The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939–1945. Max Hastings
Чтение книги онлайн.
Читать онлайн книгу The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939–1945 - Max Hastings страница 35
At the height of the Luftwaffe Blitz on Britain two FBI agents, Hugh Clegg and Clarence Hince, visited London to study ‘law enforcement in time of war’. Guy Liddell of MI5 thought that while the visitors looked somewhat thuggish, Clegg seemed ‘a very good fellow’. Such warmth was not reciprocated. On their return, the two men delivered to Hoover a report depicting the British, explicitly MI5 and the Metropolitan Police, in terms of withering scorn. They complained that it was difficult to arrange meetings before 10 a.m. or after 4 p.m. because ‘the transport situation is very difficult, you know’. They said that ‘The fact “exploratory luncheons” were usually two hours in length made our working day rather limited, particularly when compared to the customary hours that officials of the FBI are engaged in official business.’ They concluded that the British ‘might win the war if they find it convenient’. This report set the tone for the FBI’s view of the British for decades thereafter.
In January 1941, when an American codebreaking team – two army, two navy – paid a pioneering visit to Britain, they brought with them a remarkably generous gift: a mimicked Purple machine, of which a second copy was handed over later. The British, however, reciprocated cautiously. With Winston Churchill’s explicit sanction they admitted the visitors to Bletchley, and explained the Hut system. They revealed the bombes, GC&CS’s most critical innovation, but thereafter prevaricated about fulfilling American requests to be given an example of what Washington described as ‘a cypher-solving machine’. There were very good reasons for this – the US was not in the war, and the bombes were scarce pearls. The Americans recognised that they had seen in action a system way ahead of anything the US armed forces were doing. Alfred McCormack, who became the secretary for war’s special assistant on comint, said later of Bletchley: ‘It’s not good – it’s superb.’
Some people in Washington, however, were irked by apparent British pusillanimity. They themselves made little serious headway in reading Enigma traffic until floodgates opened in 1943, and – in the words of an exasperated British officer – ‘showed no appreciation of the extent of the problems facing Bletchley Park and Britain’. The Park’s Washington representative, Captain Edward Hastings, reported in November 1941 that ‘there is grave unrest and dissatisfaction about free exchange of special intelligence’. Some Americans were doggedly convinced that the British were holding out on them. As late as December 1942, when Alan Turing visited the US, he was denied admission to the Bell Laboratories in revenge for alleged British foot-dragging about collaboration, and was finally allowed inside only after a huge and protracted transatlantic row. Although William Friedman later forged warm personal relations with BP’s senior personnel, he himself made his first visit to Britain only in May 1943, about the time a formal and indeed historic intelligence-sharing pact was agreed between the two nations. Meanwhile collaboration remained wary and incomplete. Even after Pearl Harbor, Bletchley and its owners remained fearful not only about American security shortcomings, but also about the danger that this brightest jewel in the imperial crown might somehow be snatched from them by the boundlessly rich, irresistibly dominant new partner in the Grand Alliance. Alastair Denniston wrote that for Britain Ultra was ‘almost lifeblood’, whereas the Americans seemed to view Enigma, with the detachment of distance and freedom from mortal peril, merely as ‘a new and very interesting problem’.
The War Office’s deputy director of military intelligence wrote on 17 February 1942, ten weeks after Pearl Harbor, that in talking to the Americans, ‘the general policy is to be as frank as possible but no information will be given regarding our own future operations, or sources of information, nor will any information be passed which emanates from special most secret sources [Ultra]’. On 16 March the cabinet secretary Sir Edward Bridges wrote a memorandum warning that telephone conversations between London and Washington ‘still reveal instances of gross [American] lack of discretion’. Stewart Menzies and his officers at MI6 remained reluctant to open their hearts and files to their new brothers-in-arms.
Unfortunately, the British obfuscation which persisted through much of 1942 prompted misunderstandings and mounting anger among some Americans. These crystallised around a belief – entirely mistaken – that Bletchley had broken into the U-boat Shark key, but was refusing to tell the US Navy about it. Op-20-G’s eventual exasperated riposte to Bletchley’s unwillingness to surrender a bombe was to announce in September 1942 – and to begin to fulfil in August the following year – its own commitment to build four-rotor models by the hundred. This was a time when the British had just thirty-two. The American machines proved technically superior to the British models, and also more reliable: in October 1943 thirty-nine were operational and by December seventy-five, though by the time these became operational much of their capacity proved superfluous to US Navy needs.
In the early war years, British intelligence collaboration with the US was cautious; only from 1943 onwards did it become wholehearted. As with so much else about Anglo–American relations, however, it is less surprising that there was so much squabbling at the outset, in the years of Allied defeat, than that the partnership eventually achieved the intimacy that it did, in the years of victory.
* The Type-X was developed in 1934 by Wing-Commander O.C. Lywood and Ernest Smith of Air Ministry Signals, improving upon a borrowed commercial Enigma, and entered British service three years later.
4
1 ‘LUCY’S’ PEOPLE
The extraordinary incident of the Kremlin’s dogs in the night was that they barked, and barked. Operation ‘Barbarossa’, the June 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, was the defining event of the Second World War – and its most baffling, because it achieved surprise when its imminence was manifest. It was a tribute to the length and strength of Stalin’s arm that humint – agents of influence abroad – provided him with comprehensive warnings. As early as July 1940, NKVD men operating in German-occupied Poland were reporting intense Wehrmacht activity, barrack-building and troop movements. That autumn, he instructed Centre to open a special file on Hitler’s intentions codenamed ‘Zateya’ – ‘Venture’. In September this showed massive German redeployments close to the Russian border, together with continuing construction of troop accommodation. The Germans’ Moscow embassy was reported by a Soviet agent within its walls to be striving to recruit White Russians and intellectual dissidents for the Abwehr. In November 1940 Stalin was told that eighty-five divisions, comprising more than two-thirds of Hitler’s infantry, were deployed along the Russian frontier.
During the months that followed, however, some of these troops were shifted to threaten, and then to occupy, Romania and Greece. Neither in 1941 nor since have most Westerners grasped the intensity of Stalin’s conviction that Hitler’s ambitions were focused on the Balkans, where Russia also had vital interests. Nor do they acknowledge the depth of his hatred and distrust of Britain. It was barely twenty years since Winston Churchill had led a crusade to reverse the Bolshevik Revolution by force of arms. Stalin saw himself, by no means mistakenly, as the object of a sustained Churchillian campaign to drive a wedge into his pact with Hitler and force him to fight Germany, against Russia’s interests and in pursuit of those of the British Empire.
The master of the Kremlin recognised that war between the Nazis and the Soviet Union might ultimately prove unavoidable. An August 1940 GRU report, quoting Hitler’s ambassador in Belgrade, showed that this was certainly the other party’s view: ‘For Germany the Balkans are the most significant asset and ought to be included in the [Nazi-controlled] new order of Europe; but since the USSR would never agree to that, a war with her is inevitable.’ Stalin, however, remained convinced that it was overwhelmingly against Hitler’s