motive assigned too, is as incorrect as the fact. It was so far from being thought, by any party, a breach of neutrality, that the British minister congratulated Mr. King on the acquisition, and declared that the King had learned it with great pleasure; and when Baring, the British banker, asked leave of the minister to purchase the debt and furnish the money to France, the minister declared to him, that so far from throwing obstacles in the way, if there were any difficulty in the payment of the money, it was the interest of Great Britain to aid it. 4. He speaks of a double set of opinions and principles; the one ostensible, to go on the journals and before the public, the other efficient, and the real motives to action. But where are these double opinions and principles? The executive informed the legislature of the wrongs of Spain, and that preparation should be made to repel them, by force, if necessary. But as it might still be possible to negotiate a settlement, they asked such means as might enable them to meet the negotiation, whatever form it might take. The first part of this system was communicated publicly, the second privately; but both were equally official, equally involved the responsibility of the executive, and were equally to go on the journals. 5. That the purchase of the Floridas was in direct opposition to the views of the executive, as expressed in the President's official communication. It was not in opposition even to the public part of the communication, which did not recommend war, but only to be prepared for it. It perfectly harmonized with the private part, which asked the means of negotiation in such terms as covered the purchase of Florida as evidently as it was proper to speak it out. He speaks of secret communications between the executive and members, of backstairs' influence, &c. But he never spoke of this while he and Mr. Nicholson enjoyed it most solely. But when he differed from the executive in a leading measure, and the executive, not submitting to him, expressed their sentiments to others, the very sentiments (to wit, the purchase of Florida) which he acknowledges they expressed to him, then he roars out upon backstairs' influence. 6. The committee, he says, forbore to recommend offensive measures. Is this true? Did not they recommend the raising – regiments? Besides, if it was proper for the committee to forbear recommending offensive measures, was it not proper for the executive and Legislature to exercise the same forbearance? 7. He says Monroe's letter had a most important bearing on our Spanish relations. Monroe's letter related, almost entirely, to our British relations. Of those with Spain he knew nothing particular since he left that country. Accordingly, in his letter he simply expressed an opinion on our affairs with Spain, of which he knew we had better information than he could possess. His opinion was no more than that of any other sensible man; and his letter was proper to be communicated with the English papers, and with them only. That the executive did not hold it up on account of any bearing on Spanish affairs, is evident from the fact that it was communicated when the Senate had not yet entered on the Spanish affairs, and had not yet received the papers relating to them from the other House. The moment the Representatives were ready to enter on the British affairs, Monroe's letter, which peculiarly related to them, and was official solely as to them, was communicated to both Houses, the Senate being then about entering on Spanish affairs.
These, my dear Sir, are the principal facts worth correction. Make any use of them you think best, without letting your source of information be known. Can you send me some cones or seeds of the cucumber tree? Accept affectionate salutations, and assurances of great esteem and respect.
TO ALBERT GALLATIN
Dear Sir,—You witnessed in the earlier part of the administration, the malignant and long-continued efforts which the federalists exerted in their newspapers, to produce misunderstanding between Mr. Madison and myself. These failed completely. A like attempt was afterwards made, through other channels, to effect a similar purpose between General Dearborne and myself, but with no more success. The machinations of the last session to put you at cross questions with us all, were so obvious as to be seen at the first glance of every eye. In order to destroy one member of the administration, the whole were to be set to loggerheads to destroy one another. I observe in the papers lately, new attempts to revive this stale artifice, and that they squint more directly towards you and myself. I cannot, therefore, be satisfied, till I declare to you explicitly, that my affections and confidence in you are nothing impaired, and that they cannot be impaired by means so unworthy the notice of candid and honorable minds. I make the declaration, that no doubts or jealousies, which often beget the facts they fear, may find a moment's harbor in either of our minds. I have so much reliance on the superior good sense and candor of all those associated with me, as to be satisfied they will not suffer either friend or foe to sow tares among us. Our administration now drawing towards a close, I have a sublime pleasure in believing it will be distinguished as much by having placed itself above all the passions which could disturb its harmony, as by the great operations by which it will have advanced the well-being of the nation.
Accept my affectionate salutations, and assurances of my constant and unalterable respect and attachment.
TO GENERAL WILKINSON
Dear Sir,—I had intended yesterday to recommend to General Dearborne the writing to you weekly by post, to convey information of our western affairs, so long as they are interesting, because it is possible, though not probable, you might sometimes get the information quicker this way than down the river, but the General received yesterday information of the death of his son in the East Indies, and of course cannot now attend to business. I therefore write you a hasty line for the present week, and send it in duplicates by the Athens and the Nashville routes.
The information in the enclosed paper, as to proceedings in the State of Ohio, is correct. Blennerhasset's flotilla of fifteen boats and two hundred barrels of provisions, is seized, and there can be no doubt that Tyler's flotilla is also taken, because, on the 17th of December, we know there was a sufficient force assembled at Cincinnati to intercept it there, and another party was in pursuit of it on the river above. We are assured that these two flotillas composed the whole of the boats, provided Blennerhasset and Tyler had fled down the river. I do not believe that the number of persons engaged for Burr has ever amounted to five hundred, though some have carried them to one thousand or fifteen hundred. A part of these were engaged as settlers of Bastrop's land, but the greater part of these were engaged under the express assurance that the projected enterprise was against Mexico, and secretly authorized by this government. Many were expressly enlisted in the name of the United States. The proclamation which reached Pittsburg, December 2d, and the other parts of the river successively, undeceived both these classes, and of course drew them off, and I have never seen any proof of their having assembled more than forty men in two boats from Beaver, fifty in Tyler's flotilla, and the boatmen of Blennerhasset's. I believe therefore, that the enterprise may be considered as crushed, but we are not to relax in our attentions until we hear what has passed at Louisville. If everything from that place upwards be successfully arrested, there is nothing from below that is to be feared. Be assured that Tennessee, and particularly General Jackson, are faithful. The orders lodged at Massac and the Chickasaw bluffs, will probably secure the interception of such fugitives from justice as may escape from Louisville, so that I think you will never see one of them. Still I would not wish, till we hear from Louisville, that you should relax your preparations in the least, except so far as to dispense with the militia of Mississippi and Orleans leaving their homes under our order of November 25th. Only let them consider themselves under requisition, and be in a state of readiness should any force, too great for your regulars, escape down the river. You will have been sensible that those orders were given while we supposed you were on the Sabine, and the supposed crisis did not admit the formality of their being passed through you. We had considered Fort Adams as the place to make a stand, because it covered the mouth of the Red river. You have preferred New Orleans on the apprehension of a fleet from the West Indies. Be assured there is not any foundation for such an expectation, but the lying exaggerations of those traitors to impose on others and swell their pretended means. The very man whom they represented to you as gone to Jamaica, and to bring the fleet, has never been from home, and has regularly communicated to me everything which had passed between Burr and him. No such proposition was ever hazarded to him. France or Spain would
