to oxen?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?
Euth. True.
Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the ox herd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?
Euth. Certainly, not for their hurt.
Soc. But for their good?
Euth. Of course.
Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euth. No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
Soc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I mean.
Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?
Euth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
Soc. I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object—would you not say of health?
Euth. I should.
Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to the building of a house?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.
Euth. And I speak the truth, Socrates.
Soc. Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our ministrations?
Euth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. Soc. Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one?
Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning, how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety, is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn, aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you by this time the—nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads—I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a, sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?
Euth. Yes, Socrates.
Soc. Upon this view, then piety is a science of asking and giving?
Euth. You understand me capitally, Socrates.
Soc. Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no, in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.
Euth. Very true, Socrates.
Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?
Euth. That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.
Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts?
Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods?
Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases them?
Soc. Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?
Euth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.
Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten?
Euth.
