The Power of Freedom. Mart Laar
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу The Power of Freedom - Mart Laar страница 3
Map 1
Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 19th century
While Central and Eastern European nations successfully protected Europe from Mongolian, Ottoman and Russian invasions, they were weakened in this fight. One after another, the independent states of Central and Eastern Europe disappeared from the map, were divided up among their neighbours or, indeed, both. The Czechs lost their independence after the Hussite wars and the Hungarians, in the 16th century. Poland was conquered by and then divided among its bigger neighbours during the 18th century. The loss of political independence was followed by cultural and linguistic takeovers. German culture and language were especially significant in assimilating the local nobility and intelligentsia in many Central and Eastern European countries. The more successful and educated segments of local societies were Germanised and consequently lost to their nation. The elite in most Central European states was destroyed and the countries themselves started to resemble ‘peasant nations’. At the end of the 18th century, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe seemed to have disappeared from the map.
At this point, their future looked bleak. But then an era of nationalism began in Europe. England is considered to have been the first modern nation in Europe, dating back to the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 17th and 18th centuries, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands became the next countries to establish nationhood founded on political independence. The Italians and Germans had also acquired a remarkable cultural homogeneity by that time but had not been able to develop a nation-state. The emerging nation-states served as examples for at least twenty other European nations that had not achieved or restored independence but which desired comparable levels of political development and modernisation. In this way, national movements began in most of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 18th century. These movements were influenced by the ideas of Rousseau and Herder, which embodied a faith that smaller nations could be reborn with identities of their own. Neither had those nations with earlier traditions of statehood forgotten their lost independence. The Poles defended the Polish cause on battlefields across Europe at the same time helping to promote the independence of other nations. Both uprisings in Poland – in 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 – failed, however. A wave of uprisings spread over Central Europe in 1848, culminating in the Hungarian revolution (1848–1849) that was thwarted with the help of Russian forces.
Victims of Red Terror in Valga, Estonia 1919
Despite these failures, new, modern nations emerged in Central and Eastern Europe that successfully resisted all attempts at denationalisation. Common losses and sacrifices united nations, sometimes more so than victories. New social structures developed as societies were modernised and energised. Within a short period of time, political parties were organised with clear goals for the national movement: initially, mostly striving for autonomy, finally demanding full independence. These dreams long appeared unrealistic. But then World War I broke out and the realities of the situation breathed life into these dreams. Soon after the war began, both sides in the conflict realised that the support of local nations was essential for victory. Thus, ideas about greater autonomy were floated and there were suggestions of some kind of independence. In many cases, Central and Eastern European countries allied themselves with both sides in the conflict, trying to ensure the best outcome for their nations. For example, various Polish politicians worked with Russia, Great Britain and France, as well as Germany and the Habsburg monarchy. National units were raised in the Central and Eastern European nations. For many of these nations, such military units provided a foundation for national armies afterwards and also helped to garner international support for their independence movements.
With the collapse of Austro-Hungary and Czarist Russia at the end of the war, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe seized the opportunity to declare their independence in 1917-1918, often relying on autonomous structures – mostly regional councils – created by different rulers during the war. These developments were consistent with the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination which, unfortunately, was not applied either uniformly or fairly. Nations fighting for the ‘wrong side’ were punished by the winners. For example, as a result of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory and nearly half of its population. At the same time, Czech territorial claims on Austria and Hungary were fully supported. Polish demands for the restoration of its old frontiers were incompatible with the idea of the restoration of the White Russian Empire – which actually never materialised – and were condemned by France and Great Britain as ‘extreme nationalism’.
At the same time, a new threat arose from the East. From the ruins of Czarist Russia grew a real totalitarian power – Communist Russia. This totalitarian power threatened the very foundations of European society, including Christianity, individualism and private property. It was natural that the Communists liked to be called the ‘new Huns’. The leaders of the Communist takeover wanted to rule not only Russia but the entire world, a goal they planned to achieve by means of world revolution.2 In the beginning, Western Europe clearly underestimated the threat of Communism. Although it provided some support to the nations fighting against the Reds and supplied provisions to the White Russian army, decisive steps were not taken to destroy Communism. The warnings made by Winston Churchill, probably the first leading Western politician to understand the Communist threat, were ignored.3 In 1918, the Communists believed that the time was ripe for the invasion of Western Europe. After the collapse of Germany at the end of the First World War, Lenin ordered the Red Army to move to the West and ignite the fire of worldwide revolution. Exporting the Communist revolution to Germany meant that the Red Army first had to conquer the newly independent Baltic States and to reach East Prussia. By December 1918, the Red Army had captured most of Latvia and Lithuania and was advancing on Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. Confident of victory, the Red Army did not deploy many forces against the Estonians. Consequently, the Estonian forces – mostly young schoolboys, students and other volunteers–stopped the Red Army’s advance 30 kilometres from the capital and thereafter pushed it out of Estonia, much to the surprise of both groups of combatants. Most Estonians were not sure that their tiny country could win a war against Russia. Nevertheless, those young volunteers threw the Red Army back. Supported by British naval units and Finnish volunteers, the Estonian forces successfully breached the Red Army’s western flank. The Communist leaders panicked: the holy city of the revolution – St Petersburg – appeared to be threatened. On Lenin’s orders, elite Red Army units that had been moving towards the borders of Germany were stopped and redeployed against Estonia. This did not help. The increasingly confident Estonians destroyed one Red Army unit after another and even forced the Communists out of Northern Latvia. Crucially, Lenin’s first attempt to export the revolution to Europe was defeated.4
Map 2
Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War
But the Communists refused to abandon their goal of dominating Europe. They tried to encourage the Germans to revolt against the ‘capitalists’ but this ploy failed after some attempts. The Communist Republic of Hungary was destroyed by rebelling Hungarians and neighbouring nations. After these failures, Communist Russia decided to mass its forces and launch a long-postponed offensive against Poland and then
2
Pipes 2001.
3
Gellately 2007.
4
Laar 2006, pp. 112–123.