as General Sherman expressed it – were sent to the rear, that is, to Thomas. All equipments of infantry, artillery, and cavalry were examined, and every weak or worn piece replaced by new, and all the “trash” either destroyed or “sent to Thomas.” The entire cavalry force was dismounted for close inspection and for the perfect remounting of Kilpatrick’s column. Of the sound men whom Thomas received he lost 15,000 by expiration of terms of service and previous furloughs to vote, within a week after Hood’s movement began.
After this sifting of the armies General Sherman started for the sea with 62,000 veterans, of whom he wrote that “all on this exhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, so far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and vigorous action.” With this force was included the entire equipment of trains, pontoons, and similar essentials which Thomas, with great care, had perfected for the army of the Cumberland. Thomas’s request that he might have his old corps which he had organized, which had fought under him so long, was refused, and, instead, two small corps were sent him.
The nucleus around which General Thomas was to organize an army to take care of Hood – who from May till November had taxed the offensive resources of Sherman’s three armies – was, the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, with an effective force of 13,907, and the Twenty-third, General Schofield, with 10,358 effectives.
The means of holding Chattanooga are indicated by the instructions from Sherman to Steedman, whose troops had almost dwindled away by expiration of service: “You must organize and systematize the hospitals and men sent back to Chattanooga. You could use some of them for your forts,” and it was suggested to Thomas: “To make things sure, you might call upon the Governors of Kentucky and Indiana for some militia, cautioning them against a stampede.” Thomas was so short of men that when Steedman asked for enough for a small but important garrison, he was obliged to reply: “You might send a force from the organization of convalescents now being made up by General Cruft at Chattanooga.” To which Steedman replied, “So far, all such detachments reported from the front [Sherman] are with furloughs, and are waiting transportation home.”
In place of the 15,000 veterans whose terms had expired, Thomas received 12,000 newly enlisted recruits. General A. J. Smith’s veteran corps had been ordered from Missouri, and a great parade has been made of this fact by those whose interest it was to show that Thomas had been left with a competent force. But the fact that it did not arrive at Nashville till after the battle of Franklin, and that Thomas was waiting for it as well as to remount the cavalry, was not so loudly proclaimed.
However, when Sherman was ready to start for the sea, with Hood’s veteran army concentrated behind him, and Thomas, with the above mentioned elements of an army scattered over a territory as large as France, had been assigned to take care of Hood, General Sherman telegraphed Halleck: “I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered Thomas to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Ala.” And General Grant, after receiving some inflated figures of a great force left with Thomas, telegraphed Sherman: “With the force you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.” Later, when the anxiety at City Point referred to in the opening of this paper had become intense, the margin of force with which General Thomas was really operating was found to be so small that General Grant suggested that he should “arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc.,” and again, a few hours later, he was suggesting what he could do “with your citizen employees armed.”
CONCENTRATING IN FRONT OF HOOD
It was under such circumstances and conditions which, after all, are but faintly shadowed forth by the facts here stated, that General Thomas began to concentrate his conglomerate forces in Hood’s front, and begin under fire the work of organizing and refitting an army. With superhuman effort, and such loyal assistance and energy from officers and soldiers as were not elsewhere exhibited during the war, because not previously required, General Thomas set about the task of preparing the means of overthrowing Hood. Deliberate action and the extreme of prudence were essentials of the situation. The objective of Hood’s campaign, under suggestions from President Davis, was the Ohio River. There was no reserve force in sight or within summoning distance, or immediately available anywhere in case of reverses. Thomas could not afford to take the slightest risks so long as his own position was not imperilled. It was not alone the immediate interests confided to his keeping and defense which hinged upon his success or failure, but both Grant and Sherman and possibly the Union itself were to stand or fall with such success or failure. Had Hood succeeded, as at the first he might have succeeded without fault of Thomas, or even fair ground for reflection upon him, what would have been said of Sherman for marching off to the sea, leaving the central West without sufficient protection, or of General Grant for having allowed him to go?
And because the deliberate, prudent, imperturbable, and always successful Thomas appreciated the situation, and determined to be ready to annihilate his enemy before he struck, he was hastily declared to be slow by those he was preparing to save.
All of General Thomas’s troubles at Nashville arose from his adhering, in the face of threatened removal, to plans of action which made General Wilson’s cavalry an essential factor in the attack on Hood for which he was energetically preparing. He was looking not only to attack, but to crushing pursuit. In view of the great preponderance of the enemy’s cavalry, which was then double his own, and led by Forrest, one of the ablest cavalry generals on either side, effective pursuit without a strong mounted force would be impossible.
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