to consider it as a breach of their scheme, and a deviation from their directions, the whole nation can relate.
Nor is it to be forgotten, sir, how invidiously the minister himself endeavoured to extenuate the honour of that action, by attempting to procure in the address, which was on that occasion presented to his majesty, a suppression of the number of the ships with which he performed it.
In the mean time, sir, the nation expected accounts of the same kind from the Mediterranean, where Haddock was stationed with a very considerable force; but instead of relations of ports bombarded, and towns plundered, of navies destroyed, and villages laid in ashes, we were daily informed of the losses of our merchants, whose ships were taken almost within sight of our squadrons.
We had, indeed, once the satisfaction of hearing that the fleet of Spain was confined in the port of Cadiz, unprovided with provisions, and it was rashly reported that means would either be found of destroying them in the harbour, or that they would be shut up in that unfruitful part of the country, till they should be obliged to disband their crews.
We, therefore, sir, bore with patience the daily havock of our trade, in expectation of the entire destruction of the royal navy of Spain, which would reduce them to despair of resistance, and compel them to implore peace. But while we were flattering ourselves with those pleasing dreams, we were wakened on a sudden with an astonishing account that the Spaniards had left Cadiz, and, without any interruption from the Britons, were taking in provisions at Ferrol.
This disappointment of our expectations did, indeed, discourage us, but not deprive us of hope; we knew that the most politick are sometimes deceived, and that the most vigilant may sometimes relax their attention; we did not expect in our commanders any exemption from human errours, and required only that they should endeavour to repair their failures, and correct their mistakes; and, therefore, waited without clamour, in expectation that what was omitted at Cadiz would be performed at Ferrol.
But no sooner, sir, had the Spaniards stored their fleet, than we were surprised with a revolution of affairs yet more wonderful. Haddock, instead of remaining before Ferrol, was drawn off by some chimerical alarm to protect Minorca, and the Spaniards in the mean time sailed away to America, in conjunction with the French squadron that had been for some time ready for the voyage.
If we consider the absurdity of this conduct, it cannot but be imagined that our minister must send Haddock false intelligence and treacherous directions, on purpose that the Spanish fleet might escape without interruption. For how can it be conceived that the Spaniards could have formed any real design of besieging port Mahon? Was it probable that they would have sent an army, in defenceless transports, into the jaws of the British fleet? and it was well known that they had no ships of war to protect them. It was not very agreeable to common policy to land an army upon an island, an island wholly destitute of provisions for their support, while an hostile navy was in possession of the sea, by which the fortress which their troops were destined to besiege might be daily supplied with necessaries, and the garrison augmented with new forces, while their army would be itself besieged in a barren island, without provisions, without recruits, without hope of succour, or possibility of success.
But such was the solicitude of our admiral for the preservation of Minorca, that he abandoned his station, and suffered the Spaniards to join their confederates of France, and prosecute their voyage to America without hinderance or pursuit.
In America they remained for some time masters of the sea, and confined Vernon to the ports; but want of provisions obliging the French to return, no invasion of our colonies was attempted, nor any of those destructive measures pursued which we had reason to fear, and of which our minister, notwithstanding his wonderful sagacity, could not have foretold that they would have been defeated by an unexpected scarcity of victuals.
The Spaniards, however, gained, by this expedient, time to repair their fortifications, strengthen their garrisons, and dispose their forces in the most advantageous manner; and therefore, though they were not enabled to attack our dominions, had at least an opportunity of securing their own.
At length, sir, lest it should be indisputably evident that our minister was in confederacy with the Spaniards, it was determined, that their American territories should be invaded; but care was taken to disappoint the success of the expedition by employing new-raised troops, and officers without experience, and to make it burdensome to the nation by a double number of officers, of which no use could be discovered, but that of increasing the influence, and multiplying the dependants of the ministry.
It was not thought sufficient, sir, to favour the designs of the Spaniards by the delay which the levy of new troops necessarily produced, and to encourage them by the probability of an easy resistance against raw forces; nor was the nation, in the opinion of the minister, punished for its rebellion against him with adequate severity, by being condemned to support a double number of troops. Some other methods were to be used for embarrassing our preparations and protracting the war.
The troops, therefore, sir, being, by the accident of a hard winter, more speedily raised than it was reasonable to expect, were detained in this island for several months, upon trivial pretences; and were at length suffered to embark at a time when it was well known that they would have much more formidable enemies than the Spaniards to encounter; when the unhealthy season of the American climate must necessarily destroy them by thousands; when the air itself was poison, and to be wounded certainly death.
These were the hardships to which part of our fellow-subjects have been exposed by the tyranny of the minister; hardships which caution could not obviate, nor bravery surmount; they were sent to combat with nature, to encounter with the blasts of disease, and to make war against the elements. They were sent to feed the vultures of America, and to gratify the Spaniards with an easy conquest.
In the passage the general died, and the command devolved upon a man who had never seen an enemy, and was, therefore, only a speculative warriour; an accident, which, as it was not unlikely to happen, would have been provided against by any minister who wished for success. The melancholy event of this expedition I need not mention, it was such as might be reasonably expected; when our troops were sent out without discipline, without commanders, into a country where even the dews are fatal, against enemies informed of their approach, secured by fortifications, inured to the climate, well provided, and skilfully commanded.
In the mean time, sir, it is not to be forgotten what depredations were made upon our trading vessels, with what insolence ships of very little force approached our coasts, and seized our merchants in sight of our fortifications; it is not to be forgotten that the conduct of some of those who owed their revenues and power to the minister, gave yet stronger proofs of a combination.
It is not to be forgotten with what effrontery the losses of our merchants were ridiculed, with what contemptuous triumph of revenge they were charged with the guilt of this fatal war, and how publickly they were condemned to suffer for their folly.
For this reason, sir, they were either denied the security of convoys, or forsaken in the most dangerous parts of the sea, by those to whose protection they were, in appearance, committed. For this reason, they were either hindered from engaging in their voyage by the loss of those men who were detained unactive in the ships of war, or deprived of their crews upon the high seas, or suffered to proceed only to become a prey to the Spaniards.
But it was not, sir, a sufficient gratification of our implacable minister, that the merchants were distressed for alarming the nation; it was thought, likewise, necessary to punish the people for believing too easily the reports of the merchants, and to warn them for ever against daring to imagine themselves able to discern their own interest, or to prescribe other measures to the ministers, than they should be themselves inclined to pursue; our minister was resolved to show them, by a master-stroke, that it was in his power to disappoint their desires, by seeming to comply, and to destroy their commerce and their happiness, by the very means by which they hoped
