POWER OF THE STATE
Division of the Legislative Body into two Houses.—Senate.—House of Representatives.—Different functions of these two Bodies.
The legislative power of the state is vested in two assemblies, the first of which generally bears the name of the senate.
The senate is commonly a legislative body; but it sometimes becomes an executive and judicial one. It takes a part in the government in several ways, according to the constitution of the different states;105 but it is in the nomination of public functionaries that it most commonly assumes an executive power. It partakes of judicial power in the trial of certain political offences, and sometimes also in the decision of certain civil cases.106 The number of its members is always small. The other branch of the legislature, which is usually called the house of representatives, has no share whatever in the administration, and only takes a part in the judicial power inasmuch as it impeaches public functionaries before the senate.
The members of the two houses are nearly everywhere subject to the same conditions of election. They are chosen in the same manner, and by the same citizens.
The only difference which exists between them is, that the term for which the senate is chosen, is in general longer than that of the house of representatives. The latter seldom remain in office longer than a year; the former usually sit two or three years.
By granting to the senators the privilege of being chosen for several years, and being renewed seriatim, the law takes care to preserve in the legislative body a nucleus of men already accustomed to public business, and capable of exercising a salutary influence upon the junior members.
The Americans, plainly, did not desire, by this separation of the legislative body into two branches, to make one house hereditary and the other elective; one aristocratic and the other democratic. It was not their object to create in the one a bulwark to power, while the other represented the interests and passions of the people. The only advantages which result from the present constitution of the United States, are, the division of the legislative power, and the consequent check upon political assemblies; with the creation of a tribunal of appeal for the revision of the laws.
Time and experience, however, have convinced the Americans that if these are its only advantages, the division of the legislative power is still a principle of the greatest necessity. Pennsylvania was the only one of the United States which at first attempted to establish a single house of assembly; and Franklin himself was so far carried away by the necessary consequences of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, as to have concurred in the measure; but the Pennsylvanians were soon obliged to change the law, and to create two houses. Thus the principle of the division of the legislative power was finally established, and its necessity may henceforward be regarded as a demonstrated truth.
This theory, which was nearly unknown to the republics of antiquity—which was introduced into the world almost by accident, like so many other great truths—and misunderstood by several modern nations, is at length become an axiom in the political science of the present age.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE STATE
Office of Governor in an American State.—The Place he occupies in relation to the Legislature.—His Rights and his Duties.—His Dependence on the People.
The executive power of the state may with truth be said to be represented by the governor, although he enjoys but a portion of its rights. The supreme magistrate, under the title of governor, is the official moderator and counsellor of the legislature. He is armed with a suspensive veto, which allows him to stop, or at least to retard, its movements at pleasure. He lays the wants of the country before the legislative body, and points out the means which he thinks may be usefully employed in providing for them; he is the natural executor of its decrees in all the undertakings which interest the nation at large.107 In the absence of the legislature, the governor is bound to take all necessary steps to guard the state against violent shocks and unforeseen dangers.
The whole military power of the state is at the disposal of the governor. He is commander of the militia and head of the armed force. When the authority, which is by general consent awarded to the laws, is disregarded, the governor puts himself at the head of the armed force of the state, to quell resistance and to restore order.
Lastly, the governor takes no share in the administration of townships and counties, except it be indirectly in the nomination of justices of the peace, which nomination he has not the power to revoke.108
The governor is an elected magistrate, and is generally chosen for one or two years only; so that he always continues to be strictly dependent on the majority who returned him.
POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Necessary Distinction between the general Centralisation of Government and the Centralisation of the local Administration.—Local Administration not centralized in the United States; great general Centralisation of the Government.—Some bad Consequences resulting to the United States from the local Administration.—Administrative Advantages attending the Order of things.—The Power which conducts the Government is less regular, less enlightened, less learned, but much greater than in Europe.—Political Advantages of this Order of things.—In the United States the Interests of the Country are everywhere kept in View.—Support given to the Government by the Community.—Provincial Institutions more necessary in Proportion as the social Condition becomes more democratic.—Reason of this.
Centralisation is become a word of general and daily use, without any precise meaning being attached to it. Nevertheless, there exist two distinct kinds of centralisation, which it is necessary to discriminate with accuracy.
Certain interests are common to all parts of a nation, such as the enactment of its general laws, and the maintenance of its foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar to certain parts of the nation; such, for instance, as the business of different townships. When the power which directs the general interests is centred in one place, or in the same persons, it constitutes a central government. The power of directing partial or local interests, when brought together, in like manner constitutes what may be termed a central administration.
Upon some points these two kinds of centralisation coalesce; but by classifying the objects which fall more particularly within the province of each of them, they may easily be distinguished.
It is evident that a central government acquires immense power when united to administrative centralisation. Thus combined, it accustoms men to set their own will habitually and completely aside; to submit, not only for once or upon one point, but in every respect, and at all times. Not only, therefore, does the union of power subdue them by force, but it affects them in the ordinary habits of life, and influences each individual, first separately, and then collectively.
These two kinds of centralisation mutually assist and attract each other: but they must not be supposed to be inseparable. It is impossible to imagine a more completely central government than that which existed in France under Louis XIV.; when the same individual was the author and the interpreter of the laws, and being the representative of France at home and abroad, he was justified in asserting that the state was identified with his person. Nevertheless, the administration was much less centralized under Louis XIV., than it is at the present day.
In England the centralisation of the government is carried to great perfection; the state has the compact vigor of a man, and by the sole act of its will it puts immense engines in motion, and wields or collects the efforts of its authority. Indeed, I cannot conceive that
In Massachusetts the Senate is not invested with any administrative functions.
As in the state of New York.
Practically speaking, it is not always the governor who executes the plans of the legislature; it often happens that the latter, in voting a measure, names special agents to superintend the execution of it.
In some of the states the Justices of the peace are not nominated by the governor.
