to the conduct of lord ORFORD, according to the best of their knowledge, remembrance, or belief! A form of deposition, my lords, of great latitude; a man's belief may be influenced by the report of others who may deceive him, by his observation of circumstances, either remote in themselves, or imperfectly discovered, or by his own reasonings, which must be just or fallacious according to his abilities; but which must yet have the same effect upon his belief, which they will influence, not in proportion to their real strength, but to the confidence placed in them by himself.
There is only one case, my lords, in which, by the common course of proceedings, any regard is had to mere belief; and this evidence is only accepted on that occasion, because no other can possibly be obtained. When any claim is to be determined by written evidences, of which, in order to prove their validity, it is necessary to inquire by whom they were drawn or signed; those who are acquainted with the writing of a dead person, are admitted to deliver, upon oath, their belief that the writing ascribed to him, was or was not his; but such secondary witnesses are never called, when the person can be produced whose hand is to be proved.
There is yet another reason for which it is improper to admit such evidence as this bill has a tendency to promote. It is well known, that in all the courts of common law, the person accused is in some degree secured from the danger of being overborne by false accusations, by the penalty which may be inflicted upon witnesses discovered to be perjured; but in the method of examination now proposed, a method unknown to the constitution, no such security can be obtained, for there is no provision made by the laws for the punishment of a man who shall give false evidence before a committee of the house of commons.
It may likewise be observed, that this bill wants one of the most essential properties of a law, perspicuity and determinate meaning; here is an indemnity promised to those who shall discover all that they know, remember, or believe. A very extensive demand, and which may, therefore, be liable to more fallacies and evasions than can be immediately enumerated or detected. For how can any one prove that he has a claim to the indemnity? He may, indeed, make some discoveries, but whether he does not conceal something, who can determine? May not such reserves be suspected, when his answers shall not satisfy the expectations of his interrogators? And may not that suspicion deprive him of the benefit of the act? May not a man, from want of memory, or presence of mind, omit something at his examination which he may appear afterwards to have known? And since no human being has the power of distinguishing exactly between faults and frailties, may not the defect of his memory be charged on him as a criminal suppression of a known fact? And may not he be left to suffer the consequences of his own confession? Will not the bill give an apparent opportunity for partiality? And will not life and death, liberty and imprisonment, be placed in the hands of a committee of the commons? May they not be easily satisfied with informations of one man, and incessantly press another to farther discoveries? May they not call some men, notoriously criminal, to examination, only to secure them from punishment, and set them out of the reach of justice; and extort from others such answers as may best promote their views, by declaring themselves unsatisfied with the extent of their testimony? And will not this be an extortion of evidence equivalent to the methods practised in the most despotick governments, and the most barbarous nations?
It has always been the praise of this house to pay an equal regard to justice and to mercy, and to follow, without partiality, the direction of reason, and the light of truth; and how consistently with this character, which it ought to be our highest ambition to maintain, we can ratify the present bill, your lordships are this day to consider. It is to be inquired, whether to suppose a man guilty, only because some guilt is suspected, be agreeable to justice; and whether it be rational before there is any proof of a crime, to point out the criminal.
We are to consider, my lords, whether it is not unjust to hear, against any man, an evidence who is hired to accuse him, and hired with a reward which he cannot receive without confessing himself a man unworthy of belief. It is to be inquired, whether the evidence of a man who declares only what he believes, ought to be admitted, when the nature of the crimes allows stronger proof; and whether any man ought to be examined where he cannot be punished if he be found perjured.
A natural and just regard to our own rights, on the preservation of which the continuance of the constitution must depend, ought to, alarm us at the appearance of any attempt to invade them; and the necessity of known forms of justice, ought to incite us to the prevention of any innovation in the methods of prosecuting offenders.
For my own part, my lords, I cannot approve either the principles or form of the bill. I think it necessary to proceed by known precedents, when there is no immediate danger that requires extraordinary measures, of which I am far from being convinced that they are necessary on the present occasion. I think that the certainty of a crime ought to precede the prosecution of a criminal, and I see that there is, in the present case, no crime attempted to be proved. The commons have, in my opinion, already exceeded their privileges, and I would not willingly confirm their new claims. For these reasons, my lords, I openly declare, that I cannot agree to the bill's being read a second time.
Lord TALBOT spoke next, to this effect:—My lords, so high is my veneration for this great assembly, that it is never without the utmost efforts of resolution that I can prevail upon myself to give my sentiments upon any question that is the subject of debate, however strong may be my conviction, or however ardent my zeal.
But in a very particular degree do I distrust my own abilities, when I find my opinion contrary to that of the noble lord who has now spoken; and it is no common perplexity to be reduced to the difficult choice of either suppressing my thoughts, or exposing them to so disadvantageous a contrast.
Yet, since such is my present state, that I cannot avoid a declaration of my thoughts on this question, without being condemned in my own breast as a deserter of my country, nor utter them without the danger of becoming contemptible in the eyes of your lordships; I will, however, follow my conscience, rather than my interest; and though I should lose any part of my little reputation, I shall find an ample recompense from the consciousness that I lost it in the discharge of my duty, on an occasion which requires from every good man the hazard of his life.
The arguments of the noble lord have had upon me an effect which they never, perhaps, produced on any part of his audience before; they have confirmed me in the contrary opinion to that which he has endeavoured to maintain. It has been remarked, that in some encounters, not to be put to flight is to obtain the victory; and, in a controversy with the noble lord, not to be convinced by him, is to receive a sufficient proof that the cause in which he is engaged is not to be defended by wit, eloquence, or learning.
On the present question, my lords, as on all others, he has produced all that can be urged, either from the knowledge of past ages, or experience of the present; all that the scholar or the statesman can supply has been accumulated, one argument has been added to another, and all the powers of a great capacity have been employed, only to show that right and wrong cannot be confounded, and that fallacy can never strike with the force of truth.
When I survey the arguments of the noble lord, disrobed of those ornaments which his imagination has so liberally bestowed upon them, I am surprised at the momentary effect which they had upon my mind, and which they could not have produced had they been clothed in the language of any other person.
For when I recollect, singly, the particular positions upon which his opinion seems to be founded, I do not find them by any means uncontrovertible; some of them seem at best uncertain, and some evidently mistaken.
That there is no apparent crime committed, and that, therefore, no legal inquiry can be made after the criminal, I cannot hear without astonishment. Is our commerce ruined, are our troops destroyed, are the morals of the people vitiated, is the senate crowded with dependants, are our fleets disarmed, our allies betrayed, and our enemies supported without a crime? Was there no certainty of any crime committed, when it was moved to petition his majesty to dismiss this person from his councils for ever.
It
