The Bay State Monthly. Volume 2, No. 6, March, 1885. Various
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And even as she sows she reaps.
God bless her to the last!
Major General Lew Wallace At Shiloh
[Author of "Battles of the American Revolution."]
It seems common to all great wars that the true version of leading actions is rarely assured by the immediate reports of commanders. Many causes secure to such reports substantial accuracy, but the development of details seldom fails to show that justice to subordinates cannot be done by the simple statement of general plans and general results. There are historians who still claim that Arnold had no part in the battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777; and many other battles of the Revolutionary war lacked clear definition until nearly a century had passed and the records were supplemented by careful examination of the battle-fields and a more thorough scrutiny of British, French, and Hessian archives, thereby to correct topographical data and harmonize conflicting statements.
The case of General Fitz John Porter forcibly illustrates the difficulty of changing public opinion, once formed, even when supplemental data enforce military recognition of their value. The Battle of Franklin, which secured to General Thomas the opportunity to fortify Nashville and ultimately defeat Hood, and the battles of Stone River, Gettysburg, Chicamauga and Monocacy, are among the actions of the late war in which differences of statement as to positions and movements have greatly qualified first estimates of the relations which various officers sustained to those actions.
The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, has been the latest under scrutiny. It is not the purpose to consider whether the action of the day was influenced by the arrival of Buel's army, or by the non-arrival of General Lew Wallace's division; nor whether General Wallace did, or did not, march by scientific methods, when he moved for the nearest firing. Among voluminous papers touching the civil war are the copies of original papers received from General Wallace himself, and of present interest. These papers received notice from the Western press at one time, but seem to demand a more formal record, as essential factors in the better understanding of the Battle of Shiloh.
The following outline is suggested by these documents:
1st. That the Federal line of battle, early in the morning, stretched out from Pittsburg Landing nearly to the Purdy Road, with General Sherman's division on the right, within about a mile of that road.
2nd. That General Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, not more than five miles from Pittsburg Landing; it being then uncertain which of the two would be the objective of attack.
3d. That General Grant visited General Wallace at Crump's Landing and ordered him to hold his command subject to orders, and then steamed onward to Pittsburg Landing.
4th. That before 6 o'clock, A.M., the sound of firing had led General Wallace to put his command under arms; and he was prepared to move wherever active work should demand, even before he was ordered to be thus ready.
5th. That he concentrated his brigades, then in three camps, into one mass, at the forks of the Purdy Road and the road to Pittsburg Landing, so that he might take either road, as orders should decide.
6th. That he understood the original line of battle and the disposition of its divisions, and knew that General Sherman held the right.
7th. That the order received by him, before 12 o'clock, M., from Captain Baxter, staff officer of General Grant, was in writing; and while pronounced verbally, at first, the form it assumed, when reduced to writing and subsequently delivered to General Wallace, was a direct order to "unite with the right," and that involved the march on the Purdy Road.
If the verbal order of General Grant to Captain Baxter, to hasten General Wallace's Division to Pittsburg Landing, was reduced to writing by that officer, after he noticed the early success of the Union Line, he would have shaped the approach of the fresh division to the best possible advantage, to join the army, not the precise Landing, if the army was not there; since General Grant, still being on crutches from a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work conflict.
8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General Wallace and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving the enemy at every point.
9th. That a movement at that time, toward Pittsburg Landing, would have taken General Wallaces' Division out of possible contact with the enemy, instead of supporting, and perfecting victory.
10th. That when the Division of General Wallace moved, as it did, within ten minutes after receipt of the orders, "impatiently waited for," it could see the distant smoke and hear the roar of battle, and moved directly toward the point of danger by the shortest route, with the greatest celerity and in harmony with the order received.
11th. That the defeat of the main army, the enforced retirement of Sherman's Division, and, in fact, the withdrawal of the entire original line, were new conditions, to be considered, when other Staff Officers notified General Wallace of the same; and then, the addition of his division to the rallying army, at Pittsburg Landing, seemed to be an important element to the very safety of that army, except as it could lean upon the divisions of Buel, already within supporting distance.
12th. That the original advance of General Wallace's Division on the Purdy Road, while thoroughly suited to the original conditions as they existed when the order was delivered to him, was, of necessity, useless and dangerous, when he found himself alone and unsupported, and that the enemy had already swept over the position which he expected to occupy.
13th. That there was no alternative, then, but to pass around the left of the enemy, and rejoin the army, at such expense of time or labor as the new conditions imposed; and that this was done, at great pains and with great celerity, without straggling or loss.
14th. That the prominent idea of withdrawing General Wallace's Division from Crump's Landing, to support the main army in its advance, is to be kept in mind;—whereby, confusion ceases as to the hour of the day when the order to report at Pittsburg Landing was delivered or became operative;—thereby, also, reconciling memories with the incidents of the day, with no discredit to any.
15th. That every theory of supporting an advanced line, from reserves sent forward from the base, must so bend to facts, that it may be the best thing possible, to strengthen the right of a successful line, even to overlapping and turning the enemy; and that such a movement has the emphatic endorsement of standard critics, and marked experience; while a formal movement to the rear, in order to move to the front and the right, as if on parade, would, under conditions such as presented to General Wallace, have been, simply, to wear out his men in marching, with small chance for taking any part in the assumed pursuit of a defeated enemy.
16th. That it is an unsound way of dealing with the facts of history, to gauge the responsibilities of officers and men, of small experience, by the rules which apply to the same officers and men after their experience has matured; and that, when the battle of Shiloh took place, and citizen regiments took part, with very slight knowledge of arms, it was equally true, that the officers themselves, both regular and volunteer, were proportionately unfamiliar with battle action on a large scale, and that, as a matter of fact, the Generals and Colonels, for the most part, had never seen a batallion drill, unless at West Point, much less drilled more than a company; and their conduct and opinions, in 1861-2, are not to be measured