The Political Works of Thomas Hobbes (4 Books in One Edition). Thomas Hobbes
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10. But concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over those who were already converted and within the church, there be that think it greater than over them without. For some have said (Bellarmin. Lib. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29): Though the law of Christ deprive no prince of his dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal to Caesar, whilst kings were infidels and out of the church; yet when they became Christians, and of their own accord underwent the laws of the gospel, presently as sheep to a shepherd, and as members to the head, they became subject to the prelate of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Which, whether it be true or not, is to be considered by that light which we have from the Holy Scripture, concerning the power of our Saviour and his apostles, over such as they had converted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the commonwealth of the Jews in his magistrates, the twelve and the seventy; so did he also in the censure of the church, which was excommunication; but amongst the Jews, the church did put the excommunicated persons from the congregation, which they might do by their power temporal; but our Saviour and his apostles, who took upon them no such power, could not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place and congregation, into which he was permitted to enter by the prince, or sovereign of the place; for that had been to deprive the sovereign of his authority. and therefore the excommunication of a person subject to an earthly power, was but a declaration of the church, which did excommunicate, that the person so excommunicated was to be reputed still as an infidel, but not to be driven by their authority out of any company he might otherwise lawfully come into. And this is it our Saviour saith, Matth. 18, 17: If he refuseth to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. So that the whole effect of excommunicating a Christian prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate him, depart, and banish themselves out of his dominion. Nor can they thereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him; for that were to deprive him of his dominion, which they may not do; for being out of the church, it is confessed by them that make this objection, and proved in the former section, that our Saviour gave no authority to his apostles to be judges over them. And therefore in no case can the sovereign power of a commonwealth be subject to any authority ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself. And though he be informed concerning the kingdom of heaven, and subject himself thereto at the persuasions of persons ecclesiastical, yet is not he thereby subject to their government and rule. For if it were by their authority he took that yoke upon him, and not by their persuasion, then by the same authority he might cast it off; but this is unlawful. For if all the churches in the world should renounce the Christian faith, yet is not this sufficient authority for any of the members to do the same. It is manifest therefore that they who have sovereign power, are immediate rulers of the church under Christ, and all others but subordinate to them. If that were not, but kings should command one thing upon pain of death, and priests another upon pain of damnation, it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand together.
11. And therefore there is no just cause for any man to withdraw his obedience from the sovereign state, upon pretence that Christ hath ordained any state ecclesiastical above it. And though kings take not upon them the ministerial priesthood (as they might if it pleased them) yet are they not so merely laic, as not to have sacerdotal jurisdiction. To conclude this chapter: since God speaketh not in these days to any man by his private interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the interpretation of any power, above, or not depending on the sovereign power of every commonwealth; it remaineth that he speaketh by his vice-gods, or lieutenants here on earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings, or such as have sovereign authority as well as they.
Chapter 27: Of the Causes of Rebellion
1. Hitherto of the causes why, and the manner how, men have made commonwealths. In this chapter I shall show briefly, by what causes, and in what manner, they be again destroyed; not meaning to say anything concerning the dissolution of a commonwealth from foreign invasions, which is as it were the violent death thereof, I shall speak only of sedition, which is also the death of the commonwealth, but like to that which happeneth to a man from sickness and distemper. To dispose men to sedition three things concur. The first is discontent; for as long as a man thinketh himself well, and that the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his proceeding from well to better; it is impossible for him to desire the change thereof. The second is pretence of right; for though a man be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause of stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor any pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will never show it. The third is hope of success; for it were madness to attempt without hope, when to fail is to die the death of a traitor. Without these three: discontent, pretence, and hope, there can be no rebellion; and when the same are all together, there wanteth nothing thereto, but a man of credit to set up the standard, and to blow the trumpet.
2. And as for discontent, it is of two sorts: for it consisteth either in bodily pain present or expected, or else in trouble of the mind (which is the general division of pleasure and pain, Part I. chap. VII, sect. 9). The presence of bodily pain disposeth not to sedition; the fear of it doth. As for example: when a great multitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a crime worthy of death, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for fear thereof. So also the fear of want, or in present want the fear of arrests and imprisonment, dispose to sedition. And therefore great exactions, though the right thereof be acknowledged, have caused great seditions. As in the time of Henry VII. the seditions of the Cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct of the Lord Audley, gave the King battle upon Blackheath; and that of the northern people, who in the same king's time, for demanding a subsidy granted in parliament, murdered the Earl of Northumberland in his house.
3. Thirdly, the other sort of discontent which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger of violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power, and that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto them. For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said, Part I. chap. IX, sect. 21) in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take it ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postponed to those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability to govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as slaves. Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and rule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common; and that can be no where but in the popular state, or democracy. And Aristotle saith well (lib. 6, cap. 2 of his Politics), The ground or intention of a democracy, is liberty; which he confirmeth in these words: For men ordinarily say this: that no man can partake of liberty, but only in a popular commonwealth. Whosoever therefore in a monarchical estate, where the sovereign power is absolutely in one man, claimeth liberty, claimeth (if the hardest construction should be made thereof) either to have the sovereignty in his turn, or to be colleague with him that hath it, or to have the monarchy changed into a democracy. But if the