be by draft—and that those who are not drawn should contribute a Dollar or two Dollars a Man to him on whom the lot falls.—something of this kind would proportion the Burthen, and those who are drawn would have something either to encourage them to go, or to provide a substitute with—After closing this Letter I shall go again to Fort Mifflin; all was safe there on the 27th, but from some preparations of the Enemy they expect another attack somewhere.
"The enclosed return of provision and Stores is taken from an account signed by Burgoyne and sent to Ld. George Germain. I have not time to Copy the whole. Burgoyne closes his Letter as follows, 'By a written account found in the Commissary's House at Ticonderoga Six thousand odd hundred Persons were fed from the Magazine the day before the evacuation.'
"I am Dear Sir, Yr. Affectionate Hble. Servt.
"T. Paine. "Respectful Compts. to Friends.
"If the Congress has the Capitulation and Particulars of ye Surrender, they do an exceeding wrong thing by not publishing ym. because they subject the whole Affair to Suspicion."3
Had this proposal of Paine, with regard to Bur-goyne's capitulation, been followed at once, a blot on the history of our Revolution might have been prevented. The time required to march the prisoners to Boston and prepare the transports would have given England opportunity to ratify the articles of capitulation. Washington, with characteristic inability to see injustice in anything advantageous to America, desired Congress to delay in every possible way the return of the prisoners to England, "since the most virtuous adhesion to the articles would not prevent their replacing in garrison an equal number of soldiers who might be sent against us." The troops were therefore delayed on one pretext and another until Burgoyne declared that "the publick faith is broke." Congress seized on this remark to resolve that the embarkation should be suspended until an "explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be properly ratified by the Court of Great Britain." This resolution, passed January 8, 1778, was not communicated to Burgoyne until February 4th. If any one should have suffered because of a remark made in a moment of irritation it should have been Burgoyne himself; but he was presently allowed to proceed to England, while his troops were retained,—a confession that Burgoyne's casual complaint was a mere pretext for further delay. It may be added that the English government behaved to its surrendered soldiers worse than Congress. The question of ratifying the Saratoga Convention was involved in a partisan conflict in Parliament, the suffering prisoners in America were forgotten, and they were not released until the peace,—five years after they had marched "with the honours of war," under a pledge of departure conceded by Gen. Gates in reply to a declaration that unless conceded they would "to a man proceed to any act of desperation sooner than submit."
Concerning this ugly business there is a significant silence in Paine's public writings. He would not have failed to discuss the matter in his Crisis had he felt that anything honorable to the American name or cause could be made out of it.4
In his letter to Hon. R. H. Lee (October 30, 1777) Paine mentions that he is about leaving the head-quarters near Philadelphia for Fort Mifflin. Mr. Asa Bird Gardener, of New York, who has closely studied Paine's military career, writes me some account of it.
"Major-Gen. Greene was charged with the defence of the Delaware, and part of Brig.-Gen. Varnum's brigade was placed in garrison at Fort Mercer, Red Bank, and at Fort Mifflin, Mud Island. A bloody and unsuccessful assault was made by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians on Fort Mercer, defended by the 1 st and 2d Reg'ts. R. I. Continental Inf'y. The entire British fleet was then brought up opposite Fort Mifflin, and the most furious cannonade, and most desperate but finally unsuccessful defence of the place was made. The entire works were demolished, and most of the garrison killed and wounded. Major-Gen. Greene being anxious for the garrison and desirous of knowing its ability to resist sent Mr. Paine to ascertain. He accordingly went to Fort Mercer, and from thence, on Nov. 9 (1777) went with Col. Christopher Greene, commanding Fort Mercer, in an open boat to Fort Mifflin, during the cannonade, and were there when the enemy opened with two-gun batteries and a mortar battery. This very gallant act shows what a fearless man Mr. Paine was, and entitles him to the same credit for service in the Revolution as any Continental could claim."
1. MS., for which I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, Philadelphia.
2. Pa. Arch., 1779, p. 659. Paine at once set to work: p. 693, 694.
3. I am indebted for this letter to Dr. John S. H. Fogg of Boston. It bears the superscription: "Honbl. Richd. Henry Lee Esq. (in Congress) York Town. Forwarded by yr humble Servt. T. Matlack, Nov. 1, 1777." Endorsed in handwriting of Lee: "Oct: 1777. Mr. Paine, Author of 'Common Sense.'"
4. Professor Fiske ("Am. Revolution," i., p. 341) has a ferocious attack on Congress for breaking faith in this matter, but no doubt he has by this time read, in Ford's "Writings of Washington," (vol. vi.) the letters which bring his attack on the great commander's own haloed head.
{1778}
The succession of mistakes, surprises, panics, which occasioned the defeats before Philadelphia and ended in the occupation of that city by the British general, seriously affected the reputation of Washington. Though Paine believed that Washington's generalship had been at fault (as Washington himself probably did1), he could utter nothing that might injure the great cause. He mistrusted the singleness of purpose of Washington's opponents, and knew that the commander-in-chief was as devoted as himself to the American cause, and would never surrender it whatever should befall. While, therefore, the intrigues were going on at Yorktown, Pennsylvania, whither Congress had retreated, and Washington with his ill-fed and ill-clad army were suffering at Valley Forge, Paine was writing his fifth Crisis, which had the most happy effect. It was dated at Lancaster, March 121, 1778. Before that time (February 19th) General Gates had made his peace with Washington, and the intrigue was breaking up, but gloom and dissatisfaction remained. The contrast between the luxurious "Tories" surrounding Howe in Philadelphia, and Washington's wretched five thousand at Valley Forge, was demoralizing the country. The first part of this Crisis, addressed "to General Sir William Howe," pointed wrangling patriots to the common enemy; the second, addressed "to the inhabitants of America," sounded a note of courage, and gave good reasons for it. Never was aid more artistic than that Paine's pen now gave Washington. The allusions to him are incidental, there is no accent of advocacy. While mentioning "the unabated fortitude of a Washington," he lays a laurel on the brow of Gates, on that of Herkimer, and even on the defeated. While belittling all that Howe had gained, telling him that in reaching Philadelphia, he "mistook a trap for a conquest," he reunites Washington and Gates, in the public mind, by showing the manoeuvres of the one near Philadelphia part of the other's victory at Saratoga. It is easy for modern eulogists of Washington to see this, but when Paine said it,—apparently aiming only to humiliate Howe,—the sentence was a sunbeam parting a black cloud. Coming from a member of Greene's staff, from an author whose daring at Fort Mifflin had made him doubly a hero; from the military correspondent of the Pennsylvania Council, and the Secretary of the Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs,—Paine's optimistic view of the situation had immense effect. He hints his official knowledge that Britain's "reduced strength and exhausted coffers in a three years' war with America hath given a powerful superiority to France and Spain," and advises Americans to leave wrangling to the enemy. "We never had so small an army to fight against, nor so fair an opportunity
