the “social motivators” who occupied the leading position in their management – people who were able to unify others and force them to make cooperative sacrifices for common goals.
In the sixteenth century, according to Van Houtte, cities again became attractive for Dutch tradesmen, while in the seventeenth century, the village again attracted the tradesmen. Van Houtte explains this migration in terms of the level of taxation. ¬But taxes are more often imposed by “social motivators” and not by “domain experts”.
This is generally true for any unorganized backgrounds and associations of people. Real democracy is replaced in time by the management by “social motivators”. Eventually this management leads to oppression of “domain experts”, and then, to conflict with them. Without a certain number of “domain experts,” the “social motivators” have nothing to do, no one to exploit, and thus they need to create the conditions that would attract “domain experts” to them again.
On the whole, this oscillating interaction of “social motivators” and “domain experts” has enabled a more tempestuous development of society. This much is clear: this is how compromising conditions of coexistence, an optimal social and economic structure of society, are more quickly worked out between “domain experts” and “social motivators”. In the Netherlands, this oscillating movement of the tradesmen generally enabled growth of labor productivity and the development of industrial relations. This correlates with Holland’s intensive development in those years.
The relationship between “domain experts” and “social motivators”, their oscillating rotation, is likewise the basis of the rotation of the main centers of economic development. Thus, in the Middle Ages there was a competition for primacy in the system of economic relations between Genoa and Venice. Loss of the leadership positions by these city-states was frequently associated with one of the groups of “social motivators” coming into power. As a rule, social motivators come to power under the guise of democracy. This period of exceptional activity of the “social motivators” is a period of intensive development of democracy. But then the “social motivators” have to either lose power under the pressure of the masses, or cede it to the “domain experts”.
The first-generation elite is substantive, objective. The second generation of the elite is filled with social motivators. Without the difficulties that temper it, without the struggle for domination, without reinvention, the third-generation elite becomes emotionalized, hysteroid, and loses the ability to manage society effectively.
This logic of elite formation is valid when the development of society proceeds more or less without conflict. At the same time, internal and external conflicts and problems can introduce large nuances into this development, up to the point of creating the necessary conditions for rapid renovation of the elite, moving intelligent competent people into the elite to renew it, or rapid changes toward creating the necessary abilities in the existing elite.
The coupling of the type of elite and the type of economically active population in a country determines the basic socio-economic processes. Rates of economic development and the nature of relations between various social groups, political processes etc. depend on this. When the combination is detrimental, that is, when the third generation elite and the condition of the population when it mimics emotionalized, psychopathic people, a psychoeconomic crisis occurs.
History shows that this three-generational phenomenon has time limits. It may take up to a hundred years or more, and it may be shorter than 50 years. This does not depend just on the average lifespan (all else being equal, when lifespan increases, the time of three generations also increases on average). It also depends on social factors, on solar activity, on management decisions, on the personality shaping decisions on socioeconomic processes and on the decisions of the government and legislative agencies of the leading countries, and on a system of exogenous factors. The U.S. is a country where the degree of influence of external factors on development is much lower than in most other countries. And here this time interval is more indicative.
The strongest socioeconomic upheaval in the history of the U.S. (which coincided with a solar activity peak) was the Civil War of 1861-1865. The first-generation elite was formed as a result.
Prior to this, the first-generation elite was created during George Washington’s administration (1789-1797). From the beginning of George Washington’s presidency to the beginning of the US Civil War, 72 years passed.
The first-generation elite was formed anew as a result of the Civil War.
This elite grew out of the struggle, out of a violent civil war. At the top of the social hierarchy moved those who were more capable, but not more astute or successful in the system of interpersonal relationships. From the moment the U.S. Civil War began to the moment of the conclusion of the country’s second most powerful socioeconomic conflict (the Great Depression of 1929-1933), 72 years passed. If we add that time to the year of the end of the Civil War in the U.S., we get 1937. This was just as critical a year for the U.S in the opinion of modern economists. Now if we add 72 years to 1937, we get 2009. Although it is generally accepted that a world crisis began in 2008, nevertheless the coincidence of the numbers has a sacred character.
During wars, the succession of the elite psychotypes, the economically active population, and the development of the country obey slightly different laws.
The new first-generation elite in the U.S. likewise grew out of the flames of war. Let us add 72 years to 1945 (or perhaps to 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference). 2017 (plus or minus 3 years) is a time when by analogy with the past, sufficiently compelling reasons may arise to replace the existing elite of the US with a new cohort of people. But much depends on the development of the crisis that has begun and on the managerial decisions being made.
One can argue with these calculations. One can include the depression and crisis of 1873-1896. For this reason one can object that different countries have their endogenous cycles of psychoeconomic crises and that this depression is an example of the influence of Germany’s development (which was in another cycle) on the US and other countries. This is an academic argument. For our purposes, it is important that countries that depend less than others in their development on the influence of neighboring countries have a more stable cycle in their development – three generations of elite and two to three generations of an economically active population. This affected all former world economic centers (Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam etc.). This affected the development of countries like the U.S. and U.S.S.R., that is, countries that depended on external factors less than others.
It is possible to insist that one must count from the conclusion of an event that serves as a sign of transition of government from one type of elite to another. We can and must maintain that wars deform the process. All this is true. In support of what has been claimed, it is interesting to note that since 1917, when the Bolsheviks came into power in Russia, until 1991, when the now-ruling political powers, the elite, came into power, 74 years passed. One may also object by insisting on 1989, when the CPSS in power fell. Then we likewise obtain 72 years. We may talk about what the events are that our consciousness connects to the arrival of the new elite, the loss of power of one elite and its interception by another. But real changes occur more under the influence of cumulative causes, that is, a large aggregation of microreasons. In the historical process, much is accidental, which carries its own corrections to the effects of cumulative causes. However, the peaks of solar activity arise quite consistently at a 12-year interval (plus or minus 1-3 years).
On average the power of the third-generation elite passes to the first-generation elite under the influence of endogenous factors in 72 years. Wars, revolutions, and exogenous factors may deform these processes. Then the new cycle “becomes attached” to the regular cycle of solar activity, but the 72-year period amazingly stably proves itself in the cyclical development of history.
On the basis of this, two peaks of solar activity fall on the first-generation elite, two
