalin’s kindness. Stalin was furious when pro-Communist forces were defeated in the Austrian post-war elections in 1945. In Finland, his goal was first, to push pro-Communist forces into the government and then to move towards a takeover, although these plans ultimately failed. There were in fact several reasons why Austria and Finland were saved. One of them was that Finland was defeated in the Second World War but not conquered. Even though the Soviet presence was symbolised by their control of the Porkkala military base and by the Allied Control Commission run by the Soviet representative, Andrei Zhdanov, the Finnish army was clearly still in charge. Within society, there was a strong will to resist any Soviet takeover. In order to prepare for a possible partisan war against the Soviets, nationalist activists hid large amounts of weapons in special stores. The Finnish democratic system had survived the war, political parties were strong and organised, and the Social Democrats were capable of resisting Communist attempts to gain control over the trade unions. In 1948, Stalin nevertheless tried to force Finland onto the same route as Czechoslovakia. In February 1948, at the same time as Czechoslovakia’s fate was being sealed, Stalin demanded that Finland send a delegation to Moscow to conclude a ‘dependence’ pact similar to those he had signed with the new satellites. To make matters worse, the Norwegian foreign minister also received warnings that a Soviet request for a similar kind of treaty might be forthcoming. A month earlier, Stalin had expressed regret to visitors that he had not occupied Finland after the war out of ‘too much regard for the Americans.’ Now he seemed intent on rectifying that mistake, allowing the prominent Finnish Communist, Hertta Kuusinen, to declare publicly that Czechoslovakia’s road ‘must be our road.’59 But when the Finnish Communists tried to use the same tactics that had worked so well in Czechoslovakia, they found President Paasikivi to be very different to President Beneš. Paasikivi concentrated his armed forces on the capital and united all the political parties against the Communists. Any attempt at a takeover failed before it had even started and the Communists were heavily defeated in the next parliamentary elections.60 In Austria, the presence of Western forces played a significant role in undermining Soviet efforts, as did the strength of the Austrian Social Democrats, who crushed the Communists’ attempts to take over the Austrian trade unions. As a result, the so-called ‘October strikes’ organised by the Communists in 1950 failed and the Soviet leaders had to reject the Austrian Communists’ proposal to divide Austria into two parts, as had been done in Germany. Austrian democracy proved to be stronger than Communist pressure.
The loss of Austria and Finland did not, however, trouble Stalin too greatly – he had enough work to do to accomplish his new Communist world system. On the orders of the Kremlin in 1947–1948, Central and Eastern Europe entered a new Stalinist phase that lasted until 1953. All pretences were discarded as Central and Eastern European countries were pushed into outright Sovietisation. Within a few years, all Central and Eastern European countries were forced to accept the political system then prevalent in the USSR. Institutional and ideological uniformity was demanded. All chinks in the armour of the Iron Curtain were to be sealed against Western influence. The Communists took power into their own hands. Pluralism and the last vestiges of democracy vanished. The independent press and public organisations were closed down and civil society was abolished. All the main features of Stalinism were to be ruthlessly enforced wherever they did not already exist. The only feature of pre-war democracy that survived in Central Europe was the empty shell of the multi-party system – completely controlled by the Communists, of course.
The most obvious sign of Stalinism was the intensification of terror. This was manifested in an ongoing series of public and secret trials that adjudicated allegations of economic sabotage by former underground leaders in Poland and the ‘White Legion’ in Czechoslovakia. In the 1950s, for example, 244 people were executed on political charges in Czechoslovakia and a further 8,500 died as a result of torture or in prison. A minimum of 100,000 people were imprisoned for acts against the Communist state between 1948 and 1956. In Poland, repression affected no less than 350,000 to 400,000 people in the period leading up to 1956. Military courts alone sentenced 70,097 people for ‘crimes against the state’ between 1944 and 1953. Some 20,000 prisoners died due to the extremely harsh conditions.61 In Romania, five massive arrest campaigns were launched in 1947, targeting opposition party sympathisers and supporters. More than 100,000 people were to become victims of these actions. The leaders of opposition parties were arrested and condemned for ‘national treason’. The families of arrested persons were deprived of the most elementary means of survival and deported or administratively confined. In 1951, 417,916 people were kept under surveillance, 5,401 of whom were arrested for ‘hostile activity’.62 In East Germany, a new wave of repression was connected with the establishment of the German Democratic Republic. As a result of the dissolution of Soviet internment camps, around 5,000 people condemned by Soviet military tribunals were released and 10,000 ended up in East German prisons. A greater wave of political arrests took place between 1952 and 1953 as a result of the ‘intensification of the class struggle.’
The growing number of arrests throughout the region resulted in the establishment of a system of concentration camps. In the early 1950s, there were 422 concentration
Mastny 1996, pp. 41–42.
Schöpflin 1993, pp. 70–71.
Mastny 1996, pp. 42–43.
Seppinen 2008.
Handbook 2005, pp. 34, 271–273.
Handbook 2005, p. 305.
