I have omitted such synonymes as are of very rare occurrence, and distinguished from each other by a very slight difference. In my larger work I have treated as synonymes many expressions, ἅπαξ εἰρημένα, that occur but once, and whose differences, on that very account, cannot be deduced from the general usage of the language, but can merely be guessed at from etymology and other sources. Such expressions are of no importance with reference to the object of this Hand-book. The same may be said of many synonymes which can be distinguished, as it were, only by a microscope. Such synonymes are found throughout my larger work in great numbers, and have drawn upon me the reproach of “hair-splitting.” The fact I must acknowledge, but cannot admit it to be a reproach; for surely it is the proper vocation of a scientific writer on synonymes, not so much to distinguish words that merely resemble each other in meaning, as those that are apparently equivalent. The greater their apparent equivalence, the more difficult it is to grasp their essential difference, and the more indispensable the aid of a guide to synonymes. If, therefore, it be admitted, that words identical in meaning do not exist, and that it is morally impossible, if I may use the expression, that they should exist, the only questions are, whether, in such cases, it is worth while to search out their differences, and whether it is possible to find them out. Science will answer the first question, without hesitation, in the affirmative; and with respect to the second, there can at least be no presumption in making the attempt. A distinction is soon obtained when several words are contrasted with the word under consideration; and if these contrasted words are also synonymous with each other, it must follow, that the affinity of the several words in meaning is so close, as to permit their interchange, as synonymes, under all circumstances. Their differences are altogether unimportant with reference to speaking and writing, but highly important as far as the intimate and more refined knowledge of the language itself is concerned. It is on this account that hair-splitting is allowable. Can there be a doubt that a distinction will be slight in proportion as it has its origin in the individual feelings of those by whom a language is used? Such distinctions in synonymes are, consequently, most felt in one’s native language; it is only necessary that the feelings in which they have their origin should not be vague and unformed. In the introduction to the fourth part of my work I have evinced, I hope, sufficient liberality and tolerance with regard to the obligation of conforming to these hair-breadth distinctions, and selecting one’s expressions accordingly. So much in justification of those reprobated hair-splittings; those discoveries of atoms, or, as my deceased friend Bremi expressed it, keen discernment of atoms, which in my larger work, more devoted to science than to instruction, found their proper place; but in the present Hand-book, intended for the use of schools, especially in the art of writing Latin, my predilection for such nice distinctions would be sadly out of place. Distinctions of that sort I have, therefore, for the most part, omitted, but not with the intention of silently retracting them.
I here submit a few observations to the notice of schoolmasters. For the purposes of instruction, synonymes may be divided into three classes; the first embraces those which the scholar cannot too quickly learn to distinguish, because their affinity is merely apparent, arising from their being translated by the same word in the mother-tongue; for instance, liberi and infantes; animal and bestia; hærere and pendere; sumere and adimere; hostis and inimicus. The interchange of such synonymes may be counted a blunder of the same sort as that which is called a solecism. To the second class belong those synonymes which may be distinguished from each other with ease and certainty, but which are, at the same time, so nearly related in meaning, that the ancients themselves use them, without hesitation, as interchangeable; for instance, lascivus and petulans; parere and obedire; ater and niger; incipere and inchoare; mederi and sanare; vacuus and inanis; spernere and contemnere; tranquillus and quietus. As long as the scholar has to contend with the elements of grammar, the teacher may leave him in the erroneous opinion, that these expressions have exactly the same meaning; but, when further advanced, he must be taught to distinguish them, partly in order to accustom him to that propriety of expression which is necessary in writing Latin; partly, without reference to composition, as a very useful mental exercise. In the third class I rank those words whose differences are not to be ascertained without trouble, and cannot be deduced with full evidence from the old authors, and which, probably, were but dimly discerned even by the ancients themselves; for instance, lira and sulcus; remus and tonsa; pæne and prope; etiam and quoque; recordari and reminisci; lævus and sinister; velox and pernix; vesanus and vecors; fatigatus and fessus; collis and clivus. Such distinctions are of little or no consequence in composition, except when it is necessary to use synonymous terms in express opposition to each other; for instance, mare and amnis, in opp. to lacus and fluvius; metus and spes, in opp. to timor and fiducia: when such occasions occur, the richness of a language in synonymes is available. A more scrupulous exactness in this respect would appear to me arrant pedantry, and necessarily obstruct the free movement of the mind in writing. As a teacher, I should wish that the synonymes of the first sort should be distinguished by boys in the elementary classes; those of the second, I would introduce into the higher classes, and teach the scholar, when about fourteen, to observe their differences in the choice of expressions in composition; I would also explain them in the interpretation of an author, but with moderation, as a spur to thinking, not as a clog in reading. Those of the third class I would never introduce, except in explaining such passages as render their introduction unavoidable; for instance, when an author combines flumina et amnes, I would explain their difference to defend him from the suspicion of tautology.
I have consulted convenience of reference in interweaving the alphabetical index with the context. By this means any one can find at once the word of which he is in search, which a separate index would render impossible.
These arrangements, combined with an almost studied precision of expression, have enabled me to reduce the six volumes of my larger work on Synonymes (which fills, including the Supplement, more than one hundred and forty-three sheets) to this Abridgment, of about fifteen. The etymological part of my researches I reserve for a separate volume, of about the same size as the present, which will make its appearance as an Etymological Hand-book of the Latin language.
May the present publication, and that which I announce, meet with the same favorable and indulgent reception that has fallen to the share of my larger work with all its defects.
A
Abdere, see Celare.
Abesse; Deesse; Deficere. 1. Abesse denotes absence as a local relation, ‘to be away’ from a place; but deesse denotes an absence by which a thing is rendered incomplete, and means ‘to fail,’ ‘to be wanting,’ in opp. to esse and superesse. Cic. Brut. 80. Calidio hoc unum, si nihil utilitatis habebat, abfuit, si opus erat, defuit. 2. Deesse denotes a completed (i. e. already existing), deficere a commencing state. Cic. Verr. i. 11. Vererer ne oratio deesset, ne vox viresque deficerent. (v. 339.)
Abnuere, see Negare.
Abolere (ἀπολέσαι) means ‘to annul,’ to ‘annihilate,’ and, as far as possible, to remove from the universe and cast into oblivion; but delere (διολέσαι, or δηλεῖν) ‘to destroy,’ to bring a thing to nought, and make it useless.
Abominari; Exsecrari; Detestari. Abominari means to recoil from, as of evil omen; and to avert a threatening evil by a ceremony, in opp. to omen accipere; exsecrari means to curse, when one would exclude a guilty person from human society as devoted to the infernal gods, in opp. to blessing; lastly, detestari (θέσσασθαι) means to curse, when one wishes to deprecate evil by an appeal to the gods against a dreaded person
