An officer on one of the flotillas has described that uneasy darkness. " We couldn't tell what was happening. Every now and then out of the silence would come bang, bang, boom, as hard as it could go for ten minutes on end. The flash of the guns lit up the whole sky for miles and miles, and the noise was far more penetrating than by day. Then you would see a great burst of flame from some poor devil, as the searchlight switched on and off, and then perfect silence once more." The searchlights at times made the sea as white as marble on which the destroyers moved " black," wrote an eye witness, " as cockroaches on a floor."
At earliest dawn on June 1st, the British Fleet, which was lying south and west of the Horn Reef, turned northward to collect its light craft and to search for the enemy. But the enemy was not to be found. Partly he had already slipped in single ships astern of our fleet during the night; partly he was then engaged in moving homewards like a flight of wild duck that has been scattered by shot. He was greatly helped by the weather, which at dawn on June 1st was thicker than the night before, the visibility being less than four miles. About 4 o'clock a Zeppelin passed over the British Fleet and no doubt by wireless signalled to any remaining German units where lay the safe passage. All morning till 11 o'clock Sir John Jellicoe waited on the battlefield, watching the lines of approach to German ports and attending the advent of the enemy. But no enemy came. " I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion," wrote Sir John, " that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port." Till 1.15 p.m. the British fleet swept the seas, picking up survivors from some of the lost destroyers. After that hour waiting was useless, so the fleet sailed for its bases, which were reached next day, Friday, 2nd June. There it fueled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 that evening was ready for further action.
RESULTS.
The German Fleet, being close to its bases, was able to publish at once its own version of the battle. A resounding success was a political necessity for Germany, and it is likely that she would have claimed a victory if any remnant of her fleets had reached harbour. As it was she was over-joyed at having escaped annihilation, and the magnitude of her jubilation may be taken as the measure of her fears. It is of the nature of a naval action that it gives ample scope for fiction. There are no spectators. Victory and defeat are not followed, as in a land battle, by a gain or loss of ground. A well-disciplined country with a strict censorship can frame any tale it pleases, and stick to it for months without fear of detection at home. Therefore Germany claimed at once a decisive success. According to her press the death blow had been given to Britain's command of the sea. The Kaiser soared into the realms of poetry :—" The gigantic fleet of Albion, ruler of the seas, which since Trafalgar for a hundred years has imposed on the whole world a bond of sea-tyranny, and has surrounded itself with a nimbus of invincibleness, came into the field. That gigantic Armada approached, and our fleet engaged it. The British Fleet was beaten. The first great hammer blow was struck, and the nimbus of British world supremacy disappeared." Germany announced trivial losses —one old battle ship, Pommern, three small cruisers Wiesbaden, Elbing and Frauenlob, and five destroyers.
It is a striking tribute to the prestige of the British Navy that the German fairy tale was received with incredulity in all Allied and in most neutral countries. In a small mountain village in the Apennines, the inhabitants of which, owing to economic difficulties, had small enthusiasm for the war, the news arrived that the British Navy had been beaten. " That is a lie " was the unanimous decision of the village. " Nothing on earth can defeat the British Navy." But false news, once it has started, may be dangerous, and in some quarters in America, even among friends of the Allies, there was at first a disposition to accept the German version. The ordinary man is apt to Judge of a battle, on land or sea, by the crude test of losses. The British Admiralty announced its losses at once with a candour which may have been undiplomatic, but which revealed a proud confidence in the invulnerability of the navy and the steadfastness of the British people. These losses were : one first class battle cruiser, Queen Mary ; two lesser battle cruisers, Indefatigable and Invincible; three armoured cruisers, Defence, Black Prince and Warrior ; and eight destroyers, Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Nestor, Nomad and Turbulent. More vital than the ships, was the loss of many gallant men and officers, including some of the most distinguished of the younger Admirals and Captains.
Even if Germany's version of her losses had been true it is scarcely necessary to say that they were heavier than Britain's in proportion to her total strength at sea. But her version was not true ; it was not half the truth. The port of Wilhelmshaven was closed to the world that no man might verify the actual casualties. It is probable that Pommern, whose loss was admitted, was not the old Pommern of that name which was believed to have been sunk by Commander Max Horton in the previous July, but a new first-class battle ship. It is not yet possible to estimate the total German losses, owing to the conditions of low visibility during the day battle, and the approach of darkness before the action was completed. Sir John Jellicoe, basing his calculation upon the results of careful enquiries, issued a list that in his opinion gave the minimum as to numbers. According to this list Germany lost two battle ships of the largest class, and one of the Deutschland type ; one battle cruiser ; five light cruisers, one of which may have been a battle ship ; six destroyers and one submarine. These were certain and observed losses. In addition, one first-class battle ship, one battle cruiser and three destroyers were seen to be so severely hit that in all likelihood they went down before reaching harbour. It should further be remembered that many of the ships which escaped were so seriously damaged by gun fire and torpedo attack that they would not be available for many months. The German fleet returned to the Elbe bases, lacking some of its finest ships, and with most of the remainder out of action.
REAR-ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT K. REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. HORACE ARBUTHNOT, Bt., C.B., M.V.O. L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.
(Killed in Action.) (Killed in Action )
REAR-ADMIRAL H. EVAN-THOMAS, C.B., M.V.O.
It is only the ignorant who imagine that the loss of a few ships could mean a weakening of British naval prestige. A fleet, if it is to be better than scrap iron, must be risked gallantly when occasion offers. The real test of success is the fulfilment of a strategic intention. What was Germany's aim ? Her major purpose was to destroy the British command of the sea. In that she never came near succeeding. From the moment of von Scheer's return to port the British fleet held the sea and is still holding it. The blockade which Germany thought to break was drawn tighter than ever. Her secondary aim was so to weaken the British Fleet that it should be more nearly on an equality with her own. Again she completely failed, and the margin of British superiority was in no way impaired. Lastly she hoped to isolate and destroy a British division. That, too, failed. The British Battle Cruiser fleet is to-day a living and effective force while the German Battle Cruiser fleet is only a shadow. The result of the battle of May 31st was that
Britain was more confirmed than ever in her mastery of the ocean. Its effect on the campaign at large was at once apparent. Russia was established in her control of the Eastern Baltic, and Germany's grandiose scheme for aiding her Eastern campaign by sea perished in the smoke of the Jutland battle.
One word must be said upon British tactics and strategy. From a technical point of view the battle appears as an example of a tactical division of a fleet, undertaken in order to coax a laggard enemy to battle. Such a plan has, of course, its own risks, but without risks no Admiral or General has ever won success. Criticism and discussion inevitably follow all naval actions, unless, as in the case of Nelson's three battles, they are so obviously conclusive that argument is futile. But if the Battle of Jutland had not the dramatic close of Trafalgar or the Nile, yet, in a true sense, it was decisive. It defeated, utterly defeated,
