explain why Vladimir Ilyich has signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk? The answer to this question can be found in the very course of these negotiations. They developed absolutely not in the way we are used to believe. At the lead of the German delegation was Foreign Secretary Richard von Kuhlman, the Austrian delegation was led by Foreign Secretary Count Ottokar von Czernin. Comrade Adolph Joffe was at the head of the Russian delegation. His hair long and dirty, his beard greasy and uncombed, a worn-out hat on his head. The composition of the delegation is comical – among Lenin's diplomats there are a worker, a sailor, and a peasant, the images from a poster of those days. The last one was included in the delegation at the last moment. Bolsheviks thought it over and decided to include a peasant. The workers' and peasants' delegation couldn't do without a peasant.
So, comrade Joffe announces the Soviet conditions for the military operations to stop.
1. A truce period of 6 months.
2. Riga should be cleared from the German troops, as well as the strategically important Moonsund Archipelago, which they first occupied in October 1917.
Finally, Joffe announces the third Soviet condition, which brings the Germans in a state of shock.
3. The Germans have to oblige NOT TO MOVE TROOPS TO THE WESTERN FRONT![45]
What is the reason for such odd behaviour pattern demonstrated by comrade Joffe (or rather dictated to him by Lenin and Trotsky)? Why does a Soviet diplomat make such appalling demands? It is clear that it is absolutely unacceptable for the Germans to refuse moving their troops freely in any direction. A peace treaty of this kind doesn't make any sense for the Germans. The key to winning the war for any of the involved parties is in Russia. If the Germans move their best troops from the east to the west, they will still have a chance to avoid the defeat; if they keep the soldiers in Russia, Germany will collapse in a few months. It will collapse under the influence of the propaganda of Bolsheviks and the Entente.
The German authorities prepare the offensive at the Western Front in spring. To do so, they need to dislocate their troops, to conclude peace with Russia and to move their soldiers to France, Belgium, and Turkey. The goal of the intelligence services of the "allies" is polar opposite. The Germans should not dislocate their troops from the east to the west. This should be prevented at any cost. They should make Germany stay in Russia. The most important point is not to let the real peace come by any means…
Let's agree upon the fact that the demands made by the "German agent" Lenin are odd, to put it mildly. Neither do they make sense if Lenin acts as a "protector" of the interests of the emerging revolution. Why would Bolsheviks artificially hold back the German troops at the borders of the revolutionary Russia? Indeed, being so close, the monarchic German Army is a permanent threat to Red Petrograd and Moscow. And vice-versa, the more German soldiers move to France and Belgium, the quicker Lenin and Trotsky will be able to disseminate the Bolshevism in the global environment. If Ilyich had had the interests of the revolution at his heart, he would have asked the German diplomats and military men not to keep their military units but to move them away as soon as possible. And generally speaking, why should the government of Russia bother about the unengaged German divisions? Don't they have anything else to care about?
Indeed, the Communist power has a lot of other concerns. The representatives of the "allies" Jacques Sadoul and Bruce Lockhart have a common big headache, too: under no circumstances the German troops should be dislocated to the Western Front. And an "odd" demand of Bolsheviks wouldn't look that odd if we knew the following:
• right after the October, the Germans started to dislocate their troops to the west;
• 30% of the German troops were concentrated in the Eastern Front (there were about 80 divisions);
• the dislocation of the troops was still going on in November.[46]
How can the dislocation be stopped? You've guessed right – by announcing "peace initiatives" and by totally confusing the Germans! The calculation of the allied curators turned out to be correct. The Germans took the bait and agreed to stop the dislocation of their troops from the east to the west!
Reflecting upon the conditions of Bolsheviks, we can figure up to what extent the Leninist government was under the influence of the British intelligence.
You be the judge. The German troops are at one snap the distance from Red Petrograd. It was not without a reason that Ilyich himself wrote in September about the threat of abandoning Petrograd to the Germans by Kerensky. The Germans are really close by, and they can really strangle the new revolutionary power. There are practically no British, French, or American troops on the territory of Russia, and they are neither able to stop the Germans from strangling Bolsheviks, nor to help them do this.
What is danger № 1 for the revolution? It's Germany.
Who should Bolsheviks negotiate first and foremost with? With Germany.
And Lenin's terms are admittedly unacceptable for the Germans, but very much needed by the "allies." It may seem illogical and foolish – if we consider that Bolsheviks had no relations with the British and French intelligence services. And vice-versa, if we are aware that Lenin "was making" his revolution in a close contact with them, while Germany was only playing a role of the paymaster, everything gets clear and fair enough.
The "allied" emissaries urged Bolsheviks to start the negotiations and demand the Germans to stop the dislocation of their troops to other fronts.
So, then why does Lenin agree to set forth these admittedly unacceptable requirements, while he should be interested in the success of the negotiations more than anyone else? This is exactly the difference between a good tactician and a bad one. A good tactician has a good grasp of the situation. The plan is as follows: firstly one has to set forth such a condition for Germany that would satisfy the British, secondly – one can never tell, the Germans might accept it. This is next to impossible, but there still is a chance. The possibility that the Germans may reject the negotiations suits Lenin, too. He is clear in front of the British (we have tried!) and has a perfect explanation of the internal problems and the failure of his own experimental steps – the external threat. Rally around the government to repel the external aggression! Revolution is in danger!
Yet, this situation is very dangerous. Bravado is permissible only until the Germans start fighting their cunning "spy" for real. Lenin is aware that Bolsheviks lack the military power at the moment. He perfectly understands that in case Bolsheviks continue to irritate the Germans with their foolish demands, the Germans would swat the young Soviet Republic like a hornet. It is not possible to totally obey the "allies," because they are constantly trying to provoke a conflict between Russia and Germany, and what is more, by leading the Soviet delegation from behind.
Might Lenin have had no commitments to Germany? I don't have an answer to this question. There are no records of secret negotiations, all the agreements made were never put in writing. The evidence of Lenin's cooperation with the Germans is ludicrous. From the period before the February Revolution there is only one (!) receipt signed by A. Parvus (not even by Lenin!) regarding a million rubles received for staging the strike. And several bank statements from the later period regarding the payments to the accounts of legal and private persons, though, other than Lenin. In other words, there is no direct evidence of Lenin's cooperation with Germany.
The grave accusation of betraying his motherland is imputed to Lenin due to the logic of his behaviour and his travel to Russia in the "sealed railway car." That's what the heart of the matter is. Germany's cooperation with Vladimir Ulyanov resulted in its defeat in World War 1, not in the victory. This is a fact. It lost the war not in the battlefield. Having repeated the scenario of the Russian Empire's collapse, Germany lost the
World History. The Results of World War 1. V. 20. M.: AST, 2001. P. 116
Ludendorff E. My War Memoirs 1914–1918. M.: AST, 2005. P. 514.
